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Wrong life cannot be lived rightly. 
Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia 
What is it called, your country, 
Behind the mountain, behind the year? 
Paul Celan, Es ist alles anders 
In those areas that we are working in, cognition exists only flash-like. 
The text is the long rumbling thunder. 
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades-Project 
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Abstract 
The aim of this research project is to analyse forms of remembrance and 
memory of the Shoah in Germany in its and their political and cultural 
formations. The underlying question driving the research project is Adorno's 
famous essay 'What does it mean: coming-to-terms with the past? ''. The thesis 
deals with historical-philosophical reflections and the historical-literary 
perspective on the complex process of remembering the Shoah in Germany and 
its monumental manifestations in the form of the planned Holocaust Memorial in 
Berlin. The research project sets out to critique and analyse a body of artistic, 
literary and philosophical works that engage with the problematics of 
remembering and re-presenting the Shoah. It explores these critical questions 
against the backdrop of the changed social and historical conditions of the re- 
united Germany and makes reference to the debates of the 1990s, the planned 
Holocaust Memorial in Berlin and the wider context of post-Holocaust discourse. 
The first chapter delivers an exegetical reading of Walter Benjamin's texts 
in order to open up new interpretative perspectives for an understanding of the 
issues at stake. Benjamin's notions of 'history' and 'memory' serve as ideas for a 
comparative analysis of the problematics of memory in the country of the 
perpetrators and for the possibilities of future memory. 
The second chapter discusses the decision-making process for a 
national, central 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe' in Berlin; it explores 
the winning designs of the competition and their respective implications on what 
constitutes the memory of the Shoah in Germany. The decision for a central 
memorial and the implications of the chosen design are measured against the 
backdrop of the debates of the 1990s and the politics of a re-united Germany. 
The third chapter discusses the different attempts of literary and (historical-)philosophical reflection on the occurrence of the Shoah in the 
writings of Thomas Mann, Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers and Alexander and 
Margarete Mitscherlich. The chapter questions the political positioning and 
action of the author Martin Walser, as a representative of the generation of 
perpetrators, to the process of working-through and coming-to-terms. It critically 
examines Walser's speech of October 1998 and places the speech in the 
historical context of coming-to-terms in post-war Germany. 
The thesis demonstrates that the choice of design. for the planned 
Holocaust Memorial correlates with the status of politics in the united Germany. 
It is argued here that the focus on what it is that needs to be worked through and 
come to terms with, has shifted during the post-Holocaust discourse. The thesis 
demonstrates that the questions at stake in the most recent debates are the 
workings-through of a younger generation that confronts part of a horrifying 
family history. The thesis argues for the necessity of memory and remembrance 
in the future. 
1 ADORNO, Theodor W., 1997. Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit? '. »Ob nach 
Auschwitz noch sich leben lasse«: Ein philosophisches Lesebuch (Leipzig: Suhrkamp) 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
The aim of my research project is to analyse forms of remembrance and 
memory of the Shoah in Germany in its political and cultural formations. The 
post-Holocaust discourse in Germany appears to be strongly focused on the 
historical-philosophical and political perspective and, at times, is even 
ideologically motivated. The starting point of this research project is the fierce 
and passionate debates that Germany witnessed shortly before the turn of the 
millennium in the 1990s. In more or less regular intervals since the end of the 
National Socialist Regime, (West) Germany has led intense and passionate 
debates about the nation's self-understanding, self-esteem and its relation to its 
own past; from the process of de-Nazification and the Nuremberg Trials 
(1945146) to the Auschwitz Trial (1963-1965) and the debates on the statues of 
limitations (1960); from the reparation payments treaty and the Historian Dispute 
(1986) to the compensation of forced labour, the recent controversy around the 
planned Holocaust Memorial in Berlin and the Walser-Bubis Debate. In its 
representation and remembrance of the Holocaust, Germany struggles to define 
its own strategies of memory in view of its role as the perpetrating nation; it fails 
to reflect upon its own involvement as perpetrator. However, the educational 
aspect of remembering the Shoah for the sake of future generations is often 
stressed. 
After the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989 and the 
dramatic and rapid re-unification in 1990, the problematics of a new national 
identity against the backdrop of the double history of National Socialism and the 
I 
GDR state were addressed in lengthy debates. In the debate on the planned 
Holocaust Memorial in Berlin (since 1989), in the film 'Schindler's List', in the 
'Goldhagen-Controversy' (1996), in the 'Wehrmacht'-Exhibition (since 1995), 
and in the negotiations on the compensation of National Socialist slave labour 
(since 1998), the thematic of National Socialist crimes 
- 
the persecution and 
extermination of European Jewry 
- 
was the centre of public and political 
attention throughout the 1990s. Berlin became the new-old capital. The ongoing 
debates on the purpose and meaning of the planned Holocaust Memorial in 
Berlin seemed to culminate in the national debate that was initiated by the 
author Martin Walser in 1998. Given the latest and most recent debates, the 
concepts of memory and history in the 'country of perpetrators' seem to be 
unchangingly problematic. 
The underlying question that is driving the research project is Adorno's 
famous essay 'What does it mean: coming-to-terms with the past? '2. My thesis 
argues that the process of memory and coming-to-terms with the National 
Socialist past and its atrocities in Germany always seems to be a highly political 
and moral issue which, at the same time, strictly avoids any implications of 
critically questioning and working-through. 
When, in 1946, Karl Jaspers engaged with the question of guilt, he 
assessed that the spiritual and political situation fostered 'the temptation to 
evade this question': 
We live in distress 
- 
large parts of our population are in so great, 
such acute distress that they seem to have become insensitive to 
such discussions. Their interest is in anything that would relieve 
distress, that would give them work and bread, shelter and warmth. 
The horizon has shrunk. People do not like to hear of guilt, of the 
past; world history is not their concern. They simply do not want to 
suffer any more; they want to get out of this misery, to live but not 
2 Adorno, Theodor W., 1997. Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit? '. »Ob nach 
Auschwitz noch sich leben lasse«: Ein philosophisches Lesebuch (Leipzig: Suhrkamp) 
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think. There is a feeling as though after such fearful suffering one 
had to be rewarded, as it were, or at least comforted, but not 
burdened with guilt on top of it all. 3 
I am aware of my personal investment in the research question. It is 
precisely this personal investment that drives part of the research questions: 
what precisely is it that Germany remembers of National Socialism? What is 
remembered in relation to the planned Holocaust Memorial? Where does the 
future of memory in Germany lie? How does the second generation and their 
children remember4? Do we have to remember at all? 
First and second generation of and/or after what? This terminology in 
itself makes clear that there is a link, beyond the inability to remember, between 
later generations of Germans to the crimes committed by their National Socialist 
German parents and grandparents. For this reason, I argue that there is a 
necessity 
- 
also for later generations with no direct biographical involvement 
- 
to 
work through and to come to terms with the past 
- 
or better, to accept the 
process of incomplete memory. For the first and second generation of Germans 
after the Shoah, after their parents and grandparents acted as perpetrators and 
onlookers to the `Final Solution', the necessity to remember and to work through 
is as powerful as it was and/or is for the generation actively involved. However, 
the focus on what it is that needs to be worked through and come to terms with, 
has shifted. 
Over years and decades, the continuous presence of the past often made 
the political presence fade away. As I will argue, the consciousness of the past 
continued to have its effects even after 1989, the year of the re-unification. 
When the Wall came down and the re-unification became the predominant 
3 Jaspers, Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York. Fordham University Press), p. 
21 
4I am going to refer to the generation that was born in the 1940s as the first generation; to their 
children 
- 
my generation 
-I will refer to as the second generation. 
3 
theme of the election, I was alarmed. The first time that I wandered through the 
re-united Berlin will remain in my memory for ever; because, at that moment, I 
discovered that part of the past had become accessible. Of course, I rejoiced 
with the GDR citizens for their newly acclaimed freedom. Yet, at the same time, 
the slogans "Wir sind ein Volk! " (We are one people! ) that accompanied the 
peaceful protest movement, led by the churches in the former GDR, and 
Germany's new, enlarged boarders could only foster uneasiness and resistance 
in me; it made me deeply sceptical for the very reasons that Howard Caygill 
describes: 
The German Revolution was both a return and a new start, a 
settlement with the past and a promise for the future captured in 
the image of a handshake extended across the ruins of the Berlin 
wall. ' 
I could not watch these pictures without mentally forming a link with the 
past; feelings of utter powerlessness and consciousness of the past dominated. 
The signs of increasing right-wing radicalism 
- 
which are happening by no 
means only in the former GDR 
- 
frighten me. 
More than ten years have past since the re-unification, during which time 
Germany has witnessed heated public debates, fuelled by extensive media 
coverage, on its relation to its past and its new self-understanding as a re-united 
nation. It has taken more than a decade to come to a conclusive decision on the 
plans for a `central national Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe'. To me, 
life with the memory of the Shoah is a balancing act; it is the awareness of the 
present in light of the past. To live the memory, to live with the memory of the 
deeds committed, resembles the attempt to position oneself precariously in 
relation to past and future. The one who looks back, makes slow progress. My 
5 Caygill, Howard, 1997. The German handshake. Steyn, Juliet (ed. ), 1997. Other than Identity.. ' 
The Subject, Politics and Art (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p. 145 
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thesis argues that the choice of design for the planned Memorial correlates to 
the status of politics in the united Germany because, with the re-unification, the 
motion and the position of looking back 
- 
of facing the past 
- 
has been lost. 
For me it was more easily possible to approach and address these 
intrinsically complex issues from a 'safe distance' 
- 
the knowledge of a 
geographical separation between Germany and Great Britain and the 
indulgence of writing in a language that is not my mother tongue. In many ways 
this research project re-presents part of an ongoing search for identity, my own 
identity and that of a generation who grew up in the shadow of their parents and 
grandparents suppressed memories and denial of responsibility and of their 
parent's utter rejection of the past as a means of demarcation. The questions at 
stake are the workings-through of a younger generation that confronts part of a 
horrifying family history. 
At the turn of the millennium, Germany is no longer the land of the 
"Germans" in any sociological or psychological, let alone ethnic or cultural 
sense. The question is whether it ever has been. Germany's status as one of 
Europe's main countries of immigration allows for various different ethnic 
identities within the present German society. The discourses of coming-to-terms 
and working-through the 'double' history of the German past cannot be unified, 
as the most recent debates have made clear. The discourses are shaped 
through the different identities of the participants of the debates. The effects of 
the re-unification of the two German states onto the social, economic and 
psychological conditions of the "German" society are manifold and divergent. 
Contrasting positions necessarily have to arise from the sociological, historical 
and political division into the two German states, the former GDR and FRG. The 
Western German political left-right thinking plays an important role in the 
ongoing discourse of coming-to-terms. Equally important are the divergent 
5 
position that arise from the biographical conflict of generations and from the 
different ethnic points of view. Despite these arguments, I believe that we not 
only had the political 'Wende' in the form of the re-unification of the two states 
but that we can also witness a change in the public approaches of working- 
through the National Socialist past in relation to a critical discourses 
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
In the preface to her book 'Judaism and Modernity', Gillian Rose writes: 'If 
I knew who or what I were, I would not write; I write out of these moments of 
anguish which are nameless and I am able to write only where the tradition can 
offer me a discipline, a means, to articulate and explore that anguish. '' Because 
of my undeniable personal and emotional involvement in the research question, 
it was of paramount importance to constantly re-think and re-examine my 
methodological and scientific approaches in order to avoid self-indulgence but to 
promote self-reflexivity. It meant that I needed to question my perceptions and 
awareness which might have been established and pre-set a priori. The use of 
methodology, the scientific apparatus, provides the only possibility of 
approaching the subject from a view point that reaches beyond the subjective. 
The research project set out to critique, explore, analyse and evaluate a 
body of artistic, literary and philosophical works that engage in `thinking the 
6 In the common, daily usage of language, the re-unification of the two German states is simply 
called 'die Wende', 'the change' of the social and political pre-conditions. 
7 Rose, Gillian, 1993. Judaism and Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell), p. ix 
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questions of the Shoah'8 in order to establish their cultural context and place the 
works in a theoretical and historical framework. The object of my study is the 
question: how does Germany today `think the questions of the Shoah'? 
Furthermore, what constitutes (the necessity of) remembrance of the occurrence 
of the Shoah in Germany, the country of the perpetrators, now, more than half a 
century later, when the generation of witnesses is slowly disappearing? I will 
explore these critical questions against the backdrop of changed social and 
historical conditions caused by the re-unification and with reference to the 
debates of the 1990s and the planned Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. Literary and 
philosophical texts, artistic products in the monumental form and media texts are 
used to drive the research question. 
I will establish my own personal critical response to the issues at stake in 
the German memory process by providing a critical and analytical report of the 
debates. I will further relate my responses to the theoretical framework of `critical 
theory', thus integrating the historical, the cultural and the political as well as the 
textual and artistic area. My thesis closely investigates the dialogue between the 
historical change of the political parameters in Germany and the texts that 
represent it. It is an historically critical investigation into the relationship between 
the creation of texts and works of art and the historical moment, against the 
backdrop of contemporary German politics on the issues at stake. 
The thesis uses texts and the work of art, in the form of the monument, to 
explore, argue and debate the possibilities of remembering the Shoah in the 
country of the perpetrators. My own readings of the issues at stake are informed 
by a dialogue with the writings and ideas of critical thinking. Theodor W. 
Adorno's question of what constitutes a coming-to-terms with the past is the 
underlying question of the thesis and is thus systematically explored through the 
8I loosely 'borrowed' this phrase from Andrew Benjamin (Benjamin, Andrew, 1997. Present 
Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism (London: Routledge)); see chapter I of this thesis 
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different texts. The title of the thesis 'The Monument: The Shoah and German 
Memory' alludes to the dialectical position by which the process of memory and 
the representation of the remembered event are identified. I am arguing for the 
necessity of a process of memory in Germany that reaches beyond biographical 
boarders. The ephemeral of the monumental stands in direct opposition to the 
eternity with which we need to reflect upon the questions of the Shoah. 
The first chapter delivers an exegetical reading of Walter Benjamin's texts 
in order to open up new interpretative perspectives for an understanding of the 
issues at stake. For my re-reading of Benjamin I have used the complete 
German volumes of his writings; the translations are mine, unless otherwise 
stated. Benjamin's concept of history and memory is examined for its 
appropriateness and validity for a future possibility of the process of memory in 
Germany. The philosophical writings of Andrew Benjamin, Howard Caygill and 
Gillian Rose inform my re-reading of Walter Benjaim's writings and guide my 
research question into the relation between history and memory. I argue that 
Walter Benjamin's concept of true remembering (Eingedenken) could generate 
new perspectives for future generations in the discourse of coming-to-terms with 
the National Socialist past. 
The second chapter records and narrates the process of the competition 
for a 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe' and the decision making 
process that led to a Parliamentary vote on the two winning designs. Taking a 
selection of quotations from the extensive media coverage, the chapter 
discusses the two winning designs and their respective implications on what 
constitutes the state of the memory of the Shoah in Germany against the 
backdrop of the politics of a re-united Germany. It compares and contrasts the 
(im)possibilities of representation of the chosen designs and defines its 
implications for the future generations' engagement with the question of what 
constitutes memory. The chapter explores the question 'what does it mean: 
8 
coming-to-terms with the past? ' and what this entails for the second and future 
generations. The decision for a central memorial and the implications of the 
chosen design are examined with regard to the political situation of Germany's 
re-unification and the debates of the 1990s. Here the critical and theoretical 
approaches of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jürgen Habermas inform my analysis 
of the (im)possibility of public memory in the form of the monumental. 
The third chapter uses texts as examples of contextualised products 
which form part of the German cultural discussion of coming-to-terms. I have 
selected quotations from the writings of Thomas Mann, Hannah Arendt, Karl 
Jaspers, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich and Sigmund Freud to compare 
with my interpretation of the political implications of Martin Walser's speech in 
relation to the issues at stake. The chapter establishes how far the literary 
and/or philosophical thinking of Thomas Mann, Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers 
and the Mitscherlichs were points of reference for public and political debates on 
the German self-understanding after the Holocaust and how far public debates 
have appropriated the thoughts and writings of those authors and philosophers. I 
discuss the changing experiences of memory and the changing process of 
memory in Germany by examining how their writings engage with the 
explorations of the concepts of 'guilt', 'shame', 'trauma', 'conscience', 'mourning' 
and 'identity'. The chapter questions the political positioning and action of the 
author Martin Walser, as a representative of the generation of perpetrators, to 
the process of working-through and coming-to-terms. It critically examines 
Walser's speech of October 1998 and places the speech in the historical context 
of coming-to-terms in post-war Germany. 
This work is as much about the problematics of remembering the Shoah 
in Germany, the country of the perpetrators, as it is the attempt of the second 
generation to testify to the complexity of questions that arise from the process of 
9 
memory in Germany. Above all, this work testifies to the problematics of identity 
- 
as a nation and personally 
- 
that are at stake in the German process of 
memory. With Walter Benjamin's Angel of History and against the course of 
history, I write in the hope that the process of memory, of thinking the questions 
of the Shoah, will enable humanity 'to arrange their thoughts and actions so that 
Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen'. ' 
9 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 365 
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Prologue 
When in 1996 the first competition failed to produce an acceptable design 
for a 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe' the 'Auslober'10 decided to 
appoint a 'Find ungskommission'1t of experts to design and run another, limited 
competition. Its aim was an 'explicit, well-defined and rigorously non-partisan 
procedure''', extending the initial competition. Twenty-five internationally 
renowned artists and architects were invited, nearly all agreed to participate, and 
nineteen eventually submitted their designs in October 1997. This very public 
procedure again was vigorously debated in the German press. In their invitation 
to the competition, James Young writes, the 'Findungskommission' described a 
'concept of memorialisation' that 'took into account: a clear definition of the 
Holocaust and its significance; Nazi Germany's role as perpetrator; current 
reunified Germany's role as rememberer; the contemporary generation's 
relationship to Holocaust memory; and the aesthetic debate'13 with regard to the 
planned memorial itself. 
10 The 'Auslober' is the commissioning and executing body composed of members of the 
Bundestag (Parliament), the Berlin Senate and the Citizen's Committee (founded by the publicist 
Lea Rosh 
- 
Förderkreis). 
11 
'Findungskommission' is the committee that was granted the power of decision by the initiators 
of the second competition (the City of Berlin, the citizen's initiative and the Federal Government) 
to find the most appropriate design for the memorial. Its five members were Professors Dr. 
James E. Young, Professor Dr. Christoph Stölzl (who later became Berlin's Minister of Culture), 
Professor Josef Paul Kleihues, Professor Dr. Werner Hofmann and Professor Dr. Dieter Ronte 
12 Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas: Gesellschaftliche Diskussion und 
parlamentarisches Verfahren, 1999 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, Referat für 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit), p. 168 
13 Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary 
Art and Architecture (New Haven/London: Yale University Press), p. 197 
11 
Germany is faced with the sheer impossible task to remember the deeds 
it committed; the motives of remembrance are complex and often self- 
renouncing. Remembering the Shoah in Israel became part of the state's raison 
d'etre and its founding myths. In its remembrance process Germany has to 
address its role as perpetrators; it cannot fall back onto any experience as victim 
or resistance fighter. Many of the more recent monuments in Germany dealing 
with National Socialism and the Holocaust14 have sought to address Germany's 
ambivalent and self-indicting process of remembrance. 
What, however, does that mean for the artist who might be asking 
himself/herself these questions and who is faced with the complexity of issues? 
How can a memorial address the tension and dilemma of the German 
remembrance process where memory is suppressed and as such marks and 
disables a working-through and coming-to-terms? In view of the questions at 
stake I will examine the criteria according to which the committee of five 
'experts' judged and decided on the 'appropriate' memorial design. How does 
one weigh the artistic concept against the Germany remembrance process? 
What are the possibilities and promises of contemporary aesthetics in view of 
the issues at stake? James Young seemed concerned about the responsibility of 
the 'Findungskommission' towards the public at large when he queried whether 
a formal, conceptual and ethical justification of one proposal by the body of 
experts would mean that mean the public might accept it. 15 
14 There is the Baroque fountain in Kassel, which was given to the town by a wealthy Jewish 
citizen. Destroyed by the Nazis, a German artist recollected the remaining pieces, reconstructed 
the fountain to submerge it upside down into the earth. All you can see now, when crossing the 
market place, is the star-shaped foundation of the fountain. Or, for example, the steel column in 
Hamburg-Harburg: year-by-year, centimetre-by-centimetre this column slowly disappears into 
the earth. A generation of German artists has turned their scepticism of the monument into a 
radical 'counter-monumentality' (Young, 2000, p. 96). 
15 Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary 
Art and Architecture (New Haven/London: Yale University Press), p. 199 
12 
Finally, at the end of 1997, the five members of the 'Findungskommission' 
agreed on the two strongest designs: Gesine Weinmiller and Peter 
Eisen man/Richard Serra 
- 
two proposals which, 'though equally works of terrible 
beauty, complexity, and deep intelligence'", have powers of persuasion that are 
based on very different concepts. The 'Findungskommission' presented the 
public and the 'Auslober with two winning designs, which, according to their 
statement, would fulfil the difficult task the Holocaust memorial is meant to 
perform. 
Weinmiller's memorial design (see Figures 9& 10) works with the 
concept of silence and serenity; it has the spirit of fleeting presence and retained 
and cautious responses. It is a design by a young German who belongs to that 
generation who has to bear the memory and shame of an event for which they 
themselves cannot be made responsible. 
The Serra/Eisenman design is by two well-known Americans; a 
collaboration of artist and architect. Their design, massive in scale, resulted in 
something James Young describes as 'audacious, surprising and dangerously 
imagined form' (see Figures 3,4 & 5). 
The 'Findungskommission' strongly recommended both designs to the 
'Auslober'. What would the final decision of one over the other mean? Does it 
have any implication? We have to bear in mind that what follows in the second 
chapter of my thesis will be a discussion of architectural models. My reading of 
possible expressions and re-presentations of the different models is essentially 
based on the architect's rationale 
- 
and my imagination. The reality, their real 
experience, might be very different. 
16 Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary 
Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 203 
17 ibid., p. 203 
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I. The Angel's Gaze: Moment and Eternity 
Benjamin perceives both history and the historical-philosophical as 
notions that entail a theological perspective. His theory of history and memory is 
profoundly influenced by the aspects of redemption, hope and the Messianic. It 
is their implication for our understanding of the past and its affirmation in the 
monumental that I shall explore in this chapter. 
The momentum of the traumatic destruction of the world and the 
inadequacy, if not impossibility of experience, at the centre of Benjamin's writing 
and thought validates an exegetical reading of Benjamin's theories and their 
applicability to contemporary issues and debates, in particular in view of the 
problems and discussions raised around the experience of the Shoah in 
Germany and its attempt to come to terms with it18. Benjamin's writings try to 
tackle the problem of the possibility and/or impossibility of experience and of its 
destruction. Although Benjamin did not see the end of the war and his writing 
was not exclusively targeted at defining and thus overcoming Fascism, his 
thought holds valuable insight for an investigation into theoretical concepts of 
memory and history, as Andrew Benjamin has argued: 'In the case of Benjamin 
18 The word 'Holocaust' comes from the Greek Bible (Septuaginta) and means a burnt offering. It 
denotes the offerings that were made at that time in the Temple of Jerusalem. The sacrificial 
lamb (animal) as a whole was burnt. When Jews refer to the monstrous nature of Auschwitz they 
use the terminus 'Shoah'; it means extermination. Professor Richard Schröder is adamant that 
'we Germans, from whose midst the perpetrators came, are not entitled to this metaphor'. 
(Schröder, Richard, 1999. So nicht! Ein fauler Kompromiß über das Mahnmal bahnt sich an. Die 
Zeit, 21 January 1999) If we do not even know how to refer to the deeds that were committed in 
our name, from German citizens, how are we supposed to talk about it, let alone work through it 
and come to terms with it? Throughout the text I am using the word Shoah. However, the word 
Holocaust is more widely spread and exclusively used in the German press when issues of the 
memorial and remembrance were argued and discussed. Henceforth, I shall continue to refer to 
the planned memorial as the 'Holocaust Memorial/Monument'. 
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there could have been no explicit reference and yet the problem itself is raised 
within the actual formulation of another attempt to link the present and the 
past. '19 
However, the task of this chapter is not to provide a commentary on 
Walter Benjamin's work, but to employ certain aspects of his work and thinking 
in order to hold onto the general in the particular. Benjamin's thinking provides 
valuable insight for the complexity of issues of `coming-to-terms' in Germany 
that are at stake in the remembrance process in general and the planned 
memorial in particular. It is the status of history as such, as an object and 
method of investigation, that was the focus of attention in Benjamin's profound 
study 
- 
the Theses on the Philosophy of History. This chapter will closely study, 
analyse and interpret Benjamin's observations of the eschatological and 
theological within his concept of history, in order to re-think his actuality 
regarding the matters of remembering the Shoah in Germany now. Critical of all 
knowledge 
- 
that much is implied in the preface to The Origin of the German 
Mourning Play entitled 'Erkenntniskritische Vorrede' ('Epistemo-critical 
Prologue') and in a chapter of his Arcades Project (the vast bundle of notes, 
entitled Das Passagenwerk) with the title `Epistemological' 
-, 
Benjamin offers a 
form of enlightening interpretation that does not take knowledge and 
understanding for granted. Benjamin employs the term 'historio-philosophical' in 
order to point to the interpretative aspect of his perception of the historical. 
Howard Caygill points out that Benjamin did not intend these theses On 
the Philosophy of History to be published because Benjamin apparently feared 
that 'the connections they make between theology and historical materialism will 
19 Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate: Walter Benjamin' 
'Fate and Character'. The Actuality of Walter Benjamin, Marcus, Laura & Nead, Lynda (eds. ), 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 149 
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be misunderstood'. 20 Bearing in mind Caygill's cautionary remarks, nonetheless, 
I shall proceed to discuss the possibility of a theological perspective within 
Benjamin's notion of the historical. I am going to employ my reading of 
Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' to open up possible ways of 
memory and remembering whereby one is placed 
- 
the individual and the entity 
of the nation 
- 
in relation to the past, the present and the future. 
1. Waiting for the Angel of History: the Benjaminian Concept of 
History 
A. Catastrophe, Progress and Repetition 
Benjamin wrote his theses On the Concept of History21 in exile in 1940. 
His IX. thesis is based on a painting, as Benjamin himself explains: 
A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an angel looking as 
though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly 
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings 
are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face 
is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he 
sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to 
stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. 
But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings 
with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This 
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is 
20 Caygill, Howard, Coles, Alex & Klimowsky, Andrzej, 2000. Introducing Walter Benjamin 
(Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd. ), p. 167 
21 The German title is Über den Begriff der Geschichte. Instead of Theses on the Philosophy of 
History, I prefer the more literal translation of On the Concept of History. 
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turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This 
storm is what we call progress. 21 
Numerous interpretations of Klee's painting, Scholem's poem and 
Benjamin's text have been written. There is one aspect that I would like to 
discuss further concerning the gaze of the angel: His face is turned toward the 
past. For us who historically and biographically consider the past as something 
that is behind us and the future as something that lies ahead, the angel seems 
to have turned its head. The meaning of past and future in the Hebrew 
22 Benjamin, Walter, 1999. Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Pimlico), p. 249 
23 Bolz, Norbert W. & Faber; Richard (eds. ), 1985. Walter Benjamin: Profane Erleuchtung und 
rettende Kritik (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann); Brumlik, Micha, Funke, Hajo & 
Rensmann, Lars, 2000. Umkämpftes Vergessen: Walser-Debatte, Holocaust-Mahnmal und 
neuere deutsche Geschichtspolitik (Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch); Caygill, Howard, 1998. 
Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge); Emmerich, Wolfgang, 1977. 
'Massenfaschismus' und die Rolle des Ästhetischen: Faschismustheorie bei Ernst Bloch, Walter 
Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht. in Winkler, Lutz (ed. ), 1977. Antifaschistische Literatur. Programme, 
Autoren, Werke, 3 vols. (Kronberg: Scriptor Verlag); Ferris, David S., 1996. Walter Benjamin: 
Theoretical Questions (Stanford: Stanford University Press); Jennings, Michael William, 1987. 
Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin's Theory of Literary Criticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press); Knoche, Stefan, 2000. Benjamin 
- 
Heidegger. Über Gewalt 
- 
Die Politisierung der Kunst 
(Wien: Turia+Kant); Krückeberg, Edzard, 1981. Der Begriff des Erzählens im 20. Jahrhundert: 
Zu den Theorien Benjamins, Adornos und Lukäcs (Bonn: Bouvier); Marcus, Laura & Nead, 
Lynda (eds. ), 1998. The Actuality of Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & Wishart); MOSES, 
Stephane, 1994. Der Engel der Geschichte (Frankfurt: Jüdischer Verlag); Nagele, Rainer, 1988. 
Benjamin's Ground: New Readings of Walter Benjamin (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University 
Press); Opitz, Michael & Wizisla, Erdmut, 1992. Aber ein Sturm weht vom Paradiese her., Texte 
zu Walter Benjamin (Leipzig: Reclam); Rose, Gillian, 1994. Judaism & Modernity (Oxford: 
Blackwell); SMITH, Gary (ed. ), 1988. On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT); Tiedemann, Rolf, 1983. Dialektik im Stillstand: Versuch zum Spätwerk 
Walter Benjamins (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp); Valentin, Joachim & WENDEL, Saskia, 2000. Jüdische 
Traditionen in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft); Weigel, Sigrid, 1997. Enstellte Ähnlichkeit: Walter Benjamins theoretische 
Schreibweise (Frankfurt: Fischer); Wolin, Richard, 1994. Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of 
Redemption (Berkeley: University of California Press) Zuckermann, Moshe, 1999. Gedenken 
und Kulturindustrie (Berlin: Philo) 
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terminology resembles exactly the angel's gaze. In the Hebrew-Jewish tradition 
and language, this gaze is the appropriate posture, which one has to position 
oneself into, in relation to past and future. The Hebrew language imaginatively 
expresses that the past is in front of our eyes (lifnei), whereas the future lies 
behind our back ('aharit). 24 If Benjamin's angel derived from the Hebrew Bible, it 
did not have to turn around. 
Benjamin knew the past could never be recaptured 'the way it really was' 
(VI. Thesis)25. History does not appear as a logical sequence of events. To 
Benjamin, history is an expanse of rubble, a conglomeration of occurrences. 
"The past" cannot be captured in the notion of ever changing time(s). On the 
contrary the past erupts and resonates as a disturbing event: 'It means to seize 
hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. ' (VI. Thesis)26. 
Benjamin piles event upon event, occurrence upon occurrence to a single 
catastrophe; there is no causal or consecutive connection of a chain of events. 
The angel of history directs our gaze and thinking towards that which seems 
irredeemably lost, yet something that continues to haunt and torment our 
existence. To translate and interpret the past - not 'how things really were' but 
how we choose to remember27 
- 
may well be its betrayal but, more importantly, I 
would like to argue it shows a readiness to engage with the past. As we will see 
from the analysis of the German landscape of both lack and fear of memory, the 
24 For a more profound explanation of the specificities in the Hebrew language, especially in 
relation to the meaning and combination of certain prepositions and nouns that take the meaning 
of in front and behind, see Jürgen Ebach, 'Der Blick des Engels' in BOLZ, Norbert W. & FABER; 
Richard (eds. ), 1985. Walter Benjamin: Profane Erleuchtung and rettende Kritik (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann) 
25 Illuminations, 1999, p. 247 
26 Illuminations, 1999, p. 247 
27 The Lipstadtllrving trial has clearly shown again that their cannot be such a thing as "objective" 
writing on history. See also Robert Eaglestone's essay on Postmodernism, Holocaust and the 
Lipstadtllrving trial. 
18 
readiness to engage with the past, the patience to wait for the `flash' have to 
make us accept the findings as well. 
As the Angel of History is propelled backwards 
- 
blinded to that which might 
come 
- 
into the future, we have to acknowledge that the past is not given and 
the future is not predictable: 
We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the 
future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, 
however. This stripped the future of its magic, to which all those 
succumb, who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment. This does 
not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into 
homogenous, empty time. For every second of time was the strait 
gate through which the Messiah might enter. 28 
Benjamin's Angelus Novus is a figure beyond despair and hope 
- 
it is sent by 
God. 
In his annotation to the theses On the Concept of History Benjamin 
distinguishes 'Historicism' from 'historical materialism'. He demands a notion of 
history 'which has freed itself from the scheme of progression in an empty and 
homogeneous time', a notion that 'shakes the three most important positions of 
Historicism'29 (GS I, 3, p. 1240). Benjamin names the following as main 
principles of 'historicism': the idea of a universal history; the notion that history is 
something that can be narrated; and finally 
- 
and the third position, according to 
Benjamin, is the strongest and the most difficult to attack 
- 
'empathy with the 
victor' (see also VII. Thesis on the Philosophy of History). The statement of the 
impossibility of history's narration is a more difficult matter. Benjamin asks us to 
accept the 'liquidation of the epic element like Marx has done it in "The Capital"'. 
28 Annex B to Theses: Illuminations, 1999, p. 255 
29 Benjamin, Walter, 1997. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, 3 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), p. 1240; 
hereafter cited as GS 
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History calls for 'a far-stretching theory framework of steel' (GS I, 3, p. 1241). 
The theoretical outline of work under the power of the capital pays more tribute 
to the interests of humanity than those monumental and elaborate works of 
historicism: 'It is more difficult to honour the memory of the nameless than that 
of the famous' (GS I, 3, p. 1241). 
We have nurtured the belief that our existence is subjected to history and 
mortality. We have discovered the need to try to make some sense of the crisis 
and fragility of human existence. Concepts like 'truth' and 'knowledge' - with all 
their instability and insecurity 
- 
function to provide a link between two historical 
events. To accept and to acknowledge the termination of a past moment, will 
enable an interpretation of that very moment and of ourselves in the present. 
How do we perceive ourselves in the light of a particular moment or passage in 
time and history? What are the consequences, if there are any, for our very 
existence in the present? 
Knowledge figures as a profane conception of experience, a conception 
that is far removed from the absolute. As such it is not invalid, but inferior since it 
cannot reach the ultimate desire of authentic cognition. To Benjamin, the 
concept of transcendent, pure and philosophical knowledge lies in the idea of 
God: 
Thus the task of the coming philosophy can be understood as the 
discovery or creation of the very concept of knowledge which, by 
relating the concept of experience exclusively to the transcendental 
consciousness, renders logically possible not only mechanical but 
also religious experience. Which is not to say that knowledge 
renders God possible, but certainly that it first of all makes the 
experience and doctrine of God possible. 30 
30 So läßt sich die Aufgabe der kommenden Philosophie fassen als die Auffindung oder 
Schaffung desjenigen Erkenntnisbegriffes der, indem er zugleich auch den Erfahrungsbegriff 
ausschließlich auf das transzendentale Bewußtsein bezieht, nicht alleine mechanische sondern 
auch religiöse Erfahrung logisch ermöglicht. Damit soll durchaus nicht gesagt sein, daß die 
20 
The theologian Paul Tillich famously described God 'as the Lord of time 
who surmounts the gods of space"'. Traditional historicism, one could argue, is 
inclined to serve those 'gods of space'. Rarely are the different special rooms of 
history intertwined with each other. On the contrary, they are joined into a 'chain 
of events'. But Benjamin's Angel of History sees a pile of debris, a pile of 
different spaces. To worship those 'gods of space' bears the danger that in 
extreme cases the past event is dismissed as detail and thus worthy of 
forgetting. 
The motto to the IX. thesis On the Concept of History is taken from a 
poem by Gershom Scholem. Scholem here interprets the Klee painting (already 
in Benjamin's possession) in a highly theological manner. Benjamin chose the 
fifth verse (out of seven) in which the allusion to the sphere outside of Paradise 
is discernible, where the Angel wishes to return to the Paradise: 
My wing is ready for flight, 
I would like to turn back. 
If I stayed timeless time, 
I would have little luck. 32 
Benjamin's thesis, however, stresses the impossibility of such a return. 
From Paradise the storm of Messianism is blowing. The Angel is propelled, his 
wings wide open, into the future in which all debris of historical catastrophe 
enters the sphere which surrounds the Angel. I doubt that Benjamin, who 
introduces the concepts of the Messianic, creation and redemption into his 
Erkenntnis Gott, wohl aber durchaus, daß sie die Erfahrung und Lehre von ihm allererst 
ermöglicht. ' GS II, 1, p. 164 
31 quoted after Friedlander, Albert, 1988. Zachor 
- 
Gedenke!. Evangelische Theologie, 48th 
year, 5/88, p. 378 
32 Illuminations, 1999, p. 249 
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thinking and writing, falls back onto an atheological description in the form of the 
Rilkean allusion to angels in his Duinese Elegies. These concepts cannot be 
introduced and thought through without acknowledging and recognising God as 
the subject of the action. 
Benjamin knew of Fascism in Germany, what was happening in Nazi 
Germany, and he had knowledge of the atrocities that the Nazis had committed, 
of humanity's catastrophe according to Theodor W. Adorno. What is the point, 
what is Benjamin's intention when he speaks of the Messianic fulfilment of 
history? Why does he even ask the question of the revelation of God in a time 
that God has obviously rejected? 
If the path of progress led into the experience of history's catastrophe, 
would it then not make more sense to do without a concept of history? Benjamin 
rejects the notion and tendency to relinquish or give away the concept of history 
in the crisis of progress. Benjamin understands updating, not progress, as the 
fundamental concept of 'historical materialism' (GS V, 1, p. 576/7). 
He formulates a concept of history in which the essential character of 
history consists of those events which, again and again, blast open its 
continuum. Present, then, is no longer a transition but standstill of time. The 
past, of which traditional historicism claims it would stand still, flits by, depending 
on the moment in which recognition sets in. The dualism of revelation and world 
is decisive for Benjamin's thinking. 
Theology, brimmed with worldly experiences as an instrument to 
understand the world, can never be a lesson; it will always be a passionate 
option and not an intellectual establishment of theological theorems: 
33 Adorno, Theodor W., 1997. Zu einem neuen kategorischen Imperative: Erziehung nach 
Auschwitz. In »Ob nach Auschwitz noch sich leben lasse«: Ein philosophisches Lesebuch 
(Leipzig: Suhrkamp), p. 63 
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The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it 
could play a winning game of chess, answering each move of an 
opponent with a countermove. A puppet in Turkish attire and with a 
hookah in its mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large 
table. A system of mirrors created the illusion that this table was 
transparent from all sides. Actually, a little hunchback who was an 
expert chess player sat inside and guided the puppet's hand by 
means of strings. One can imagine a philosophical counterpart to 
this device. The puppet called 'historical materialism' is to win all 
the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the 
services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has 
to keep out of sight. ` 
Benjamin's little, ugly hunch-back, hiding from our perception, is the 
theological dimension of our existence; and the historical materialist in his quest 
for truth can truly only be guided by theology. Only then can we mark out the 
hope of a turning point hidden behind the apparent infinity of the emptiness of 
hope. It is exactly this duality between infinite and unfulfilled historical time and 
fulfilled messianic time that informs Benjamin's thinking. The dialectic between 
the extreme contradictions is already given away if mediation is anticipated. 
What is involved here is an effort of restoration or of reinstatement 
- 
but one that 
can never be finished or fulfilled, especially in the light of the moment, which as 
a form, freezes. To speak of catastrophe becomes the expression for the great 
need of redemption. The simultaneous occurrence of theology and materialism 
is possible but both need to remain faithful to their matters and ought to be 
strictly differentiated, according to Benjamin 
- 
so that it all becomes one big 
game of chess. 
We have to get hold of memory as it flashes up in the moment of danger; 
historical re-cognition, to speak with Benjamin, is realised as a shock when 
discovering the tense constellation of time. This process of re-cognition has its 
vanishing point always in the Now, the Jetzt-Zeit. According to Benjamin the 
image of the past which the observer brings home to himself, enters in the 
34 Illuminations, 1999, p. 245 
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'moment of its recognisability' into a constellation with present and future. His 
concept of the 'Jetzt-Zeit' (the Now) hopes that the continuum of time might be 
present, provided that it 'flashes up' as that which it was and as that which it 
could be as the decisive turning point of messianic redemption. The structure of 
the 'Jetzt-Zeit' is the pre-condition that the one who actively remembers can fall 
back onto the past in such a way that the very past comes through into the 
present as not (yet) final and conclusive. At the same time, however, Benjamin 
asserts that only in the revelation of the eschatological Now in the past, in the 
revelation of its lost possibilities, its transformation and salvation, lies the 
possibility of a history and historicism which does not exclusively present the 
'empathy with the victor. 
Important to his concept and new interpretation is the term 
'understanding' (Verstehen). 'Understanding' no longer has the meaning of 
empathy which opens up the text for interpretation. This concept of 
understanding works only by way of re-living the past: 
Spiritual »understanding« fundamentally has to be grasped as a 
re-living of the understood and, thus, that which was recognised in 
the analysis of »re-living of works, of »fame«, is to be regarded as 
the basis of history as such. (GS V, 1, p. 574/5) 
The Benjaminian form of 're-living' is not to be read as a deficient form of 
life. On the contrary, 're-living' in the Benjaminian sense means that in the event 
of fulfilment and completion, past and present enter a state of communication: 
35, Geschichtliches 
»Verstehen« ist grundsätzlich als ein Nachleben des Verstandenen zu fassen 
und daher ist dasjenige was in der Analyse des »Nachlebens der Werke«, des »Ruhmes« 
erkannt wurde, als die Grundlage der Geschichte überhaupt zu betrachten. ' GS V, 1, p. 574/5 
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It is not that the past sheds its light onto the present or that the 
present sheds its light onto the past, but a picture is when the past 
merges with the present flash-like into a constellation. In other 
words: a picture is dialectic at a standstill. (GS V, 1, p. 578)36 
Benjamin demands of history that it illuminates the relation between past 
and present buried in the individual and collective unconsciousness. The 
moment of waking-up becomes characteristic for his interpretation and modus 
operandi of history: 
Should awakening be the synthesis of the thesis of dream- 
consciousness and the anti-thesis of wake-consciousness? Then 
the moment of awakening would be identical with the »Now of 
Recognisability(( in which the things put on their true - surrealistic 
- 
expression. (GS V, 1, p. 579)37 
'This storm is what we call progress' 
- 
instead of the inspiring, fresh 
wind of history we are faced with a storm which 'irresistibly propels us into the 
future'. One thing without any doubt is obvious: a return is not possible. The Lost 
Paradise is remembered only in all too sentimental a reminiscence, like 
childhood memories. To outgrow it, however, means incarnation. The Angelus 
Novus' concept of progress does not grant the fulfilment of the history of 
progress. The term 'progress' is founded in the idea of catastrophe. In 
Zentralpark Benjamin writes that 'it goes on like this, is the catastrophe' (GS I, 2, 
38, Nicht so ist es, daß das Vergangene sein Licht auf das Gegenwärtige oder das Gegenwärtige 
sein Licht auf das Vergangene wirft, sondern Bild ist dasjenige, worin das Gewesene mit dem 
Jetzt blitzhaft zu einer Konstellation zusammentritt. Mit anderen Worten: Bild ist Dialektik im 
Stillstand. ' GS V, 1, p. 578 
37 Sollten Erwachen die Synthesis sein aus der Thesis des Traumbewußtseins und der 
Antithesis des Wachbewußtsein? Dann wäre der Moment des Erwachens identisch mit dem 
»Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit«, in dem die Dinge ihre wahre 
- 
surrealistische 
- 
Miene aufsetzten. ' 
GS V, 1, p. 579 
38 llluminations, 1999, p. 249 
39 Erfüllung 
- 
the achievement, completion, conclusion, fulfilment; to come true 
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p. 683). It is not the imminent but the currently given. Hope solely lies in its 
demolition and break-off. Only after the break-off of the history of catastrophes, 
something might be possible that correlates to the beginning in the term Ur- 
sprung. Benjamin understands 'Ur-Sprung' (Hervorgehen: evolving, producing) 
not as a leap backwards; on the contrary, it is a leap into a world that flashes up 
fragmentally in the pictures of triumphant life 
- 
behind the inevitable catastrophe, 
behind life under not-alienated conditions. 
But can we honestly conclude from such hope to the fulfilment of history, 
from where all suffering was purposely endured and all sacrifices were made for 
justified causes? Against the separation of violence and salvation, of history of 
suppression and history of liberation, of liberty and order, Benjamin insists on 
the oneness of violence and salvation, of culture and barbarity. 
In the annotations to the Arcades Project Benjamin gives a definition of 
what he conceives as 'history's fundamental concepts': 'catastrophe - to have 
missed the opportunity; critical moment 
- 
the status quo threatens to be 
preserved; progress 
- 
the first revolutionary measure'. (GS V, 1, p. 593)40 These 
are the keywords for Benjamin's methodological concept of history as such; it 
thematises in its core a philosophy of history which marks itself clearly with the 
certainty of secularised apocalypse. It is a certainty, however, that succeeds - 
fully aware of culture's decline in the sense of rendering the concepts of value 
meaningless 
- 
in doubting itself, yet at the same time in providing hope through 
the utopia of the changeability of the world. This utopia of changeability breaks 
into the open, is eschatologically motivated and mate riali stic-h i stori cally 
intended. Catastrophes are not the eventful occurrence of the future, they are 
the conditioning state of the Now: the term 'progress' is founded in the idea of 
40 Definitionen historischer Grundbegriffe: Die Katastrophe 
- 
die Gelegenheit verpaßt haben; 
der kritische Augenblick 
- 
der status quo droht erhalten zu bleiben; der Fortschritt 
- 
die erste 
revolutionäre Maßnahme. ' GS V, 1, p. 593 
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catastrophe. In Zentralpark Benjamin writes that 'it goes on like this, is the 
catastrophe' (GS 1,2, p. 683, also GS V, 1, p. 592). It is not the imminent but the 
currently given. The insidious remaining of the same, the un-alterability, the 
inner chaos of a constantly-the-same 
- 
that it could stay or remain like this, is 
the most oppressive momentum of history: 'The concept of progress has to be 
sustained in the idea of catastrophe. ' (GS V, 1, p. 592)" Benjamin drafts a highly 
charged dialectical concept of catastrophe and progress: how can catastrophe 
sustain and underpin progress in realistic and conceptual terms? The Now 
functions as the explosive force which breaks open and interrupts the 
homogeneous epochs of history in order to arouse suspicions. The Now 
becomes the meter against which the catastrophes become to be calculated; the 
Now opposes the continuity of history as it dialectically guarantees history. In the 
Benjaminian Now, a thinking about history is wretched which cannot be anything 
other than a chronological guiding into the future. 
The belief in progress, in the infinite perfectibility - an infinite task 
within morality 
- 
and the conception of eternal recurrence are 
complementary. They are indissoluble antinomies in the light of 
which the dialectical concept of historical time has to be developed. 
In opposition to it, the notion of eternal recurrence appears as the 
»feeble rationalism«, as what faith in progress has become 
disrepute, and the latter belonging to the mythical mode of thinking 
as well as the notion of eternal recurrence. (GS V, 1, p. 178)42 
'41 Der Begriff des Fortschritts ist in der Idee der Katastrophe zu fundieren. ' GS V, 1, p. 592 
42 Der Glaube an den Fortschritt, an eine unendliche Perfektibilität 
- 
eine unendliche Aufgabe in 
der Moral 
- 
und die Vorstellung von der ewigen Wiederkehr sind komplementär. Es sind die 
unauflöslichen Antinomien, angesichts deren der dialektische Begriff der historischen Zeit zu 
entwickeln ist. Ihm gegenüber erscheint die Vorstellung von der ewigen Wiederkehr als eben der 
»platte Rationalismus« als der der Fortschrittsglaube verrufen ist und dieser letztere der 
mythischen Denkweise ebenso angehörend wie die Vorstellung von der ewigen Wiederkehr. ' GS 
V, 1, p. 178 
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That the progress recurs ever and ever again, therein lies the true 
catastrophe 
- 
that the catastrophe continues, that no end seems foreseeable, 
that no cultural forces seem visible which could terminate the terrible events. 
The futility of a change lies within its character because 'the essence of mythical 
events is recurrence. It has been inscribed with futility as a hidden figure. ' (GS 
V, 1, p. 178). Hope is there which denies itself superficial optimism and therefore 
enables a future. To tackle the given problematics Benjamin chose, as in his 
Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (The Origin of the German Mourning 
Play), a period which counts as a time of decline (Verfallszeit): the Nineteenth 
Century. His Arcades Project pursues one purpose: 'the overcoming of the 
concept of »progress(( and of the concept of ))declining time(( are only two sides 
of one and the same thing. '43 (GS V, 1, p. 575) Benjamin's thinking seeks to 
overcome these concepts which belong to a historicism that lacks self-reflexivity 
and self-critique. 
B. A Theological Dimension: The Messianic 
Irving Wolfarth asks the Benjamin student of today to 'blot out' theology in 
order to find ways through his work. 44 And Howard Caygill asserts that 'it is not 
essential to Benjamin's concept of experience that the intimations of the future 
be figured Messianically, and indeed to do so in a superficial way compromises 
43 Die Überwindung des Begriffes des »Fortschritts« und des Begriffes der »Verfallszeit« sind 
nur zwei Seiten ein und derselben Sache. ' N2,5 
- 
GS V, 1, p. 575 
44 Wolfarth, Irving, 1998. The Measure of the Possible, the Weight of the Real and the Heat of 
the Moment: Benjamin's Actuality Today. In Marcus, Laura & Nead, Lynda (eds. ), 1998. The 
Actuality of Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 20 
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its rigour. ' I consider the theological an important dimension within Benjamin's 
thinking that attests to the actuality of his work for the process of mourning in 
Germany now. 
In a letter to Max Rychner of 7 March 1932, Benjamin asserts the 
importance of religion and theology for his thinking: 
And if I have to declare it in one word: I have never been able to 
research and think differently as in a, if I may say so, theological 
way of thinking/meaning 
- 
namely in accordance with the talmudic 
doctrine of the forty-nine stages of meaning of every passage in 
the Torah. 46 
In my view it is the theological aspect of Benjamin's work that holds 
valuable clues for our quest of understanding and coming to terms with the 
catastrophic past. 
In his annotations to the theses On the Concept of History, Benjamin 
takes up a general approach where theology functions as some kind of pre- 
stage. At the end always stands the true, pure thought. Benjamin uses the 
image of a piece of blotting paper to explain his relation to theology and religious 
aspects: 
My thinking is to theology as the piece of blotting paper to the ink. 
It has become saturated with it. If the piece of blotting paper was to 
45 Caygill, Howard, 1998. Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge), p. 
149 
46 Und wenn ich es in einem Wort aussprechen soll: ich habe nie anders forschen und denken 
können als in einem, wenn ich so sagen darf, theologischen Sinn 
- 
nämlich in Gemäßheit der 
talmudischen Lehre von den neunundvierzig Sinnstufen jeder Thorastelle. ' Scholem, Gershom & 
Adorno, Theodor W. (eds. ), 1966. Walter Benjamin: Briefe, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Fischer), p. 524, 
quoted after Ullmann, Wolfgang, 1992. Walter Benjamin und die jüdische Theologie. Aber ein 
Sturm weht vom Paradiese her. Texte zu Walter Benjamin (Leipzig: Reclam), p. 117 
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decide, nothing would remain that was written. (GS I, 3, p. 1235 & 
GS V, 1, p. 588)4' 
'Theology is taken up and should 
- 
in his view 
- 
be erased in the process 
of absorption', writes Jurgen Ebach, expert in studies of the Old Testament4ß. 
The imprints of the words on the piece of blotting paper certainly have lost much 
of their 'clarity'; the contours of the signs become blurred. The piece of blotting 
paper itself is rough, not even; as the bearer of the words it reveals the cracks 
and breaks. Jurgen Ebach points out that the image of the saturated blotting 
paper refers to another image: the mirrored writing. Not only does the blotting 
paper suck up the ink, it also takes on the written words, yet in its mirrored form. 
For Benjamin, theology, once erased, can be preserved only in the mirrored 
writing of the blotting paper and its salvation might only be possible in this form. 
Thinking wants to swallow up theology, so that nothing remains. Thinking erases 
theology; yet in this extinction lies its salvation, if not redemption. The idea to 
erase that which is written comes close to the notion of its redemption and 
salvation; that it is its only solution, according to Benjamin, I shall now explain. 
I think Benjamin's remark on theology and thinking is important and 
needs to be looked at in more detail. In order to understand Benjamin's writing 
we need to know something about theology, as Jurgen Ebach claims. But how 
are Benjamin's texts to be interpreted in the light of the (Hebrew) Bible? Is there 
an implication that Benjamin's writing could serve as a interpretation of many 
aspects of our lives, including religion? In his essay "Der Blick des Engels" 
47 Mein Denken verhält sich zur Theologie wie das Löschblatt zur Tinte. Es ist ganz von ihr 
vollgesogen. Ginge es aber nach dem Löschblatt, so würde nichts was geschrieben ist, 
übrigbleiben'. GS 1,3, p. 1235 
48 Jürgen Ebach, 'Der Blick des Engels' in BOLZ, Norbert W. & FABER; Richard (eds. ), 1985. 
Walter Benjamin: Profane Erleuchtung und rettende Kritik (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann), p. 57 
49 ibid., p. 59 
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Jürgen Ebach interprets some texts of the Old Testament (Book of Job; 
Paradise Narration) through Benjamin's texts. In the following I attempt a 
reversal of that reading: the implications of the Book of Job for Benjamin's notion 
of history as manifested in the figure of his Angel of History. 
Perhaps the 'critical' historian has to follow the gaze of the angel 
-a line 
of sight and viewpoint which preserves because it becomes saturated, if not 
soaked, with history in the process of erasing it. Only then does the historian 
become 'the prophet who is turned backwards' (GS 1,3, p. 1235), the prophet 
who 'turns his back on his own time; his visionary powers are sparked off by the 
height of earlier events that retain the past'S0. (GS 1,3, p. 1235) 
While eating from the Tree of Knowledge, while eating the forbidden 
fruits, humanity, itself, decides about the rules of life. It is here, in violating the 
commandment, that humanity recognises 'good' and 'bad'. For Benjamin it is the 
moment through which the 'real', 'true' history becomes ascertainable and can 
be experienced. God's initial beholding is substituted by the subjective 
judgement of good and evil. Humanity becomes autonomous in so far as it 
decides for itself. Expulsion from Paradise is not God's punishment for the 
deeds committed; it is the consequence intrinsic to the deed. The ability to 
recognise 'good' and 'bad' takes humanity away from Paradise. 
Benjamin's Angel wants to stay to pay witness to the fulfilment of the 
hope that the universal history of suffering may be redeemed. Can we still 
assume that there is a connection between a human's deeds and actions and 
his welfare and happiness? Can we still assume that our hope is valid? May it 
50 
... 
der Historiker ist ein rückwärts gekehrter Prophet. Er kehrt der eigenen Zeit den Rücken; 
sein Seherblick entzündet sich an den ins Vergangene verdämmenden Gipfeln der früheren 
Ereignisse. GS I, 3, p. 1235 
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be that the good man can enjoy the fruits of his deeds? '0 earth cover not thou 
my blood, and let my cry have no place' (Job 16,18)51. Does history not teach us 
to draw reversed conclusions from a connection of deed and happiness? 
Jürgen Ebach points out that the hope that the deed of a man bears 
consequences according to the deed, allows for the thought 'that the sufferer 
must be the culprit and that the triumphant murderer cannot be a murderer". If 
we look at Germany's post-war history, success most certainly seems to have 
become the standard for such ethics. The biblical context of deed and 
consequence (intrinsic to the deed) describes the irreversible history of culture 
and civilisation. The deeply pessimistic understanding of the biblical narrator is 
based on his negative experience; the intention of humanity to use its ability to 
foster life stands in opposition to the consequences of its deeds. 
However, the Book of Job does not criticise this frame of reference 
between deed and consequence. Rather, it criticises the reversal of conclusions 
drawn from this frame of reference and the transfer into a doctrine, an ideology. 
Job experiences God as a 'violent criminal' and as a saviour. Jürgen Ebach 
claims that 'the Book of Job refuses a solution which would make the separation 
of violence and salvation possible; it also refuses to reconcile on a higher level 
that which, on the earthly level, can only be understood only as a 
contradiction'53. The world is full of events, moments and circumstances that 
seem random and withdraw themselves from human understanding. The Book 
of Job does not give an answer for the reason, the purpose or the necessity of 
Job's suffering. Hope exists so that, at the end, everything that seemed 
purposeless and pointless can causally or finally be explained. 
51 Ach Erde bedecke mein Blut nicht, und mein Schreien finde keine Ruhestatt! ' (Hiob 16,18). 
52 Jürgen Ebach, 'Der Blick des Engels' in BOLZ, Norbert W. & FABER; Richard (eds. ), 1985. 
Walter Benjamin: Profane Erleuchtung und rettende Kritik (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann), p. 74 
53 ibid., p. 76/7 
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It is the end, the breaking-off of the universal history of suffering, which is 
the history of mankind, that Benjamin's Angel of History would like to oversee. 
To Benjamin the Messiah is not only the conqueror of the Anti-Christ; it figures in 
relation to redemption and the Judgement Day. At the same time, Benjamin 
forms a link to the directly political actions of revolutionary classes: 
A historical materialist approaches a historical subject only where 
he encounters it as a monad. In this structure he recognises the 
sign of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a 
revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past. (XVII. 
Thesis)' 
and 
But classless society is not to be drafted as the end of an historical 
development 
... 
The term of classless society needs to be given 
back its true Messianic appearance, specifically in the interest of 
the revolutionary politics of the proletariat itself. (GS I, 3, p. 1232) 
To Benjamin it seems important to hold onto the dialectical opposition of 
the concepts of theological Messianism and directly political Marxism. Jürgen 
Ebach stresses that Benjamin offers an 'explosive linking' of theology and 
Marxism 'in which theology is endowed with the task of stripping materialism of 
all pseudo-theological attitudes and of making it political again; materialism, on 
the other hand, is meant to refer theology back to its theme of redemption'. 
Benjamin, against certain trains of thought in Marxism or Theology, 
decisively rejects the notion of a fulfilment of history: 
In truth there is not one moment which does not carry its 
revolutionary chance with it 
- 
it only wants to be defined as a 
specific one, namely as the chance of a totally new solution in the 
face of a totally new task. To the revolutionary thinker the 
sa Illuminations, 1999, p. 254 
es Jürgen Ebach, 'Der Blick des Engels' in BOLZ, Norbert W. & FABER; Richard (eds. ), 1985. 
Walter Benjamin: Profane Erleuchtung und rettende Kritik (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann), p. 83 
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characteristic revolutionary chance of any historical moment 
confirms itself out of the political situation. But no less does it 
confirm itself to him through the key power of this moment over a 
specific, up until then closed apartment of the past. The admission 
to this apartment strictly coincides with the political action; and it is 
this admission through which it reveals itself 
- 
how ever 
devastating 
- 
as Messianic. (Classless society is not the final task 
of progress in history but its so often failed, finally contrived 
interruption. ) (GS I, 3, p. 1231) 
Benjamin asserts that history 'needs to be brushed against the grain' (VII. 
Theses)'; the 'culture of epistemological abilities' which Benjamin demands 
may, however, not be understood as a purely epistemological history that insists 
in itself: 
A chronicler who recites events without distinguishing between 
major and minor ones acts in accordance with the following truth: 
nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for 
history. To be sure, only a redeemed mankind receives the fullness 
of its past 
- 
which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its 
past become citable in all its moments. Each moment it has lived 
becomes a citation ä I'ordre du jour 
- 
and that day is Judgement 
Day. (III. Theses)' 
Benjamin's concept of experience includes an artistic and religious 
dimension. It is this `the concept of experience itself that, as Caygill states, 
se In Wirklichkeit gibt es nicht einen Augenblick, der seine revolutionäre Chance nicht mit sich 
führte 
- 
sie will nur als eine spezifische definiert sein, nämlich als Chance einer ganz neuen 
Lösung im Angesicht einer ganz neuen Aufgabe. Dem revolutionären Denker bestätigt sich die 
eigentümliche revolutionäre Chance jedes geschichtlichen Augenblicks aus der politischen 
Situation heraus. Aber sie bestätigt sich ihm nicht minder durch die Schlüsselgewalt dieses 
Augenblicks über ein ganz bestimmtes, bis dahin verschlossenes Gemach der Vergangenheit. 
Der Eintritt in diese Gemach fällt mit der politischen Aktion strikt zusammen; und er ist es, durch 
den sie sich, wie vernichtend immer, als eine messianische zu erkennen gibt. (Die klassenlose 
Gesellschaft ist nicht das Endziel des Fortschritts in der Geschichte sondern dessen so oft 
mißglückte, endlich bewerkstelligte Unterbrechung. )' GS 1,3, p. 1231 
57 Illuminations, 1999, p. 248 
58 Illuminations, 1999, p. 246 
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necessarily exceeds philosophy, and puts into question the relationship between 
philosophical reflection and its object'. By including the experience of the 
absolute, Benjamin opens the dimension of experience to reach beyond, thus 
creating a metaphysics of experience. It is Benjamin's concentration on 
precisely the 'complexity of intuition', as Caygill remarks, 'on things seen over 
those of understanding'60. To Benjamin, the modern destruction of experience is 
manifest in the collapse of Erfahrung into the Erlebnis, of the experience into the 
lived instant. Benjamin is insinuating a traumatic destruction of the world as an 
object capable of being experienced. In Erfahrung and Armut (Experience and 
Destitution), Benjamin describes the soldier returning from the war and his 
suffering of the destruction of meaningful experience. For Benjamin, the soldier's 
suffering is only a more drastic account of what every individual of modern 
society has to encounter daily: the ultimate loss and transformation of 
experience 
- 
the `destruction of experience as tradition"". The problem of 
modernity seems to become a problem of experience for Benjamin. Only critique 
and criticism permit us to experience the destruction of experience 
- 
it must 
translate the occurrences and events of the world as Erlebnisse into becoming 
Erfahrungen. The loss of experience, however, involves the need to recover 
possible experiences of the past: 
Whatever is excluded from the time of the present 
- 
whether this 
be past or future 
- 
announces itself obliquely in the form of 
distortion and exclusion 
... 
' 
e9 Caygill, Howard, 1998. Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge), p. 
xiv 
60 ibid, p. xiv 
61 ibid., p. 31 
62 ibid., p. 7 
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Benjamin's conception of theoretical experience resembles the 
discontinuous time (or space), which, however, is implied indirectly by means of 
distortion and deformation within the presently projected time. The importance of 
eschatology for Benjamin's thinking becomes apparent in his construction of 
discontinuous time, of temporal experience. Benjamin interrogates modernity as 
a sense of lost experience through experiencing the loss of experience. It marks 
an attempt to recognise experiences that are discontinuous from the present - 
absent, because excluded, as well as present for potential experience, which is 
implied by and yet lost to this present. 
The Messianic theme running through Benjamin's entire thinking is placed 
in relation to the likely, hopeful momentum of redemption. Like Benjamin, 
Caygill dedicates the closing words of his book'The Colour of Experience' to the 
theme of the Messianic. He identifies the importance of eschatological thinking 
but asserts that the Messianic has often been over-interpreted. The Angelus 
Novus bears witness to the ruination, according to Caygill, in expectation of a 
new promise or law. I would like to argue that Benjamin insists on the 
impossibility of knowing redemption, yet he insists on the hope for the 
approaching redeemer who then would restore what was lost and mend what 
was broken. When Caygill claims that Benjamin makes the speculative 
immanent to his temporal experience, not enough attention is paid to the 
importance of the Messianic interpretation of Benjamin's writing. Most certainly 
the closing words of On the Concept of History point to an eschatological 
interpretation, and the distinctive feature of Benjamin's thinking is the highly 
theological influence: 'For every second of time was the straight gate through 
63 Caygill identifies the Messianic thematic of Benjamin's writing as particular dogmatic that 
arises almost always out of the 'problem' of redemption (Caygill, 1998. p. 149). In my 
understanding, it is precisely this dialectical tension of identification of catastrophic world history 
and its possible, if not likely, salvation through the redeeming Messiah that marks the actuality of 
Benjamin's theory. It is the Either/Or that comes close to a mediation. 
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which the Messiah might enter. ' Benjamin asserts the importance of hope and 
reconciliation in the divine sense at the end of his interpretation of Goethe's 
Elective Affinities: 
This most paradoxical, most fleeting hope at last emerges out of 
the appearance of reconciliation, in the same way that when the 
sun wanes, the evening star arises in the twilight which outlives the 
night 
... 
All hope is based in this most humble, also the richest 
hope only can come from it. Thus, in the end, hope justifies the 
appearance of reconciliation and Plato's statement that it is absurd 
to wish for the appearance of the good suffers its only exemption. 
Because the appearance of reconciliation may, if not must be 
intended: it alone is the home to the most extreme hope. 
... 
To the 
certainty of blessing which in the novella the lovers carry home, the 
hope for redemption answers which we cherish for all the dead 
... Only for the sake of the hopeless ones have we been given hope. ' 
(GS I, 1, p. 200/201)` 
- 
it is the hope for the dead. Benjamin here most clearly demonstrates 
possibilities for 'meaning', for life's purpose that by far exceed mere attempts of 
explaining experience. Benjamin implies an ideal of Messianic wakefulness in 
view of the catastrophe: it is the duality between the historical time, which is 
unfulfilled and infinite, and the Messianic time. As Caygill affirms, 'it is the 
64 Illuminations, 1999, p. 255 
65 Jene paradoxeste, flüchtigste Hoffnung taucht zuletzt aus dem Schein der Versöhnung, wie 
im Maß, da die Sonne verlischt, im Dämmer der Abendstern aufgeht, der die Nacht überdauert 
... 
Und auf solchem geringsten beruht alle Hoffnung, auch die reichste kommt nur aus ihm. So 
rechtfertigt am Ende die Hoffnung den Schein der Versöhnung und der Satz des Platon, 
widersinnig sei es, den Schein des Guten zu wollen, erleidet seine einzige Ausnahme. Denn der 
Schein der Versöhnung darf, ja er soll gewollt werden: er allein ist das Haus der äußersten 
Hoffnung 
... 
der Gewißheit des Segens, den in der Novelle die Liebenden heimtragen, erwidert 
die Hoffnung auf Erlösung, die wir für alle Toten hegen 
... 
Nur um der Hoffnungslosen willen ist 
uns die Hoffnung gegeben. ' GS I, 1, p. 200/201 
w s. also Weigel, Sigrid, 1996. Body- and Image-Space: Re-Reading Walter Benjamin (London: 
Routledge) 
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experience of the absolute'. 67 He however continues to confirm that it could not 
be hope where the break-off would be redemptive; it is the 'rather paradoxical 
hope for the hopeless'. This Messianic aspect, this paradox that there is hope 
for the forsaken ones, is precisely the dialectic in Benjamin's thought. 
B. a. A Detour on the Lutheran/Protestant 'Rechtfertigungslehre': 
Justification by Faith Alone 
Gillian Rose in her essay Walter Benjamin 
- 
Out of the Sources of 
Modem Judaism68 argues that it is precisely the Protestant Lutheran ethic of 
'justification by faith alone', with its worldly aestheticism, that leads to the loss of 
salvation; and has its consequent outcome in the violent spirit of Fascism69. An 
unintended consequence of the Protestant ethic is its Innerlichkeit (inwardness), 
Rose states, which legitimised one's worldly vocation, demonstrating but never 
earning salvation. The Protestant form of inwardness correlates with the 
transition from the Reformation's form of asceticism to the artificiality and 
aesthetics of the Baroque era: 'They are also correlated with the transition from 
67 Caygill, Howard, 1998. Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge), p. 51 
sa Rose, Gillian, 1993, Judaism & Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell); see also in Marcus, Laura & 
Nead, Lynda (eds. ), 1998. The Actuality of Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & Wishart) 
ss The theory to link the Reformation and Luther to the emergence of Fascism and the Third 
Reich is not new. The theory that Germany went down a "Special Path" (Sonderweg) 
- 
as 
opposed to the other European enlightened states 
- 
into the Third Reich, however, bears its 
problems, if only to exculpate the German state and its citizens from any kind of active 
involvement because they were 'predestined" to go along that path of history. 
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the end of politics in the spirit of capitalism to aestheticised politics in the spirit of 
Fascism. '70 
In a section of the Trauerspiel under the heading 'Doctrine of Salvation' 
(Rechtfertigungslehre) Benjamin writes: 
The great German dramatists of the Baroque were Lutherans. 
While in the last decades of the counter-reformative restoration, 
Catholicism, with its entire strength, penetrated the profane life; 
Lutheranism was positioned antinomic to every day life. The 
rigorous morality of bourgeois life-style which it taught was 
opposed by its turning away from the »good deeds((. In denying 
them the specific spiritual miracle effect, by referring the soul to the 
mercy of the belief and by making the world-stately realm to a trial 
of an only indirect religious life, meant, for the demonstration of 
bourgeois virtues, it had established in the people the strict 
obligation of duties but in the great the melancholy. ' (GS I, 1, p. 
317)71 
Both Benjamin and Gillian Rose have not taken into account that, in 
Lutheran Protestantism, the question of justification by faith has never become 
an ethical question: The ethical context of deed and consequence, the 
connection of the perpetrator to his deed, has never lost its validity; it remains in 
force: It refers `the soul to the mercy of one's belief. Whereas Catholicism 
penetrates the profane life, the Lutheran belief takes away all of its strength and 
70 Rose, Gillian, 1998. Walter Benjamin 
- 
Out of the Sources of Modem Judaism. The Actuality 
of Walter Benjamin, Marcus, Laura & Nead, Lynda (eds. ), (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 88 
71 Die großen deutschen Dramatiker des Barock waren Lutheraner. Während in den letzten 
Jahrzehnten der gegenreformatorischen Restauration der Katholizismus mit der gesammelten 
Macht seiner Disziplin das profane Leben durchdrang, hatte von jeher das Luthertum 
antinomisch zum Alltag gestanden. Der rigorosen Sittlichkeit der bürgerlichen Lebensführung, 
die es lehrte, stand seine Abkehr von den »guten Werken« gegenüber. Indem es die besondere 
geistliche Wunderwirkung diesen absprach, die Seele auf die Gnade des Glaubens verwies und 
weltlich-staatlichen Bereich zur Probstatt eines religiös nur mittelbaren, zum Ausweis 
bürgerlicher Tugenden bestimmten Lebens machte, hat es im Volke zwar den strengen 
Pflichtgehorsam angesiedelt, in seinen großen aber den Trübsinn. ' GS I, 1, p. 317 
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power, gloominess sets in and finally melancholia, Benjamin maintains. 
'Justification by faith alone' does not justify any unscrupulous action; the 
Lutheran doctrine of salvation does not separate signification from salvation. 
The instrumental rationalisation of the world is more a product of progressive 
science than an outcome of loss of salvation. 
C. Hope for Redemption and Salvation 
In his interpretation of the Baroque age and its use of the Allegoria 
(Trauerspiel), Benjamin describes the turning from melancholy into hope, from 
break-off as destruction into break-off as redemption, from desperation into 
consolation. The prohibition to depict denies the representation of a positive 
conception of hope, salvation and consolation. Until the end it refers to the 
absorption into melancholia, destruction and desperation: 
This time of hell becomes secularised in the room and that world 
which surrendered and gave itself to the deepest spirit of Satan, is 
that of God. In God's world the allegorist awakes. 
... 
Therewith the 
allegory looses everything that belonged to her as the most 
characteristic: the secret, privileged knowledge, the tyranny in the 
realm of dead things, the supposed infinity of the emptiness of 
hope. All this scatters with one complete turning, in which the 
allegorical immersion has to vacate the last phantasmagoria of the 
objective and in which it finds itself, now solely thrown back on its 
own resources, not playfully in the material world but seriously in 
heaven. This precisely is the nature of melancholic immersion that 
her last resources, in which it believes to be the most assured of 
the depraved, turn into allegories; that they fill and deny the void, in 
which they portray themselves; as at the end the intention not 
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faithfully endures in the sight of the mortal remains but unfaithfully 
jumps across to the resurrection''. (GS I, 1, p. 406) 
In this Benjaminian notion of redemption, redemption figures not as 
fulfilment and culmination of the history of progress but as its break-off. It cannot 
function as the meaning of the totality of history, only as its end. For Benjamin's 
thinking, the confrontation between the notion of history's fulfilment as the 
completion of a development 
- 
with the Messianic notion of end, of breaking-off, 
of standstill 
- 
is decisive. It is the notion of breaking-off which predominates the 
idea of history's meaning. The need for redemption in light of the human 
catastrophe seems so immense that 'the question of the reality and unreality of 
redemption itself hardly matters''. 
What if the enlightening concept of the gradual victory of religion over 
reason remained illusion? What would the position of the Now be in humanity's 
history of religion? Benjamin's theses On the Concept of History fight against 
despair by thoroughly destroying the illusion of linear and natural progress only 
to recognise the past in such a way that its contents become prophecies of and 
for the future. Theology is not understood as a means to legitimise or to 
differentiate political action, but newly to grasp the concept of revelation as a 
n 
, 
Denn auch diese Zeit der Hölle wird im Raume säkularisiert und jene Welt, die sich dem tiefen 
Geist des Satan preisgab und verriet, ist Gottes. In Gottes Welt erwacht der Allegoriker.... Damit 
freilich geht der Allegorie alles verloren, was ihr als Eigenstes zugehörte: das geheime, 
privilegierte Wissen, die Willkürherrschaft im Bereich der toten Dinge, die vermeintliche 
Unendlichkeit der Hoffnungsleere. All das zerstiebt mit jenem einen Umschwung, in dem die 
allegorische Versenkung die letzte Phantasmagorie des Objektiven räumen muß und, gänzlich 
auf sich selbst gestellt, nicht mehr spielerisch in erdhafter Dingwelt sondern ernsthaft unterm 
Himmel sich wiederfindet. Das eben ist das Wesen melancholischer Versenkung, daß ihre 
letzten Gegenstände, in denen des Verworfnen sie am völligsten sich zu versichern glaubt, in 
Allegorien umschlagen, daß sie das Nichts, in dem sie sich darstellen, erfüllen und verleugnen, 
so wie die Intention zuletzt im Anblick der Gebeine nicht treu verharrt, sondern zur Auferstehung 
treulos überspringt. ' GS 1,1, p. 406 
73 Adorno, Theodor, 2000. Minima Moralia (London: Verso), p. 247 
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purely theological one, to re-develop a language that combines life and 
judgement. Benjamin demands of his reader more than the enlightened 
understanding of the realm of God as a purely symbolic expression of final 
victory of good over evil. The Messianic redemption has to be understood in a 
strict theological context as something beyond a moral concept of finality and 
conclusion: 'Trauerspiel 
- 
and I would like to argue with Rose that Benjamin's 
entire oeuvre 
in its extreme allegorical forms demands a theological 
understanding not an aesthetic one, but this theology would be a 
dynamic theology of history, not "a guaranteed economics of 
salvation *74. 
'By dint of a secret heliotropism the past strives to turn toward the sun 
which is rising in the sky of history' (IV. Theses)". This is Benjamin's 
precondition to the idea of the realm of God in which the past turns towards the 
sun, which is rising in the sky of history. In yet another of his allegorical pictures 
Benjamin gives us the precondition for the coming of God's realm: only if the 
clouds of the epoch's self-consciousness have parted can the Messianic sun 
shine. In the Theological-Political Fragment Benjamin had claimed the profane 
could not be a category of the Messianic realm, only of its most silent coming. 
Now, in the theses On the Concept of History, Benjamin puts the profane into 
concrete terms of historical struggle, the struggle of the classes for raw and 
material things, which in their rawness and materiality become essential. Here, 
the thinking about the Messianic realm becomes concrete: it is the realm of the 
one who not only comes as the redeemer but also 'as the subduer of Antichrist', 
74 Rose, Gillian, 1998. Walter Benjamin 
- 
Out of the Source of Modem Judaism. The Actuality of 
Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 98; Rose quotes from the 'Trauerspiel', GS I, 
2 
75 Illuminations, 1999, p. 246 
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as the subduer of the one from whose powers of deception not even the dead 
will be safe (VI. Thesis). 
History cannot relate itself to the Messianic; God's realm is not its 
immanent end. The relation of history to the Messianic can only be established 
by the Messiah. The order of the profane and God's realm have to be 
understood as profoundly different entities. Benjamin radically distinguishes not 
only the realm of God and the world but emphatically marks out the asymmetry 
in their radical difference. The Messiah's action is the condition for a possible 
relation of the two; it can neither be anticipated in humanity's fortunate moments 
nor in its end. The absence of Messianic force in history is totalised in the 
complete a-historicity of the Messianic. 
'In Fortune all earthly things strive for their end, but only in fortune it is 
destined to find its end'76 (GS II, 1, p. 204). Only with the destruction of the 
profane could the profane actually promote the coming of the Messianic realm. 
If, however, the order of the profane is restored solely in the idea of fortune, the 
coming of the Messianic realm can be established only in its end, which the 
profane desire for happiness was aiming at right from the beginning. Then, so 
Benjamin maintains, politics of nihilism and the destruction of fortune do not 
count as categories of the realm but one of 'its most silent approach 177 (GS 11,1, 
p. 204) 
- 
drowned out only by the storm which is blowing away the Angel. 
Would the Messianic fulfilment or completion of history only be possible in 
a thorough break from the world, thus provoked and made possible by the 
destruction of the world? Can redemption be seen as destruction of history and 
thus as restitution of pure spirit? Spirit is only restored through the destruction of 
76 Denn im Glück erstrebt alles Irdische seinen Untergang, nur im Glück aber ist ihm der 
Untergang zu finden bestimmt. ' Theologisch-Politisches Fragment, GS 11,1, p. 204 
77 
, 
seines leisesten Nahens': GS 11,1, p. 204 
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world and life; suffering is terminated through the extinction of life and not 
through its curing or through the restitution of spiritual and physical integrity. 
Where is the indepictable, transcendent God? The God of creation who saw at 
the end of his work that his creation was good? 
What remains is the provocative awareness that every Future marks a 
work of destruction of the past and that it, at the same time, places the code of 
inner dissolubility within the present. In historical moments of existential danger, 
this remembering, this state of awareness, breaks open and flashes up as 
salvation, as redemption. Should the moment be missed, history would sink into 
the irretrievability, and the present would loose itself in stagnation, domination 
and power. Catastrophes make history collapse into constantly new orders with 
all the elements of chance, exteriority and inaccuracies. Like the Benjaminian 
kaleidoscope, where everything changes with every turning 
- 
the images full of 
facets are differently composed 
- 
history collapses into constantly different 
formations and images: 'History disintegrates into images, not stories. ' (GS V. 1, 
p. 596)'$. The concept of catastrophe, like the kaleidoscope, is the mirror of the 
dominating ideas of order and structure. Its destruction, the kaleidoscope's 
destruction, would be the first revolutionary action (see 'Zentralpark' in GS I, 2). 
Only the radical separation of the realm of God from history makes an 
understanding possible where the world's destruction can be read as 
redemption. Suffering in the world will be removed through the elimination of life, 
not through a curing salvation. Ultimately, Benjamin's understanding of the 
Creation is positive and gives an affirmation to humanity's claim to happiness 
- 
the nihilistic mediation of God and world in the world's destruction is moved 
towards the Messianic intervention in the break-off of its catastrophic progress. 
Any interruption of the catastrophe implies the possibility of salvation: 
78 Geschichte zerfällt in Bilder, nicht in Geschichten. ' GS V, 1, p. 596 
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'like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed 
with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a 
claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply. Historical materialists 
are aware of that. " 
- 
like the 
'conception of the present as the 'time of now' which is shot 
through with chips of Messianic time'80. 
The difference between the recalled past and the 'past charged with the 
time of the now'81 (XIV. Thesis) was decisive for Benjamin's thinking. The 
'today', the 'now', which in the constructions of the history of the empty 
homogeneous time is always reduced and minimised to the already vanished 
point, becomes, in the Messianic history, the at-any-time-possible moment in 
which 'Eingedenken'82, political action and breaking-off of the continuum 
coincide as redemption. 
History's Angel is bestowed with ultimate melancholia, contemplating the 
destruction of the world 
- 
and he only came to announce the silent approach of 
the Messiah. He wants to stay to awaken the dead, to make whole that which 
has been smashed; but he cannot. Upon the realisation of his inability and 
impossible task, shock and melancholia set in and are reflected in the Angel's 
face 
- 
that is what the expression of his gaze means: shock, horror and despair 
upon what he sees; the wish, the longing to interfere, to change the course of 
history; the despair and pain upon the realisation of the impossibility of such a 
task. The Angel cannot remain, and the further away the storm blows him, the 
more his eyes widen in horror. The Angel resembles another Benjaminian 
image; like the Baudelairian onlooker Benjamin's Angel of History cannot 
79 Illuminations, 1999, p. 246 
80 Illuminations, 1999, p. 255 
81 Illuminations, 1999, p. 253 
82 The term 'Eingedenken' is difficult to translate; 'Eingedenken' is more of a concept of action, of 
active remembering, so I decided to work mainly with the German word. 
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interfere, he becomes an utterly helpless witness painfully enduring the sight of 
death and destruction. The Angel cannot redeem, for history's victims have no 
redeemer in this world. However, Benjamin's Angel, sent by God and attesting 
to humanity, bears witness and hope to the redeemer's silent approach- and in 
the space of his mission the Angel is good. 
The disappearance of the history of the sufferer and of the oppressed in 
history's laws is a triumph over the victims. Benjamin's Angel embodies the 
protest against any kind of triumph over the victims. Hope is there but not for the 
fulfilment, but for the breaking-off of the history of suffering. It can never be 
hoped that the suffering fulfilled any purpose or meaning or might prove to, but 
that it comes to an end. At the end of the Book of Job the purpose or meaning of 
Job's suffering is not unfolded, only its end. It recounts the end of this one 
suffering; therewith partially, in concrete utopian terms, it describes that all 
suffering might come to an end. Benjamin clearly defines theology's role as 
hope and longing, very much so in the sense of Horkheimer's understanding of 
theology as 'expression of a longing, a longing that the murderer might not be 
triumphant over the innocent victim'. 
83 Ausdruck einer Sehnsucht, einer Sehnsucht danach, daß der Mörder nicht über das 
unschuldige Opfer triumphieren möge. ' Horkheimer, Max, 1970. Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz 
Anderen (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag), p. 62 
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2. Eingedenken: the Memory of the Nameless 
A. Deserted and Betrayed by Memory 
In his Aufzeichnungen und Materialien (Notes and Details) on the 
Passagenwerk (Arcades Project) Benjamin resumes the question of the 
incompleteness of history, which Max Horkheimer had propounded to him in a 
letter of 16th March 1937: 
The statement of incompleteness is idealistic if the completeness is 
not included in it. Past injustice happened and is finished. The 
stroked dead really are dead 
... 
If we take the incompleteness 
seriously we have to believe in the Last Judgement 
... 
Perhaps 
there is, in relation to the incompleteness, a difference between the 
positive and the negative so that only injustice, terror, the 
sufferings of the past are irreparable. Fulfilled justice, happiness - 
these works relate differently towards time because their positive 
character is widely negated through its transience. At first this 
applies to the individual being in which not fortune but misfortune is 
sealed through death. 
Benjamin then continues with his refutation of Horkheimer's theory: 
The corrective of these trains of thought lies in the consideration 
that history is not simply a science but also and no less a form of 
'Eingedenken' (mindful remembering). What science has 
»proven«, 'Eingedenken' can modify. 'Eingedenken' can make the 
unfinished (happiness) into something finished, and the finished (suffering) into something unfinished. That is theology; but what we 
experience in 'Eingedenken' prevents us from understanding 
history in a fundamentally atheological manner, just as it excludes 
its being written in purely theological concepts. '84 
sa Über die Frage der Unabgeschlossenheit der Geschichte Brief von Horkheimer vom 16 März 
1937: "Die Feststellung der Unabgeschlossenheit ist idealistisch, wenn die Abgeschlossenheit 
nicht in ihr aufgenommen ist. Das vergangene Unrecht ist geschehen und abgeschlossen. Die 
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Benjamin's concept of 'Eingedenken' needs to be seen and read as a 
Messianic sign against the context of anti-enlightened barbarism. 'Eingedenken' 
directs the view onto history in which its continuous horrors and a concept of the 
present as 'Jetzt-Zeit' are combined equally, because 'fragments of the 
Messianic are sprinkled in'85. For Benjamin there can be no such thing as 
'progress' in relation to historical time; he asserts its possible abolition in the 
sign of the Messiah who 'every second could be entering through this small 
gate'86. Within the momentum of 'Eingedenken' the event of the Messiah's 
coming and his actions are never part of knowledge. Benjamin's concept of 
'Eingedenken', in its manner towards history, is identical to the direction of the 
coming Messiah, Ottmar John confirms. 87 The universal concept of happiness 
asserts everybody's 
- 
including the dead's 
- 
entitlement to redemption in the 
Erschlagenen sind wirklich erschlagen 
... 
Nimmt man die Unabgeschlossenheit ganz ernst, so 
muß man das jüngste Gericht glauben 
... 
Vielleicht besteht in Beziehung auf die 
Unabgeschlossenheit ein Unterschied zwischen dem Positiven und dem Negativen, so daß nur 
das Unrecht, der Schrecken, die Schmerzen der Vergangenheit irreparable sind. Die geübte 
Gerechtigkeit, die Freuden, die Werke verhalten sich anders zur Zeit, denn ihr positiver 
Charakter wird durch die Vergänglichkeit weitgehend negiert. Dies gilt zunächst im individuellen 
Dasein, in welchem nicht das Glück, sondern das Unglück durch den Tod besiegelt wird. ' Das 
Korrektiv dieser Gedankengänge liegt in der Überlegung, daß die Geschichte nicht alleine eine 
Wissenschaft sondern nicht minder eine Form des Eingedenkens ist. Was die Wissenschaft 
»festgestellt« hat, kann das Eingedenken modifizieren. Das Eingedenken kann das 
Unabgeschlossene (das Glück) zu einem Abgeschlossenen und das Abgeschlossene (das Leid) 
zu einem Unabgeschlossenen machen. Das ist Theologie; aber im Eingedenken machen wir 
eine Erfahrung, die uns verbietet, die Geschichte grundsätzlich atheologisch zu begreifen, so 
wenig wir sie in unmittelbar theologischen Begriffen zu schreiben versuchen dürfen. ' GS V, 1, p. 
588/9 
85 Illuminations, 1999. p. 255 
86 Illuminations, 1999, p. 255 
87 John, Ottmar, 2000. Walter Benjamin: Zwischen Gnosis und Messianismus. In Valentin, 
Joachim & Wendel, Saskia (eds. ), 2000. Jüdische Tradition in der Philosophie des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), p. 67 
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reflecting action of 'Eingedenken'. In view of the suppressed past, this universal 
concept of happiness holds onto the entitlement of redemption, but the concept 
remains an abstract one. In the 'Eingedenken', understanding is directed 
towards the very place where happiness will happen in the form of universal 
salvation: in the life of the unhappy and of those destroyed through human deed 
and guilt. The hope that is effective in the Benjaminian concept of 'Eingedenken' 
is given to the hopeless. 
Ernst Bloch's remarkable characterisation of the term 'forgetting' shows a 
close and significant immanence to the Benjaminian theory: 
If remembering (Erinnerung) presupposes that something has 
been forgotten, forgetting altogether marks the failure where and 
against which remembering and hope as reflection ultimately meet. 
As far as the failure of forgetting is concerned, remembering 
appears as admonition and hope as Eingedenken [mindful 
remembering]; both are united in utopia in relation to 
consciousness and knowledge of a refraining, of a not-done, of a 
to-be-done. Forgetting is not the antithesis of remembering, since 
remembering's antithesis would be a total failure, one where 
nothing is affected, where no admonition has its place, to which no 
way of reflection can lead. For the same reason forgetting is also, 
no antithesis to hopeful 'Eingedenken'. Rather, forgetting is a 
modus of remembering as well as 'Eingedenken'; it is that very 
deficiency which in memory is called desertion, and in 
'Eingedenken' is called betrayal. Thus forgetting is lack of 
faithfulness and not a faithfulness against something that has 
waned/ceased to exist, but against something that is not settled. 
Forgetting of such utopian standing becomes apparent within 
remembering 
- 
if it is made objective, if it is shown at objects 
- 
as 
the horror of admonition not to have dealt with, not to be taken up, 
not to be picked up along the road: in this executed remembering 
of catching up, everything decayed then appears like a deserted 
lover, every sea devil so to speak as a severe sin of omission. 
Forgetting within remembering could also want to communicate 
itself to the primeval beginning of the Nothing in such a way that in 
it there exists a crime that has never been reflected on, that has 
never been put right, and after which the whole world, that has 
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formed since then, is penetrated by it, a dungeons which is 
unbroken until reflection succeeds. 
Bloch clearly marks out that forgetting, remembering and hope ultimately 
meet. Within forgetting, remembrance is there to make us aware and to warn us; 
hope stands for the 'Eingedenken' of the dead. Forgetting is the very desertion 
and betrayal of the history of the sufferer and the deed. Forgetting as part of our 
memory marks the betrayal of that which has not been settled, of that which has 
not been reflected on. This is a very important aspect of Bloch's and Benjamin's 
thought which has relevance to the current problems of working-through and 
coming-to-terms in Germany: there are no ways to make good and atone the 
indescribable suffering, pain, torture and death that has been inflicted on others 
during the historical event which is known to us now as the Shoah. We tend to 
suppress such negative experiences, especially if we have no direct 
sa Bloch, Ernst, 1977. Tübinger Einleitung in die Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe XIII (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp), p. 282: Wenn Erinnerung voraussetzt, daß etwas vergessen worden ist, so ist 
Vergessen insgesamt die Unterlassung, woran und wogegen Erinnern und Hoffen als Besinnung 
sich letzthin begegnen. Vom Ausfall Vergessen her erscheint Erinnerung als Mahnung, Hoffnung 
als Eingedenken; beides ist im Gewissens-, Wissensbezug auf ein Unterlassen, Unbesorgtes, zu 
Besorgendes utopisch geeint. Das Vergessen ist kein Gegenteil des Erinnerns, denn dessen 
Gegenteil wäre vollkommener Ausfall, einer, an dem gar nichts betrifft, an dem keine Mahnung 
statthat, zu dem überhaupt kein besinnender Weg führen kann. Das Vergessen ist aus gleichem 
Grund auch kein Gegenteil des Hoffnungs-Eingedenkens, vielmehr. Vergessen ist ein Modus 
der Erinnerung wie des Eingedenkens, ist jenes Defiziens, das im Gedächtnis Verlassen, im 
Eingedenken Verrat heißt. Vergessen ist also Mangel an Treue und wieder nicht einer Treue 
gegen Erloschenes, sondern gegen Unabgegoltenes. Vergessen diese utopischen Rangs macht 
sich in der Erinnerung, wenn es objektiviert, an Objekten erscheint, als ein Grauen der Mahnung 
kenntlich, nicht besorgt, nicht mitgenommen, nicht am Weg aufgehoben worden zu sein: jedes 
Verrottete sieht in dieser mitvollzogenen Aufholens-Erinnerung dann aus wie eine verlassene 
Geliebte, jeder Seeteufel sozusagen wie eine schwere Unterlassungssünde. Vergessen in der 
Erinnerung kann sogar auf den Uranfang des Nichts ausstrahlen wollen, dergestalt daß darin ein 
nicht zur Besinnung gebrachtes, nicht gutgemachtes 
- 
Verbrechen vorliegt, wonach die gesamte 
seitdem gewordene Welt davon durchdrungen und ein bis zur gelingenden Besinnung 
unaufgebrochener Kerker. ' 
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biographical experience but only `know' of it. It takes the conscious attempt and 
action to reach beyond death and murder to remember, as the theologian 
Helmut Peukert confirms: 
Communicative action as remembering solidarity with the 
innocently murdered, then seems a statement of reality which 
saves the other, who acted historically, from extermination (through 
forgetting). 
The idea of abolishing all suffering seems a twisted and distorted notion 
in view of past and present historical events. However, in view of Benjamin's 
notion of history it can only be wrong to accept that suffering unalterably belongs 
to the existence of humanity. Like the Book of Job, Benjamin rejects any false 
reconciliation; there can be no legitimising of suffering, no reason, no necessity 
and no purpose of it. Only constant admonition and reflection will open up the 
incarcerated and suppressed memory and will give way to hope of a possible 
break-off of all suffering: 
Like the cleansing storm before a clap of thunder, God's wrath 
roars in the storm of forgiveness through history to sweep along 
everything that should be consumed forever in the lightning of the 
divine weather. What is said in this picture ought to be clearly 
expressible in concepts: the significance of time in the economy of 
the moral world, in which it not merely effaces the traces of the 
misdeed (Untat), but also through its duration 
- 
and beyond all 
ss Helmut Peukert in Körner, Klaus, 1992. Verlorenes nur was uns bleibt. Aber ein Sturm weht 
vom Paradiese her. Texte zu Walter Benjamin (Leipzig: Reclam), p. 149: Kommunikatives 
Handeln in erinnernder Solidarität mit den unschuldig Vernichteten erschiene dann als die 
Behauptung einer Wirklichkeit, die den anderen als den, der geschichtlich gehandelt hat, vor der 
Vernichtung (durch Vergessen) bewahrt. 
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remembering and forgetting 
- 
leads in a most mysterious manner 
to forgiveness, although never to reconciliation. (GS VI, p. 98)90 
For Benjamin, the spatial continuum of time always entails a moral 
dimension. It is important that an effort or attempt is made to encourage 
restoration and reinstatement; yet the very effort can never find its end or 
fulfilment. What if God's storm of forgiveness is blowing so hard that the bearer 
of his news, the Angelus Novus, cannot stay? What if his herald, upon viewing 
the human catastrophe, is so shocked that he forgets to close his wings so that 
the Messianic news does not reach humanity? 
Ernst Bloch asked infinitely more of the concept of 'Eingedenken' than 
mere remembering. History, he claims, 
cannot be evoked by memory alone, unless the categories of 
relations of effectiveness and inner-historical values are joined by 
the continuation of life, the state where finally one self and the 
entity is affected, the truest "reprint", the productive scheme of 
'Eingedenken'. 
... 
The dead return 
- 
in the new doing as well as in 
the newly announced context 
- 
and understood history, which is 
subjected to continuous revolutionary concepts, made into a 
legend and investigated, never losses its function in its wealth of 
witness in relation to revolution and apocalypse. It is a hard, 
dangerous journey, a suffering, a wandering, an erring, a quest for 
the hidden 'Heimat', full of tragic disruption all the way through; 
90 Wie der reinigende Orkan vor dem Gewitter dahinzieht, so braust Gottes Zorn im Sturm der 
Vergebung durch die Geschichte, um alles dahinzufegen, was in den Blitzen des göttlichen 
Wetters auf immer verzehrt werden müßte. Was in diesem Bild gesagt ist, muß sich klar und 
deutlich in Begriffe fassen lassen: die Bedeutung der Zeit in der Ökonomie der moralischen 
Welt, in welcher sie nicht allein die Spuren der Untat auslöscht, sondern auch in ihrer ganzen 
Dauer 
- 
jenseits allen Gedenkens und Vergessens 
- 
auf ganz geheimnisvolle Art zur Vergebung 
hilft, wenn auch nie zur Versöhnung. ' GS Vi, p. 98 
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boiling, broken with cracks, eruptions, lonely promises, 
discontinuously loaded with the conscience of light. 91 
The Angel of History wants to 'awaken the dead and make whole what 
has been smashed' (IX. Thesis). Would that not imply the end? Only the one 
who remembers has the gift to arouse the spark of hope that is imbued with the 
idea not to let the victor destroy the memory of the dead, their continuity of life in 
the 'Eingedenken'. What are we to do when the loneliness between the graves, 
in the midst of the overpowering anonymous dead, becomes unbearable? Not at 
any moment do I wish to imply that Benjamin asserts that history can be written 
in purely theological terms. Theology is part of historical re-cognition, but it is 
theology which turns the un-finished state of happiness, in the process of 
91 Bloch, Ernst, 1977. Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution, Gesamtausgabe II 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), p. 14: Folglich ist die Geschichte mit Erinnerung allein nicht 
heraufzubringen, gesellt sich zu den Kategorien der Wirksamkeits- oder noch innerhistorischen 
Wertbeziehung nicht auch noch das Weiterleben, das schließliche Selbst- uns Allbetroffensein, 
der eigentlichste Neudruck", das produktive Schema des Eingedenkens hinzu: als 
unbetrügliches, essentielles Gewissen für all das Ungeschehene, uns ewig Gemeinte, 
Unbetretene, geschichtsphilosophisch wohl zu Betretende im bereits Geschehenen, im sinnlos- 
sinnvollen Gemenge, in der wirren Durchkreuzungs- und paradoxen Führungssumme unseres 
Schicksals. Die Toten kehren, wie im neuen Tun, so im neuanzeigenden Sinnzusammenhang 
wieder, und begriffene Geschichte, gestellt unter die fortwirkenden revolutionären Begriffe, zur 
Legende getrieben und durcherleuchtet, wird unverlorene Funktion in ihrer auf Revolution and 
Apokalypse bezogenen Zeugenfülle. Sie ist 
... 
harte, gefährdete Fahrt, ein Leiden, Wandern, 
Irren, Suchen nach der verborgenen Heimat; voll tragischer Durchstörung, kochend, geborsten 
von Sprüngen, Ausbrüchen, einsamen Versprechungen, diskontinuierlich geladen mit dem 
Gewissen des Lichts. ' 
- 
The concept of Heimat' bears ist problematics. Edgar Reitz' successful 
film Heimat' (shown on German TV autumn 1984) consciously investigates that concept, 
perhaps only to make aware of what is lost or what changes it had undergone. The author Peter 
Weiss in search for the place where his autobiography could have started, retrospectively 
realised that all the places he visited 'become blind spots and only one place 
... 
remained 
... 
it is 
the place for which I was destined but which I could escape'. Auschwitz is understood as the 
anti-place par excellence; here it is understood as the negation of the possibility of 'Heimat. 
quoted after Körner, Klaus, 1992. Verlorenes nur was uns bleibt. Aber ein Sturm weht vom 
Paradiese her: Texte zu Walter Benjamin (Leipzig: Reclam), p. 151 
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'Eingedenken', into something finished, and the finished state of suffering into 
something which has not finished. In some ways, Benjamin's work is describing 
is the dimension of human recognition and recognisability. 
In his Annotations to the Arcades Project, Benjamin writes: 
All historical knowledge (Erkenntnis) can be represented by the 
image of a pair of scales where one pan is weighed down by the 
past, the other by knowledge (Erkenntnis) of the present. While the 
facts assembled in the former can never be too numerous or too 
insignificant, the latter may, however, contain only a few heavy, 
massive weights. (GS V, 1.585) 
The image of the scales does suggest a balance between historicism and 
the task of the materialist historian. They are the scales of justice: historical 
justice to the past and political justice to the present, as Irving Wolfarth 
suggests'. Benjamin employs the image 
- 
the allegory 
- 
to remind the historical 
materialist that he not only needs to employ the service of theology (as his first 
thesis suggest), but he also must make use of some forms of historicism. 
Historicism is necessary in so far as it accumulates obligatory data. But in 
his entire writings, one can detect Benjamin's criticality towards Erkenntnis, what 
knowledge is, what exactly it is that we know, what in the relation to (the sheer 
horror of) the actual event Shoah we can know, what we can know if we are not 
directly biographically involved. For my research into the relation of memory and 
history in current German consciousness, Benjamin's writings become important 
92 Jede geschichtliche Erkenntnis läßt sich im Bild eine Waage, die einsteht, vergegenwärtigen 
und deren eine Schale mit dem Gewesnen, deren andere mit der Erkenntnis der Gegenwart 
belastet ist. Während auf der ersten die Tatsachen nicht unscheinbar und nicht zahlreich genug 
versammelt sein können, dürfen auf der zweiten nur einige schwere, massive Gewichte liegen'. 
GS V, 1, p. 585 
93 Wolfarth, Irving, 1998. The Measure of the Possible, the Weight of the Real and the Heat of 
the Moment: Benjamin's Actuality Today. In Marcus, Laura and Nead, Lynda (eds. ), 1998. The 
Actuality of Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 24 f. 
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in so far as they allow a conclusive examination of the possibilities and 
impossibilities of knowledge which, at the same time, never lose sight of the 
'project of remembrance' 
- 
the 'Eingedenken'. It is this 'Eingedenken' that the 
third generation after the Shoah in Germany needs to hold onto because only in 
it lies 'hope for the sake of the hopeless'. In his last sentence of his theses On 
the Concept of History, Benjamin explicitly marks out the one condition that 
'Eingedenken' has: he qualifies 'Eingedenken' as a specific mode of expectation 
of the Messianic realm, of the most silent approach of the Messiah. 
B. Mourning and Guilt: Benjamin qua Benjamin 
As I will develop in the following chapters, the matters of mourning and 
guilt are of primary importance for the question of remembering the Shoah in 
Germany today. In his essay Fate and Character, Benjamin marks out the inter- 
relation between fate and character, the context of guilt in relation to happiness 
and suffering. Andrew Benjamin closely examines the Benjaminian concept of 
guilt and fate in order to think through the occurrence of the Shoah 
- 
its 
character 
- 
and its implications for the enduring problem of coming-to-terms with 
the very event. Thinking the event of the Shoah thus becomes a philosophical 
demand. 
'Is happiness, like without any doubt suffering, a constituting category of 
fate? ', Walter Benjamin asks in 'Fate and Character and he continues by stating 
that 'it is the happiness which releases the happy from the chain of fates and 
94 To distinguish the one Benjamin from the other Benjamin, I shall refer to Walter Benjamin as 
Benjamin and Andrew Benjamin using his full name. 
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from the net of its own' (GS II, 1, p. 174)5. Benjamin makes clear that there can 
be only a connection between fate and guilt. Happiness is a different concern. 
Because happiness 'releases from the chain of fates', there can be no 
connection between the two. That itself places innocence outside the concept of 
fate: 
It is essential to look for a different area [other than religion] in 
which nothing but suffering and guilt are valid, a scale on which 
bliss and innocence are considered too light and float up. This 
scale is the scale of justice. (GS II, 1, p. 174)96 
The laws of fate, Benjamin claims, are misfortune and guilt; law makes 
these into matters of the individual. It was in tragedy, as Benjamin asserts that 
the demonic fate is breached (GS II, 1, p. 174/5). 
'Eingedenken' as an expectation thus demands a differentiation from, but 
also a context with, fortune-telling. Fortune-telling and 'Eingedenken' have in 
common that, in both, time is not understood as homogeneous and empty but 
eventful. But 'the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future'97. The one 
who visited the soothsayer 'abdicated in favour of the guilty life within him. ' (GS 
II, 1, p. 176). Benjamin insists that the 'context of guilt' is 'uneigentlich 
(uncharacteristically) temporal' and thus 'different from the time of redemption, 
or of music, or of truth'. In Benjamin's understanding, fate places deed and its 
inherent consequence into the context of a guilty person. Fate is part of human 
95 ist das Glück, so wie ohne Zweifel das Unglück, eine konstitutive Kategorie für das 
Schicksal? ' 
- 
Das Glück ist es vielmehr, welches den Glücklichen aus der Verkettung der 
Schicksale und aus dem Netz des eigenen herauslöst. ' GS II, 1, p. 174 
, 
Es gilt also ein anderes Gebiet zu suchen, in welchem einzig und allein Unglück und Schuld 96 
gelten, eine Waage, auf der Seligkeit und Unschuld zu leicht befunden werden und nach oben 
schweben. Diese Waage ist die Waage des Rechts. ' GS II, 1, p. 174 
97 Illuminations, 1999, p. 255 
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ontology 
- 
historically and temporally. Benjamin claims that there is no relation 
between the concept of fate and the concept of innocence: 
Fate shows itself in the contemplation of life as a condemned one, 
basically as one that was condemned first and as a result became 
guilty. Goethe sums up the two phases in the following words: You 
let the poor man become guilty". Law does not impose punishment 
but guilt. Fate is the guilt context of the living. This corresponds to 
the natural condition of the living, to the totally disintegrated illusion 
from which the human is so transposed that he could never totally 
immerse in it but under its powers could remain invisible only in his 
best part. (GS II, 1, p. 175)98 
It is the illusion of continuity and myth that holds its power over the 
'natural condition of the living'. Sheer life within the human takes part in natural 
guilt and suffering by virtue of illusion (GS II, 1, p. 175). Andrew Benjamin 
understands this introduction of illusion as the turning-point of experience and 
repetition: 
Illusion here can be understood as the forgetful turning away from 
happiness where experience becomes no more than the re- 
experience of the already experienced. It is important to note that 
what is at stake here is a particular construal of repetition 
- 
one in 
which forgetting may come to play a constitutive role. ' 
sa Das Schicksal zeigt sich also in der Betrachtung eines Lebens als eines Verurteilten, im 
Grunde als eines, das erst verurteilt und darauf schuldig wurde. Wie denn Goethe diese beiden 
Phasen in den Worten zusammenfaßt: 
"Ihr laßt den Armen schuldig werden". Das Recht 
verurteilt nicht zur Strafe, sondern zur Schuld. Schicksal ist der Schuldzusammenhang des 
Lebendigen. Dieser entspricht der natürlichen Verfassung des Lebendigen, jenem noch nicht 
restlos aufgelösten Schein, dem der Mensch so entrückt ist, daß er niemals ganz in ihn 
eintauchen, sondern unter seiner Herrschaft nur in seinem besten Teil unsichtbar bleiben 
konnte. ' GS II, 1, p. 175 
99 Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate: Walter Benjamin's 
'Fate and Character. The Actuality of Walter Benjamin, Marcus, Laura & Nead, Lynda (eds. ), 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 142 
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According to Benjamin, the soothsayers allow for a contemporaneity of 
times but that could only be 'a dependent time which relies on the time of a 
higher, less natural life like that of a parasite' (GS II, 1, p. 176). It is at such a 
moment, as Andrew Benjamin observes, that the future could be brought into 
the present; but although present, the future could never be co-present. From 
Benjamin's fortune-teller we learn that one time can be made contemporary with 
another 
- 
this is why the future constantly exists on a 'higher, less natural' level. 
Only here could the Messiah most silently approach, opening the small garden 
gate to a new, different spatial time behind the contours of our garden. 
Fate is the 'guilt context of the living'. Fate is not owned by a single 
human, Benjamin claims: 'Basically it is not the human being who owns fate, but 
the subject of fate is undeterminable' (GS II, 1, p. 175). It is, however, precisely 
this concept of fate that becomes important for the project of memory in 
Germany: 
Guilt appears in its being forgotten; in its being that which emerges 
in its transcendence by the work of character. What this means is 
that guilt is not part of either history or temporality as merely given, 
a posited provision. It is rather, and more emphatically that guilt is 
the expression of a history and a temporality. 100 
But, as we have seen above, guilt appears in its 'Uneigentlichkeit' 
- 
inauthentic temporality 
- 
as Andrew Benjamin notes. This time (of fate) can be 
made contemporary, at any moment, with another time. However, this time has 
no present; and past and future it knows only in characteristic modifications (GS 
II, 1, p. 176). It is not the fortune-teller's status that gives them access to the 
future. The 'less natural life', as the continuity of history, makes the Messianic 
time a constant possibility. The fortune-tellers make predictions within the life of 
fate as the continuity of history. The future exists on a different level and is 
100 ibid., p. 145 
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radically different to the present. The present is marked by a persistent 
continuity. It is the work of mindful remembrance ('Eingedenken') that makes an 
approach to the future and the past possible. Only 'Eingedenken' can fulfil the 
task of thinking a relation between present, past and future. 
Thus, Andrew Benjamin reopens the question of remembering, its 
demand for the present and its implications for the future in relation to the 
Shoah. What are the implications of Benjamin's concept of fate and guilt in 
relation to the memory process in Germany? Andrew Benjamin confirms the 
importance of such a connection in relation to the question of remembering and 
thinking the Shoah: 
In sum it is that remembering, perhaps uniquely, is linked to 
disruption. Here the larger question will be the remembering of that 
whose disruption precludes any simple reiteration of continuity. It is 
only refusal 
- 
which will work as a type of forgetting 
- 
coupled to 
actual forgetting, that will allow the effect of the Shoah to be 
effaced. As its effect would involve thought and thus the possibility 
of thinking, refusal and forgetting would combine in sustaining 
continuity's reiteration. The disruption, the break up of that 
seamless present, is to be undertaken in order that it be 
remembered and therefore that the Shoah's consequences for 
thinking come to work through the demand that it be thought. As 
such memory and work will be part of that which constitutes the 
present. Part of tracking this movement demands holding together 
both the necessity of the task as well as that which makes it 
possible. The latter is the necessity yet complex interrelation 
between thinking and remembering. 101 
Andrew Benjamin is linking the Benjaminian form of remembrance and 
mindfulness to vigilance and as such it takes on a political, even ethical 
dimension; remembrance is no longer constituted of a simple form of memory. 
Paul Klee has painted another angel: the Angel of Vigilance who, like Gillian 
Rose's Angelus Dubiosus, watches the viewer, stares at us with wide open, 
101 ibid., p. 146 
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empty or hollow eyes. Unlike Gillian Rose's angel, however, the Angel of 
Vigilance does not 'hide' behind enfolded wings. Like the Angel of History, the 
Angel of Vigilance attests to humanity, bears witness, and is sent by God; there 
is no desperate or forced clasping of wings; the Angel of Vigilance stays with 
humanity, endorsed with the same inability to amend and to awaken the dead; it 
helplessly watches and consoles, yet is prepared to watch and make sure 'that 
Auschwitz" will not repeat itself, that nothing similar will happen. '103 
In Other than Identity, Juliet Steyn observes that 
the ghosts of the past and the future haunt every present. It is only 
in traces and ruins of some other possible reality that we can 
perhaps escape the totalitarian power of the whole. Those that do 
not remember are compelled to repeat. Remembering enables a 
going-beyond (in so far as a going-beyond necessitates a working 
through, a repetition). "' 
In relation to the Shoah repetition involves a continuity that works beyond 
the confines of mourning. Only vigilance can distance the necessity of mourning, 
of loss and absorption, thus working against the act of forgetting that would be 
put in place by absorption. 
102 Lyotard points to the problematics of "Auschwitz" as a sign for something that cannot be 
determined, when he writes: 'The differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein 
something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be 
... 
The silence that 
surrounds the phrase, Auschwitz was the extermination camp is 
... 
the sign that something 
remains to be phrased which is not, something which is not determined 
... 
The indetermination 
of meanings left in abeyance, the extermination of what would allow them to be determined, the 
shadow of negotiation hollowing out reality to the point of making it dissipate, in a word, the 
wrong done to the victims that condemns them to silence 
- 
it is this 
... 
which calls upon unknown 
phrases to link onto the name of Auschwitz. ' Lyotard, Jean-Frangois, 1988. The Differend: 
Phrases in Dispute (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 13/4 
103 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 365 
104 Steyn, Juliet (ed. ), 1997. Other than Identity: The Subject, Politics and Art (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press), p. 2 
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Mindful remembrance, so Andrew Benjamin suggests, frees hope which, 
so far, had been aligned with either mourning or melancholia. For that reason I 
would like to argue with Andrew Benjamin that the planned memorial in 
Germany could reflect memory in one form or the other. It might even show a 
form of mourning. However, the temporality of the monument and the finality of 
mourning stand in direct opposition to the 'eternity of remembrance' I am 
proposing, as Andrew Benjamin observes: 
The major problem with the structure of mourning is the simple 
implausibility of the argument for an infinite mourning. Linking 
mourning to the infinite rids mourning of whatever specificity it may 
have. 105 
As will become clear from a reading of the writings of Freud and the 
Mitscherlichs in the concluding chapter of this thesis, mourning in relation to the 
Shoah is a necessity. Andrew Benjamin affirms that this necessity involves 
holding on to mourning's pathos, the feeling of sympathy for suffering and pain. 
Yet mourning cannot be reduced to the state of pathos as such; pathos is one 
possibility which has to be kept alive. True mourning resembles some kind of 
mindfulness and remembrance as it involves the act of participation. Mourning is 
the precondition for the relation of distance and space; only this gap over the 
abyss allows for the necessity to negotiate the ineliminable presence. 
. 
Mourning 
as a means of thinking the questions of the Shoah marks 
a participation that affirms not only the presence of relation but its 
necessary irreducibility; opened as marking the continual opening 
of the site of vigilance. t06 
105 Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate, p. 154, footnote 
12 
106 ibid., p. 147 
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What Andrew Benjamin is describing here is the endless state of 
mourning over the abyss of time and space. In relation to the Shoah, mourning, 
first of all, is necessary; a priori it prevents mediation and resolution; and only 
because such accommodation is eliminated, an affirmed distance is allowed for; 
only within this space and distance is room given to negotiate. Mourning no 
longer finds itself in a position of delimitations; rather, it affirms the irreducibility 
of distance. This irreducibility, the distance as such, places a new emphasis on 
the relation of mourning and vigilance: 
The shift in the register of mourning means that while it is not the 
direct consequence of vigilance 
- 
in the strict sense that it would 
only be possible and therefore only allowed because of the 
presence of vigilance 
- 
the same maintained opening must be 
sustained in each. Giving way to remembrance, memory causes 
the former to emerge as an insistent question. The necessity of 
remembering is never in question. 10' 
Andrew Benjamin's reading of Benjamin does not allow for answers or 
explanations of the inadequacy of the world, of reasons for suffering, pain and 
death. Andrew Benjamin only affirms the theological aspects of Benjamin's 
concept of history in his statement of hope. The impossibility of remembrance's 
finality in relation to the Shoah 
- 
its enduring presence 
- 
makes hope in relation 
to it possible. I would go so far as to claim that it is hope which fosters the 
enduring necessity and need to remember. Mourning in the presence of 
vigilance will be a form of active 
-'affirmative'- remembering and 
in the absence of its self-enclosing finality maintains hope in the 
present since hope will have become linked to securing 
remembrance; securing in and as part of the present. Hope will be 
107 Benjamin, Andrew, 1997. Present Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism (London: 
Routledge), p. 68/9 
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inevitably connected therefore to the maintained presence of the 
possibility of present remembrance. 108 
However, as Andrew Benjamin insists, there is no connection 
- 
and there 
never can be a connection 
- 
between Shoah and hope. Hope exists but only in 
relation to the Shoah. Hope is 'sustained by the affirmed sundering of 
continuity"'. The necessity to think the Shoah, its necessary remembrance, 
relates to hope; and it is this hope that makes a future possible. The hope for 
redemption is possible because, as we have seen, in this world the victims have 
no redeemer 
- 
hope is there for 'its silent approach, every second of time 
through the straight gate': 
Hope is sustained by the affirmed sundering of continuity. The 
Shoah, however, in forcing the thinking of that which works beyond 
the confines of an inclusive and therefore predictive history, and 
thus eschewing continuity, is not hope. What after all would be 
continuous with the Shoah? Within what universal would it form a 
part, even diremptively? Hope exists in relation to the Shoah. What 
this entails is that, in its having to be thought, the consequence of 
that demand is the possibility of thinking hope. 10 
'Present hope' affirms an incompleteness. Only the break-off of universal 
history incorporates the hopeful implementation of its redemption, Benjamin 
claims. With the Shoah there can be no continuity; continuity lies in its 
uninterrupted demand of having to be thought. For Andrew Benjamin, the 
Shoah's occurrence renders invalid any plain formulations of historicism and 
thus enforces a constant re-working 
- 
therein lies the possibility of thinking 
hope. Within this category of hope, time is put on hold 
- 
it flashes up in the 
108 Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate, p. 147 
109 ibid., p. 148 
110 ibid., p. 148 
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moment of danger. Here, according to Andrew Benjamin, hope is given an 
ontological dimension: 
Reworking hope such that what is central is the hold of time and its 
interarticulated mode of being entails that its presentation no 
longer has an automatic and unequivocal ethical or moral 
dimension, one which would, by its very nature, necessitate 
approval. "' 
What causes some of the problematics is the fact that the occurrence of 
the Shoah needs to be thought in the first place: 'The difficulty is thinking its 
specific impossible possibility. 1112 This demand is still met with disapproval and 
rejection in Germany. I am not at all convinced that in Germany the fear prevails 
that the past as a pars pro toto might be forgotten, as Gidon Reuveni asserts13. 
More importantly, I think, in the current debates seems to be a focus on the 
question of what exactly it is that is remembered or forgotten. As we have seen, 
such a refusal to engage in the thinking of the questions of the Shoah comes 
close to its rejection and denial. Benjamin's theory on historical time and 
'Eingedenken' allows for reworking of past events by relieving time of any 
soothsaying. To remember in the Benjaminian notion means to position 
'Eingedenken' in an association of distance. The continuity of mindful 
remembrance 
- 
Andrew Benjamin's present remembrance 
- 
holds on to the 
possibility of recognition of truth, of the abolition of historical time in the 
Messiah's silent approach 
-a remembrance charged with vigilance. Here 
remembrance can be linked to hope. Intrinsic to the 'Eingedenken', however, is 
that it is open; there can be no momentum of closure. 
111 Benjamin, Andrew, 1997. Present Hope, p. 69 
112 Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate, p. 153 
113 Reuveni, Gideon, 1998. Zukunft ohne Vergangenheitl? Geschichte und nationale Identität in 
Deutschland und Israel. Evangelische Theologie, vol. 3,1998, p. 221 
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Andrew Benjamin demands a connection of thought and thinking to the 
Shoah, which seems problematic in so far as the Shoah seems to be standing at 
every possible limit, if not beyond"`. But precisely because historicism seems to 
be without any valid foundation, we need ways and modes of thinking, and a re- 
working of the occurrence of the Shoah. Otherwise we could be caught up in the 
dangers of rendering the singularity15 of the Holocaust absolute: 
The trap of the absolute is exposed by the necessary presence of 
the relation of non-relation. Furthermore, pure singularity, because 
of the relation between positing and existing, will always lend itself 
to occlusion or absorption. The problem of absorption that 
threatens is more complex than it seems. Not only is there the 
necessity of maintaining a remembering excluding absorption - 
there is also the real possibility that it is the faithful who may 
forget. 1' 
What are the implications for a memory process in the country of 
perpetrators if indeed the limits are reached or even transgressed? What could 
be said then? The philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard, in his book The Differend, 
sees Auschwitz as the end of all historical process and reason when he argues 
that, looking from today, one could sense that some great, massive disaster had 
struck but that it was so distant and foreign that no one can adequately articulate 
it"'. In his Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes that 'after Auschwitz there is no 
114 See for example: Saul Friedlander (ed. ), 1992. Probing the Limits of Representation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 
115 The Shoah might show similarity to other historical events in as far as it 'demands 
knowledge', data can be applied and concluded. It is, nevertheless, radically dissimilar, as 
Andrew Benjamin remarks because 'the question of its prediction; its being the work of fate; its 
having been known in advance reduces it to the status of a moment in historical time; a flicker in 
the passage of continuity. ' Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of 
Fate, p. 153 
116 ibid., p. 149 
117 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 1988. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. 56 
65 
word tinged from on high, not even a theological one, that has any right unless it 
underwent a transformation. 1118 
It is the silence that the crimes of Auschwitz have imposed on traditional 
historicism, the un-presentability of its occurrence and the impossibility of 
comprehension and cognition that make Benjamin's concept of history a 
possibility. 
1 18 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 367 
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3. Representing the Un-Known: the Monument 
What are the conditions for re-cognition and remembering? Benjamin's 
essay 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' extensively 
discusses the abolition of autonomous art. This secular cult of beauty developed 
during the Renaissance to prevail only for the next three hundred years 
(Illuminations, p. 217). When art was separated from its basis in cult (through 
mechanical reproduction), the semblance of its autonomy disappeared forever 
(Illuminations, p. 220). His thesis that art escaped the realm of beautiful 
appearance, Benjamin explains with the changed status of the work of art and 
its altered reception. The period of singularity and duration is typical for the 
autonomous work of art. Fleeting time and repetition 
- 
instead of singularity 
- 
shatters the aura and creates the 'sense for the similar in the world'. Aura is 
identified as `unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be' 
(Illuminations, p. 216). With the shattering of 'aura', the symbolic structure of the 
work of art shifts such that the sphere decays and is not only released from the 
material process of learning and experience but is also opposed to it. 
The philosopher Jurgen Habermas identifies a 'redemptive criticism' in 
Benjamin's writings that employs a self-understanding method: 
His [Benjamin's] criticism of art relates to its objects conservatively, 
whether it is a question of the baroque Trauerspiel, Goethe's 
Elective Affinities, Baudelaire's Fleurs du mal, or Soviet film of the 
early twenties. It aims at the "mortification of the works"; however, 
criticism effects the mortification of the work of art only in order to 
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transpose that which is worthy to be known from the medium of 
beauty to the medium of truth 
- 
and thereby to rescue it. 119 
At stake here is the same 'metaphysic of redemption' Benjamin has been 
elaborating on in his theses On the Concept of History. This impulse to be 
rescued, to be saved that we have also encountered informs Benjamin's 
historio-philosophical theses. The continuum of history consists of the 
permanence of the unbearable 
- 
progress is the eternal recurrence of 
catastrophe. Benjamin's criticism intends to destroy the work of art only to 
transpose it from the medium of beauty to the medium of truth 
- 
and thereby to 
save it. The work of art as an autonomous, independent entity is degraded by 
the philosophical insight of the criticism; the historian Richard Wolin claims that 
the 'dead', historical, 'material content' of the work is negotiated until the 
connection to redemption is brought into the open through its true content: 
Works of art are objects that originate in a determinate, fleeting 
moment in time but transcended that limited, historical point of 
origin in order to reveal something supra-historical: the image of 
truth. 120 
The historical relation of the work of art is marked by a duality where final 
and ultimate recognition or understanding cannot be known, where a momentum 
beyond experience sets in: 
119 Seine Kunstkritik verhält sich zu ihren Gegenständen konservativ, gleichviel ob es sich ums 
barocke Trauerspiel, um Goethes Wahlverwandschaften, Baudelaires Fleurs du Mal oder den 
sowjetrussischen Film der frühen zwanziger Jahre handelt; sie zielt zwar auf »die Mortification 
der Werke« (Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels), aber die Kritik übt am Kunstwerk eine 
Abtötung nur, um das Wissenswürdige aus dem Medium des Schönen ins Medium des Wahren 
zu transportieren 
- 
und dadurch zu retten. ' Habermas, Jürgen, 1997. Bewußtmachende oder 
rettende Kritik: Die Aktualität Walter Benjamins. Politik, Kunst, Religion (Stuttgart: Reclam), p. 57 
120 Wolin, 1994, p. 30 
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The Schein des Scheinlosen, the appearance of that which cannot 
appear, the emergence of something infinite, the truth, from 
something that is man-made and finite, a work of art. t21 
If, however, rescue in form of critique fails to appear and consequently 
forgetting sets in, Benjamin explains that the enemy who threatens the dead as 
well as the living, has remained the same: it is the domination of myth and fate. 
We can wrest only fragments of experience from fate, from the continuum of 
empty, homogeneous time for the actuality of the Now. But Benjamin asserts 
that these fragments 
- 
the debris 
- 
form the decisive part of that vanishing 
tradition and history. In the part entitled 'Epistemological' of his Arcades Project, 
Benjamin observes that art and its historical relation follow a similar pattern: 
In every true work of art there is the place from which it blows on 
the one who immerses himself in it, chillingly like the wind of an 
approaching morning. From this follows that art which has often 
been understood as refractive towards any relation of progress, 
can serve as its true definition. Progress is not at home in the 
continuity of the course of time but in its interferences: there where 
the true New makes itself felt for the first time with the sobriety of 
the morning. ' (GS V, 1, p. 593) 
In view of the escalating danger, for Benjamin the programme of aesthetic 
had been rendered useless that sought to ensure opposition to Fascism by 
viewing the social reality that Fascism creates as a work of art. Redemption, 
which has its source solely in the reflection of suppression, hands the viewer 
over to that from where redemption is supposed to redeem. 
121 Wolin, 1994, p. 30 
122 in jedem wahren Kunstwerk gibt es die Stelle, an der es den, der sich dareinversetzt, kühl 
wie der Wind einer kommenden Frühe anweht. Daraus ergibt sich, daß die Kunst, die man oft 
als refraktär gegen jede Beziehung zum Fortschritt ansah, dessen echter Bestimmung dienen 
kann. Fortschritt ist nicht in der Kontinuität des Zeitverlaufs sondern in seinen Interferenzen zu 
Hause: dort wo ein wahrhaft Neues zum ersten Mal mit der Nüchternheit der Frühe sich fühlbar 
macht. ' GS V, 1, p. 593 
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In his V. Theses On the Concept of History, Walter Benjamin draws a 
picture of the constellation between present and past that is important for our 
investigations into the questions of remembering the Shoah: 
The true picture of the past flits by. The past can be seized only as 
an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognised 
and is never seen again 
... 
For every image of the past that is not 
recognised by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to 
disappear irretrievably. '' 
The danger lies in the disappearance of the Shoah from the landscape of 
memory and remembrance, that forgetting sets in. But what form of 
representation can remembrance have? How do we remember when there are 
no witnesses any more, nobody to testify? How should this form of 
remembrance be presented? What are the specificities 
- 
if there are any 
- 
of 
memory and remembrance in the German project? How do we keep hold of that 
image? How do we recognise it in the first place? Now it is important to 
investigate how far one can re-present the image of the past as something 
present. What present constellations allow for the 'image of the past' to be 
'recognised' as part of the present? What role do time and memory play to allow 
for the images to be recognised? 'Mindful remembrance' is linked to vigilance; 
as such it is more than mere memory because it takes on the political and 
ethical dimensions that concern the present. We have seen that, in relation to 
the Shoah, thinking must continue as a re-working of memory 
-a repetition 
within memory linked to vigilance. 
Andrew Benjamin's concepts of 'present hope' places some importance 
on the relationship of remembrance and knowledge, the relation between 
epistemology and memory. For the context of the thesis, I will explore some of 
123 Illuminations, 1999, p. 247 
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the problems that arise from the questions of what can be known. What does 
memory know? The possibilities of knowledge will inevitably reach a limit, they 
are finite. Representation, the work of art and language, re-presents the limits of 
knowledge but, at the same time, opens up the limits within which knowledge is 
confined. The question regarding the knowledge of what took place concerns 
the representation of what is known; Andrew Benjamin confirms: 
'Representation represents the known'. 124 Within art, the question of 
representing the known or un-known is paramount: it is the understanding and 
conception of the event that comes to be re-presented and thus to be the 
representation. Because it is art that, according to Benjamin, will come to 
transcend and, in transcending it, will redeem the fallen world. 
'There are neither monuments for, nor ones marking out, what shall 
henceforth be called present remembrance. '125 How do we remember correctly? 
What role does the ontological category of Benjamin's affirmation of hope play in 
relation to presenting remembered things? For Andrew Benjamin 'the extent to 
which tradition already contains the resources to deal with any subsequent 
occurrence' is to be discussed''. Does the 'German' tradition contain any 
resources to deal with the occurrence of the Shoah? What would they be? What 
if this very 'tradition' allowed for the occurrence in the first place, as it has often 
been argued? What are the implications for its remembrance if the occurrence 
essentially was implemented by the very culture and tradition that tries to 
'remember and to 'come to terms' now? 
There would be a monument but not one that demanded its own 
thinking. Monuments will never be sufficient for remembrance. In 
124 Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate: Walter 
Benjamin's 'Fate and Character'. The Actuality of Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart), p. 136 
125 ibid., p. 148 
126 ibid., p. 155, footnote 14 
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general terms the problem of tradition and its relation to memory 
(accepting the initial generality of these terms), as it pertains to 
both philosophy and theology, emerges at this precise point. '' 
What is at stake is the (im)possibility of a relation between representation 
and remembrance. The present, as it is given in the relation to the past, is the 
decisive component for the form remembrance takes on. Yet, the link between 
past and present itself is not given; it has to be established through the abolition 
of all continuous thought of time. Benjamin clearly demands the active 
engagement of 'Eingedenken'. There is a relation between the limits of 
representation and active practices of remembrance. How then could we do 
justice to Baudrillard's claim that 'what haunts the system is the symbolic 
demand''? 
Despite more than fifty years of post-war history that seem to prove the 
opposite, I would like to stress the possibilities of memory and remembering in 
the active form of 'Eingedenken' for a country of perpetrators. At stake is a 
concept of knowledge, a link between the epistemological and memory, as 
Andrew Benjamin points out when asking the question: 'What does memory 
know? '12'. Knowledge and, with it, language 
- 
as knowledge's representation 
- 
will always reach a limit. It is representation that could establish or open up such 
a limit. Andrew Benjamin asserts that to know what happened always engages 
the question of how to present that which we know: 'Representation presents 
the known'130. 
Art 
- 
in its various forms 
- 
might re-present part of the process of 
'Eingedenken'; problematic, of course, are its limits of re-presentation. The 
question of art's possibility and power of representation in the era of mass death 
127 Benjamin, Andrew, 1997. Present Hope, p. 70 
128 Baudrillard, J., 1975. The Mirror of Production (St. Louis: Telos), p. 147 
129 Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate, p. 135 
130 ibid., p. 136 
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cannot be ignored: `Could a sculpture entail the Shoah? '131. We must also 
consider the temporal and spatial presence of such a sculpture. In many ways 
art archives history, but, perhaps in art, the nameless dead from history may 
return 
- 
full of experience to tell their story. To start the search for the future in 
artistic terms means to give in to fear and mourning, to desperation and 
promise; and to open the path for hope as a quote from the past which is 
inherent in the future132. 
It is worth noting that such a demand to remember will be met by a 
complexity of responses. As we have seen from the reactions to the various 
designs of the planned Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, the different reactions 
carry within them the index of complex religious, philosophical and political 
traditions. To speak of a 'national memory' that was going to be re-presented in 
the memorial, means to take into account the complexity of memory handed 
down through the various traditions. Andrew Benjamin makes clear that in 
relation to the Shoah there can be no necessary link between remembrance and 
representation or the monumental; the problematics lie in the acceptance of an 
absence of such a necessary link. There can be no such link because, as 
established above, there is no foundation on which to base that which becomes 
represented. Andrew Benjamin insists that the occurrence of the Shoah needs 
to be thought in the first place: 
what will always have to be retained is the question of it as an 
occurrence for thinking. Remembrance is inscribed therefore in the 
very process of which its own formulation 
... 
forms a part. It is 
131 Benjamin, Andrew, 1997. Present Hope, p. 104 + 112 
132 Rachel Whiteread claimed to have struggled with similar feelings and emotions during the 
competition for the Holocaust Memorial in Vienna and the subsequent erection of her design, 
Observer 29 October 2000. 
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precisely the impossibility of an outside that implicates philosophy 
in the practise in which it takes place. ' 
The image of the past that becomes to be recognised in the present as 
part of it will always be more than mere memory. The occurrence of the Shoah 
demands a remembrance. Benjamin's writing is of paramount importance as it 
tries to incorporate the philosophical, the political and the theological in order to 
achieve an all-inclusive historical picture. This mode of thinking history and thus 
thinking the questions of the Shoah is opened up through his writings. 
We view a fagade, a spectacle, a canvas, a screen, in whose 
glance the baroque reflects upon itself. Caught in history, 
guaranteed by nothing but its own death, this sensibility extracts a 
sense of being from a continual dialogue with its limits. Its purpose 
lies within itself: the erotics of the gesture, the designed frustration 
of form and function that supplements and subverts the closure of 
logos and makes of language an event whose artificial, historical, 
truth echoes throughout the grammar of the baroque. ' 
It is in the Benjaminian Baroque, Chambers argues, that the past time is 
observed and identified and thus preserved for the present. In its recognition of 
life and death, of temporality and mortality, the Baroque marked out the limits of 
the two different worlds. Benjamin exerts that only through the 'melancholia' is a 
connection between these two extremes possible: the fusion of the rational and 
the un-representable. If, as it was argued above, the Shoah stands at every 
possible limit 
- 
the limits of understanding, representation, the very limit of the 
rational 
- 
would that not mean that we had to re-introduce the melancholic into 
our existence? What would the implications be if we accepted and lived with the 
Melancholia Benjamin discovered in the Baroque? 
133 Benjamin, Andrew, 1998. Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate, p. 150 
134 Chambers, lain, 1998. History, The Baroque and the Judgements of the Angels. The Actuality 
of Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 173 
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According to Benjamin, the Baroque was able to `release a tragic vision of 
the world' and thus redeemed the truth of human existence, mortality and 
suffering. In naming the past and recovering it for the present, in its mindful 
remembrance (Eingedenken), the Baroque mourned that which seemed forever 
lost but simultaneously celebrated the Now (Jetzt). Along the lines of life and 
death, along the borders of two different worlds, certainties are re-formed and 
reversed. 
In his essay History, the Baroque and the Judgements of the Angels, lain 
Chambers draws a comparison between the different architectural and musical 
creation of the Baroque age: 
A (sombre) dissonance hovering over the formless abyss that lies 
at the bottom of being, pulls us down through the sound to release 
a tragic vision of the world and a (musical) redemption of the 
truth. ' 
In his view, the seemingly frivolous ornamentations and embellishments 
of Baroque music 
- 
as of all Baroque art 
- 
are its necessary foundations, the 
'essential point towards which the work strives''. It is the very embellishment, in 
the creation of dissonances and frivolous disorder, that fosters an infinite sense 
of loss: the notion of resolution in the sheer endless embellishments seems to 
destroy any symbolic form and function. In the midst of decay and ruin we are 
faced with the incomprehensible and the infinite. Chambers argues that 
Benjamin recognises, in the Baroque's artistic creation, humanity's insatiable 
desire for transcendence, for fulfilment 
- 
for the ultimate, metaphysical truth. It 
could be argued that in relation to thinking the Shoah there is precisely this 
longing for metaphysical, mightiest truth, that informs all thinking of the Shoah 
i35 Chambers, lain, 1998. History, The Baroque and the Judgements of the Angels. The Actuality 
of Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 174 
136 ibid., p. 174 
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until today. The planned Holocaust memorial in Berlin might be perceived as 'a 
dissonance' over Germany's 
- 
and humanity's 
- 
abyss of being. For how long 
can such a 'dissonance' be taken in, be 'listened' to? The musically trained ear 
would long for its resolution. 
Benjamin discovers, in the Baroque's artistic creations, the refusal to 
acknowledge the given and the persistence of its order, the Baroque addresses 
humanity's mortality and its inaccessibility to ultimate truth: in the artistic display 
of the Baroque Benjamin finds the reason to transcend life as a mere 
appearance, to accept the transient moment of being. 
From that very moment on, when Germany claimed and considered itself 
to be caught in its own history, to be subjected to the very changes of historical 
uncertainties, Germany discovered a terrible freedom. Even in post-war 
Germany now, the silence of the untranslatable was (and is) forced to bear 
witness to the dangers of amnesia. The awareness of temporal limits could open 
up a space that returns to inhabit our present. The Baroque's refusal to give up 
that which is lost, the perpetual mourning which continues across the 'abyss of 
time' raises questions and creates an opening 
- 
the very crack in the essence of 
our knowledge. 
In the preface to The Origin of the German Mourning Play, Benjamin 
addresses the problematics of Darstellung (re-presentation); how to present 
something which is not given, such as, historical truth. For Benjamin it is clear a 
priori that the ultimate truth eludes our knowledge; it is not accessible to us. In 
some ways, presentation is the attempt to find truth for something that cannot be 
sought. For that reason, something that cannot be communicated 
- 
not mediated 
- 
is presented in the re-presentation. To present something involves using a 
language that, according to Benjamin, never ceases to communicate. 
Truth can never be our personal property; it is not restricted to our 
intentions. Speaking with and through Benjamin, truth is something that both 
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grants and escapes us 
- 
it is discontinuous. The ephemeral past,. apparently lost 
forever, returns to create a new understanding of the immediate present in order 
to open a path towards the future. The newly created space in the language and 
time makes another history possible and with it an alternative future which 
means that each historical moment reveals a new opening of possibilities not yet 
taken. Historical time thus permits and demands a re-membering. His theses On 
the Concept of History represent a process of remembering, bridging the past 
with present sense of loss, mourning and vigilance. Perhaps Jürgen Ebach is 
right when he demands that we need to learn about the possibilities of narrating 
suffering, pain, torture and humiliation and their termination without forcing 
causality and purpose onto it; because the price we would be paying for such 
legitimising, for enforcing such a framework of causality, necessity and purpose 
is, according to Benjamin, the price of deception and fraud. Perhaps we need to 
accept that `mindful remembrance' and mourning might leave us hovering over 
the abyss 
- 
like the Baroque's dissonance 
- 
of dialectical uncertainties where a 
resolution is not possible. 
`Artifice, as sublime meaning for and on behalf of the underlying, implicit 
non-being, replaces the ephemeral'137, Julia Kristeva claims. With the fall from 
God's grace and the expulsion from Paradise, a profound sense of loss befell 
humanity; the loss of ultimate truth. In a world of incomprehensible and infinite 
disorder the desire for transcendence, for knowledge of the ultimate 
(metaphysical) truth becomes paramount. Chambers states that, for Benjamin, 
only the Baroque, with its ornamentation and embellishments, was able to 
acknowledge the absurdity of such desire: 
137 Kristeva, Julia, 1989. Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (New York: Columbia 
University Press), p. 99 
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the acknowledgement of the image in and for itself, of the temporal 
construct of the artifice, of the simulacrum, `implies the closure of 
metaphysics and the complete acceptance of the historical 
world'. ' 
Benjamin claims that there are no answers to these questions; they 
cannot be answered even if we want them to be. He points to 'a world's 
condition in which these questions have no place because their answers, far 
from providing explanations, lift them away''. 
Kafka in his poetry, Benjamin explains, never tried to make a virtue of the 
necessity to provide answers. Instead, Kafka aimed for a redeeming conclusion. 
The little hunchback Odradek is, according to Benjamin, the form of 
disfigurement and distortion which things in need of 'Eingedenken' take on: 
The strangest bastard which the prehistoric world has begotten 
with guilt in Kafka is Odradek 
... 
Odradek is the form which things 
assume in oblivion. They are distorted 
... 
These Kafka figures are 
connected by a long series of figures with the prototype of 
distortion, the hunchback 
... 
In the Penal Colony those in power 
use an archaic apparatus which engraves letters with curlicues on 
the backs of guilty men, multiplying the stabs and piling up the 
ornaments to the point where the back of the guilty man becomes 
clairvoyant and is able to decipher the writing from which he must 
derive the nature of his unknown guilt. It is the back on which this 
is incumbent. It was always this way with Kafka. Compare this 
early diary entry: 'In order to be as heavy as possible, which I 
believe to be an aid to falling asleep, I had crossed my arms and 
put my hands on my shoulders, so that I lay there like a soldier with 
his pack. ' Quite palpably, being loaded down is here equated with 
forgetting, the forgetting of a sleeping man. The same symbol 
occurs in the folk song 'The Little Hunchback'. This little man is at 
home in distorted life; he will disappear with the coming of the 
Messiah, of whom a great rabbi once said that he did not wish to 
change the world by force, but only make a slight adjustment. 140 
'38 Chambers, lain, 1998. History, The Baroque and the Judgements of the Angels. The Actuality 
of Walter Benjamin (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 17617 
139 Scholem, Gershom & Adorno, Theodor W. (eds. ), 1966. Walter Benjamin: Briefe, 2 vols. 
(Frankfurt: Fischer), p. 614 
140 Illuminations, 1999, p. 129/30, GS II, 2, p. 43112 
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- 
the little hunchback as the inmate of distorted life. Benjamin says of 
Kafka that he is stirring in the depths which neither mythic premonition or 
theology have ever entered into. But for this Benjamin delivers a theologically 
well-founded reason: 'No other writer has obeyed the commandment 'Thou shalt 
not make unto thee a graven image' so faithfully. '141 
It is the theological dimension, deprived of public recognition, that 
Benjamin credits with the power to distinguish times so that past, present and 
future are not empty homogeneous dimensions but characteristic of certain 
events. Decisive here, however, is the Jewish character of Benjamin's 
theological thinking: Benjamin validates for history and in history the biblical 
prohibition to depict. No idea is permitted to take the place of the real, the true 
constellation of the epoch 
- 
last of all the idea of progress. It cannot know of any 
completion other than fulfilment that inspires and shines on all past times. 
'Only for the sake of the hopeless ones have we been given hope. ' (GS I, 
1, p. 200/201) 
- 
we cannot abandon hope even if or exactly because it is not yet 
fulfilled. Reality and allegory are two different categories which, nevertheless, 
are accompanied by each other. The Benjaminian category of Messianic 
expectation has to be understood as 'reality' and, at the same time, it should be 
read allegorically. Benjamin's praise of Kafka's work evokes some of the 
problematics of the Holocaust Memorial: 
In the mirror which the prehistoric world held before him in the form 
of guilt he merely saw the future emerging in the form of judgement. Kafka, however, did not say what it was like. Was it not 
the Last Judgement? Does it not turn the judge into the defendant? 
Is it not the punishment? Kafka gave no answer. Did he expect 
anything of this punishment? Or was he not rather concerned to 
postpone it? In the stories which Kafka left us, narrative art regains 
141 Illuminations, 1999, p. 125 
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the significance it had in the mouth of Scheherazade: to postpone 
the future. 142 
The apocalyptic and messianic expectation has to turn towards its 
realisation if it wants to be more than mere ideology and not serve as 
prevarication. At the same time it has to fight against any apparently occurring 
fulfilment which means to reveal the Non-Realisation, as long as there is no new 
world and all tears are wiped away. 
But without having his house ready, without having something to 
fall back on, he cannot leave 
- 
this the Bible also realised 
... 
Benjamin then continues by explaining: 
This Abraham appears 'with the promptness of a waiter. ' Kafka 
could understand things only in the form of a gestus, and this 
gestus which he did not understand constitutes the cloudy part of 
the parables. Kafka's writings emanate from it. The way he 
withheld them is well known. His testament orders their 
destruction. This document, which no one interested in Kafka can 
disregard, says that the writings did not satisfy the author, that he 
regarded his efforts as failures, that he counted himself among 
those who were bound to fail. He did fail in his grandiose attempt to 
convert poetry into doctrine, to turn it into a parable and restore to 
it that stability and unpretentiousness which, in the face of reason, 
seemed to him to be the only appropriate thing for it. No other 
writer has obeyed the commandment 'Thou shalt not make unto 
thee a graven image' so faithfully. '
The prohibition to depict does not allow for any re-presentation and 
projection; more importantly, it forbids the worship of them as if they were God. 
In his essay 'Messianismus and Utopie' Jürgen Ebach writes that 'those who 
make their own products 
- 
whether they are materialistic, though or hoped for 
- 
142 Illuminations, 1999, p. 124/5 
143 Illuminations, 1999, p. 125 
80 
into their god and serve them, make themselves slaves to their own creation. 
This also happens if a utopia as a design of 'true life' takes up the domination 
over 'real life' and begins to form it according to its own image'". However, 
images are necessary especially in the context of the problematics of 
remembrance. The danger lies within the very claim that image and event are 
the same or even identical. Ebach continues by explaining that image and event 
cannot be separated, but that between re-presentation and fact is a strict 
differentiation. No re-presentation can claim totality for itself. Re-presentation 
and event both belong to the realm of the true and real. 
Benjamin's criticism identifies in the desire for modernisation of the forms 
of life driven by the forces of production, the compulsive mythical urge of 
repetition (an urge that gets nonetheless established in a capitalistic society) 
- 
the always same within the constantly new. His criticism aims at a salvation of 
the past which is burdened with the time of Now; it ascertains the moment in 
which artistic sensibility puts on hold destiny which is disguised as progress and 
which encodes utopic experiences in the dialectical image 
- 
the new in the 
constantly same. 
Benjamin asked cultural criticism to shift the beautiful into the medium of 
truth where 'truth is not disclosure which destroys the secret but revelation which 
does justice to it 145 (GS I, 1, p. 211). The beautiful appearance as the necessary 
frame becomes replaced by the concept of aura which, in the state of decay and 
crumbling, reveals the secret of complex experience: 
The experience of aura lies in the transference of a form of 
reaction common in human society to the relation of the 
144 Ebach, Jürgen, 2000. Messianismus und Utopie. Kirche und Israel, 1.002000, p. 83 
14 Und nur dieser kann es bezeugen, daß Wahrheit nicht Enthüllung ist, die das Geheimnis 
vernichtet, sondern Offenbarung, die ihm gerecht werden wird. ' GS I, 1, p. 211 
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amorphous or of nature to man. The one who is looked at, or the 
one who believes he is looked at, opens his eyes [den Blick 
aufschlagen]. To experience the aura of an appearance, he has to 
invest in it so that the returns are empowered with the ability to 
open up his eyes. ' (GS I, 2, p. 646/7) 
'Aura' names the indepictable portrayal of distance and separation. Aura's 
historical aspects are its decline and fall, which form part of its state of being. 
Aura is the 'unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be' 
(Illuminations, p. 216). It can never fully disappear despite its fading away, 
perishing and decline. From the very beginning, aura is identified by an 
irreducible element of 'taking leave', of departing and separation. However, aura 
returns, ready to avenge, in precisely those forms of art which Benjamin 
considered most hostile to it, where he, nevertheless, clearly identified its re- 
appearance: the film. It is aura's ability to demarcate itself which makes a return 
in the age of technical reproduction possible. 
On the basis of the aura Benjamin develops the emphatic concepts of an 
experience (Erfahrung). With the abolition of autonomous art and the decay of 
the aura, access to the work of art disappears along with its cult-like distance to 
the viewer and also the contemplation of lonely enjoyment. However, the 
experience, which the cracking frame of the aura releases, was already included 
in the aura's experience: the metamorphosis of the object into the Gegenober- 
the one opposite, the one facing and looking at us. In such a structure the 
appearing character withdraws from the distance-less grasp of the immediate. 
Benjamin aims at a condition in which the experience of happiness has become 
14'3 Die Erfahrung der Aura beruht also auf der Übertragung einer in der menschlichen 
Gesellschaft geläufigen Reaktionsform auf das Verhältnis des Unbelebten oder der Natur zum 
Menschen. Der Angesehene oder angesehen sich Glaubende schlägt den Blick auf. Die Aura 
einer Erscheinung erfahren, heißt, sie mit dem Vermögen belehnen, den Blick aufzuschlagen. ' 
(GS I, 2, p. 64617) 
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public and common. Art's de-ritualising also risks the work of art surrendering its 
content of experience together with its aura, thus taking on the status of banality. 
Benjamin's art theory is a theory of experience, as the title of Howards 
Caygill's book is suggesting''. The experience of aura has burst open the 
auratic frame in the form of profane inspiration. Aura does not owe itself to an 
analysis which brings to light suppressed events, reflection is not capable of 
such a thing. It is gained through a re-establishment of semantics which is 
released, and at the same time kept, in the Messianism of great art. 
In 1987 the French politician, Jean-Marie Le Pen, claimed that he had 
asked himself quite a number of questions: 
I am not saying that the gas chambers did not exist. Personally I 
was unable to see them. Questions regarding this issue I have not 
studied specifically. However, I understand this as a detail in the 
history of the Second World War. 
... 
Do you want to force me to 
say that this is the revealed truth which everybody has to believe 
in? That this is a moral duty? I claim that historians are still 
debating these questions. " 
To engage with and acknowledge the occurrence of the event. of the 
Shoah is not a question of belief. But with regard to the occurrence of the Shoah 
a certain absoluteness and singularity is reached 
- 
it is not debateable. 149 It 
becomes dangerous if historical facts are dismissed as belief or myth; it meant 
147 see CAYGILL, Howard, 1998. Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: 
Routledge) 
- 
What are Eisenman's and Serra's "experience' of the Shoah? Would one be able to 
read their "experiences" in their work of art? 
148 At the time of writing, Spring 2002, Le Pen was running for the office of President of State in 
France. Quoted after Friedlander, Albert, 1988. Zachor 
- 
Gedenket. Evangelische Theologie, 
48th year, 5188 
149 The Lipstadtllrving trial was yet another case where it became clear that Holocaust denial is 
still very much a problem. See also Robert Eaglestone's book on Postmodernism, Holocaust and 
the Lipstadt/Irving trial. 
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that myth was disguised as reason, a pseudo-science wherefrom memory only 
can retreat, as Albert Friedlander claimst50. Friedlander continues by explaining 
that one cannot put aside the evil, the terrible and describe it as a 'detail' within 
personal and/or universal history 
-a detail which one might not be able to 
'remember fully and correctly'. If it cannot be remembered to the full extent, if it 
cannot be written historically and described with all its facets, why should I 
believe it? Why should I engage with it, the German author Martin Walser 
demands to know. 
Those who forget, who refuse to walk the path into the past in order to 
build a basis for their own existence, are not free but caught in the space of their 
own existence. In his theses On the Concept of History Benjamin is clear about 
the role of memory in relation to historical understanding: 'For every image of 
the past that is not recognised by the present as one of its own concerns 
threatens to disappear irretrievably"". 
Remembrance and memory are part of Jewish existence 152. The biblical 
man and the Jew under the spell of his prayers cannot abandon memory or 
remembrance. Every Jewish celebration in the Bible is an invitation to 
remember, to re-live the historical event. One day in particular is dedicated most 
clearly to human remembrance15': Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year and 
the day of remembrance, yom-ha-zikaron. Since early days this is a day of 
reflection and repentance, concerned with the individual and his relation to God 
and to his fellow men. The Creation, as an important event for humanity, is 
150 Friedlander, Albert, 1988. Zachor 
- 
Gedenkel. Evangelische Theologie, 48th year, 5/88, p. 
379 
151 Illuminations, 1999, p. 247 
152 What role the occurrence of the Shoah had in relation to the self-understanding of the newly 
founded state Israel cannot be answered here. 
153 As opposed to God's memory: God remembers and judges the people, he remembers their 
deeds and brings past in relation to the future. 
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celebrated and remembered here. Through remembrance this event is recalled 
and brought back into one's own life. Humanity, through its past, is decided on 
for the future. Friedlander reminds us that the word "sachor" (rememberl) 
admonishes not only the religious Jew to remember the singularity of Auschwitz 
but refers to 'a duty to remember the six million continuously as an essential 
component of their own life'154. 
This remembrance confirms Jewish existence; at the same time it also 
recalls the fact that at any time they were attacked by enemies but were rescued 
by God. To Gillian Rose, however, these politics of remembrance (sachor) and 
memory in Judaism are ambiguous: 
The ancient commandment of remembrance, the annual renewal 
of awareness of the exilic condition and of the redemption, has the 
consequence of devaluing historiographical discernment in 
different times and places. It encourages eschatological repetition 
in the place of political judgement. But, for Benjamin, all political judgement is melancholic and violent. ' 
She then continues and reminds us that, for Benjamin, the political is 
violent and melancholic. In Benjamin's work the Jewish commandment to 
remember points to a Messianic dimension of the future. 
The Jewish calendar celebrates the Sabbath Sachor 
- 
the Sabbath of 
Remembrance, the introduction to the feast of Purim 
- 
once a year. Purim 
celebrates the victory over those who wanted to destroy Israel; it remembers a 
'pogrom-final-solution program''' in biblical times: Lo tishkach: Do not forgetl 
154 Friedlander, Albert, 1988. Zachor 
- 
Gedenke!. Evangelische Theologie, 48th year, 5/88, p. 
380 
155 Rose, Gillian, 1994. Judaism & Modernity, p. 207 
156 Friedlander, Albert, 1988. Zachor 
- 
Gedenke!. Evangelische Theologie, 48th year, 5188, p. 
384 
85 
(Deut. 25,17 ff)157. History is lived and re-lived. Remember what happened! - 
Sachor is part of Jewish historical understanding. Gillian Rose points out that 
this special Sabbath of Remembrance is celebrated only once a year, because 
it is soul-destroying and destructive'. What is not to be forgotten, she claims, is 
that it offers 'rest from one's enemies'. ' 
To seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger 
... 
The danger affects both the content of the tradition and its 
receiver 
... 
In every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest 
tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it 
... 
Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in 
the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe 
from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be 
victorious. ' 
How can we historically 
- 
not to mention, from the Christian view point, 
religiously 
- 
contemplate remembrance and memory of the Holocaust? Albert 
Friedlander identifies the difficulties in understanding the meaning of the word 
"sachor": 'to remember, to say, to name, to call, to swear, to report, or: to 
confess one's sins. '160 Also, for Charles Maier the only valid reparation in relation 
to the Holocaust could be a 'confessional memory". 
The question that is of interest for this research and informs part of my 
reading of Benjamin's theory on memory is whether the occurrence of Auschwitz 
and the memory of it poses a problem too overwhelming and too daunting to 
157 Friedlander, Albert, 1988. Zachor 
- 
Gedenke!. Evangelische Theologie, 48th year, 5/88, p. 
384 
158 Rose, Gillian, 1998. Walter Benjamin 
- 
Out of the Sources of Modem Judaism. The Actuality 
of Walter Benjamin, Marcus, Laura & Nead, Lynda (eds. ), (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 109 
159 Illuminations, 1999, p. 247 
160 Friedlander, Albert, 1988. Zachor 
- 
Gedenke!. Evangelische Theologie, 48th year, 5188, p. 
378 
161 Maier, Charles S., 1997. The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National 
Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), p. 160 
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speak of hope, let alone freedom and rescue. The memory, the act of 
remembrance, is supported by rites and symbols during the Jewish celebrations, 
memory revives and, thus, memory functions as a medium of liberation and 
freedom. In a way, the rites and symbols bring the reality of memory within the 
human senses of experience. This concept of memory and remembrance links 
the current present and the irretrievable past. The memory of the past brings 
with it the reassurance of the future, that the future is guaranteed: 
Our image of happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image of 
redemption. The same applies to our view of the past, which is the 
concern of history. The past carries with it a temporal index by 
which it is referred to redemption. ' 
Swept backwards into the future, whirled around a sheer infinite load of 
humankind's disastrous history, Benjamin's Angel must witness to testify. He 
cannot stay to amend. Benjamin knew not the momentum of atonement or 
forgiveness on earth because it would incorporate the moment of forgetting. 
Though the Angel is sent by God, he himself cannot forgive. Rescue from and 
hope for our worldly history lies for Benjamin solely in the silent approach of the 
Messiah and the break-off through divine intervention. It is the dialectical image 
'which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognised''', the tension 
between lost and recovered times, informs Benjamin's hope for redemption. 
Within Benjamin's writing it is the momentum of remembrance, the reiterated 
memory of past events with their temporal index, their re-collection as flashing 
images in the time of Now, the Angel's gaze onto humanity's wretched history 
which enables hope and the certainty of future. 
There can be no such thing as a moral duty to "believe in Auschwitz"; in 
order to find certainty for the future 
- 
especially as the nation of perpetrators 
162 Illuminations, 1999, p. 245 
163 Illuminations, 1999, p. 247 
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with a distinct plan to build a Holocaust memorial 
- 
Benjamin's theory on 
memory in relation to historical events can teach us how to live with the 
inheritance of such a horrific past under the gaze of God, a gaze which needs to 
be returned in the form of remembrance. 
`What is must be changeable if it is not to be all', Adorno postulated in the 
Negative Dialectics. '" Also, the reverse should be true: Only if that which is, is 
not all, can that, which is, be changed. Adorno insists on the difference between 
current reality and totality because that which is, is being denied to be the solely 
possible. If that which is, was all, the current present would become eternity and 
thus totality. Memory, remembering in the understanding of Benjamin's 
Eingedenken holds on to the notion that that which is, cannot be all. And hope 
holds on to the conviction that for the future's sake that which is, is not all. The 
holding on to the difference between that which is and that which was, which 
could be and will be formulates the difference between claim and reality 
- 
and 
therein lies the historical origin (Ursprung) of Messianic hope. Expectation and 
hope cannot be the same. The more the expectation becomes dashed, the more 
it mutates into hope. The dissimilarity between ideal and reality, between claim 
and reality generates expectation and hope. The claim is clung on to in its 
prolongation into the future. What, so far, has not been fulfilled, is expected to 
be accomplished by the coming Messianic force. This will take up the former 
history and will break with it. The expected and hoped for fulfilment is at the 
same time the expected breaking off. Idealised memory and utopian hope 
together dispute the present where that which is, is all. It is strict negativity which 
solely allows for the possibility of change, as Adorno confirms in his Minima 
Moralia: 
164 Adorno, Theodor W., 1998. Negative Dialektik: Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, Gesammelte 
Schriften VI (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), p. 391; Adorno, Theodor W., 
2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 398 
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The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in the face 
of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would 
present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge 
has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is 
reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned 
that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts 
and cervices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in 
the Messianic light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or 
violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects 
- 
this alone is the 
task of thought. It is the simplest of all things, because the situation 
calls imperatively for such knowledge, indeed because 
consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror- 
image of the opposite. ' 
However, the danger lies in the possibility that hope might change into 
escapism, that the holding on to the possibility of changing the world changes 
into withdrawal from the world, that comfort becomes prevarication and utopia 
becomes illusion. How do we determine reality? Is reality the whole truth? What 
if the hope for the coming becomes such pure habit that the possibility of having 
arrived is nearly excluded? Without giving away reality, expectation and reality 
have to be reversed and (inter)changed. The expected becomes that which has 
to be assumed; so-called reality takes its place at the edge of the just-about- 
possible: 'That it goes on like this, is the catastrophe' (GS I, 2, p. 683). In this 
statement Benjamin's absolute and ultimate holding on to apocalyptic, Messianic 
expectation becomes clear against any perennial preservation of current affairs 
and against any myth of progress: 'Salvation holds on to the small crack within 
the continuous catastrophe' (GS I, 2, p. 683). 
If monuments were built to commemorate the heroic deeds of a people or 
its victorious rulers, and to display a feeling of gratitude for having been spared 
165 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Minima Moralia (London: Verso), p. 247 
89 
a catastrophe or having survived it's, then I am not aware of any memorial 
admonishingly reminding a nation of its historical deed and guilt. Monuments, as 
public display of historical triumph, were built for celebratory purposes, pomp 
and vanity. Long ago there were monuments of atonement by virtue of which the 
perpetrators had to beg pardon in the theological sense; or there were 
monuments of shame and guilt built to punish the perpetrators. The common 
denominator usually is that they were enforced onto the perpetrators by the 
respective victor or conqueror and that they were not built of the perpetrators' 
own volition. With a national Holocaust memorial in Germany, the country of the 
perpetrators, the stakes are high, as Jurgen Habermas reminds us: 
Founders are those citizens who find themselves as the immediate 
heirs to a culture where this was possible 
- 
in a relation to traditions 
which they share with the perpetrators' generation. With their 
memorial they establish a reference to the perpetrators, to the 
victims and to their descendants. " 
The national memorial 
-a memorial which indicts the past crimes of 
National Socialism 
- 
is to be measured against the German political identity as a 
Federal Republic. Can a national memorial fulfil the task of making the 
murderous deeds, German deeds, between 1933 and 1945, part of a national 
`responsibility'? Does a consciousness of responsibility exist? As I have tried to 
166 s. Introduction to Mythen der Nationen: Ein Europäisches Panorama, Exhibition Catalogue, 
Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin (Berlin, 1998) The chapter dealing with Germany and 
Germany's possible history as a nation starts by exploring cornerstones of Germanic/Teutonic 
history (whether those, however, function as cornerstones of the history of the Federal Republic, 
I cannot answer here): the battle in the Teutoburg Forest (9 AD), the death of the Emperor 
Friederich I. in 1190 AD, Luther (1520) and the Emperor's proclamation in 1871. 
167 Stifter sind diejenigen Bürger, die sich als die unmittelbaren Erben einer Kultur, in der das 
möglich war, vorfinden 
- 
in einem Traditionszusammenhang, den sie mit der Tätergeneration 
teilen. Mit ihrem Denkmal stellen sie gleichzeitig einen Bezug zu den Tätern, zu den Opfern und 
zu deren Nachkommen her. Habermas, Jürgen, Die Zeit, 1 April 1999 
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identify in the previous sections, with regard to Germany's political identity the 
murderous past constituted and still constitutes (part of) the identity-forming 
process, if only subconsciously. 
As citizens of the country we do take an interest in the darkest chapter of 
our history, Habermas hopes, especially in regard to a critical ascertainment of 
our own political identity. But as we have seen in the previous chapters, the 
memory of the guilt, the remembrance of the deeds was only marginally 
instrumental in forming current German identity; it could not have been fully 
instrumental since the process of working-through 
- 
of mourning linked to 
mindful remembering and vigilance 
- 
has hardly been given a chance. Yet, 
Jeffrey Herf is not the only one to claim that the remembrance of the genocide is 
undoubtedly linked to the political self-communication of the contemporary 
generation, especially as expressed by the political party currently in power 
which 
more than any other has courageously been fighting to relate 
national honour, decency and self-consciousness in the post-Nazi 
Germany to a raised remembrance of the Holocaust. '
What are the motives behind the planned Holocaust memorial in 
Germany? Is it the 'moral obligation' to remember the post-war generation sees 
itself burdened with? Is it the nation's and/or government's need for 
'atonement'? Or is it plainly a display of vanity? Vanity, in the sense of self- 
justification that the sons and daughters of the perpetrators feel the need to 
provide the public 
- 
national and international 
- 
with a recognised display of 
'political correctness'; vanity in the sense that the current generation in power 
168 Eine Partei, 'die mehr als jede andere tapfer dafür gekämpft hat, nationale Ehre, Anstand und 
Selbstbewußtsein im Deutschland nach der Nazizeit mit einem herausgehobenen Gedenken an 
den Holocaust zu verbinden'. Jeffrey Herf, Traditionsbruch, Die Zeit, 13 August 1998 
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needs to prove that it took more than fifty years, the German re-unification and a 
new generation to remember 'correctly'. I am inclined to believe that there is a 
double edge to the memorial and memory process in Germany. I am not 
disputing that there might be a genuine deep felt necessity to 'remember the 
Shoah, the unutterable, horrible crime committed in the name of and by the 
Germans. The necessity to think the questions of the Shoah, of which mindful 
remembrance is part, were established above. To remember one's own guilt and 
deed is understood as an impossible task, as I have established in the 
concluding chapter. I would like to argue that the planned memorial marks a 
post-war generation's 'vanity', a longing to be remembered for the future as the 
generation who has not forgotten, who was prepared to take on the burden of 
their parents' deed, and who accepted the moral obligation 
-a generation 
prepared to 'face the past'. Even if the moving spirit behind the memorial plans 
seem not as much a genuine wish to remember the `pile of historical debris' as 
it seems to be a generations need to be itself remembered for its conscious, 
morally righteous differentiation and demarcation from what was before, it does 
not render the planned memorial superfluous. It is the political, social, and 
perhaps even theological response to the demand that the questions of the 
Shoah had to be thought. As such, the national memorial is 
- 
to speak with and 
through Benjamin 
- 
the re-presenting part of mindful remembrance 
('Eingedenken'). No doubt, on its own, representation is not enough, but linked 
to vigilance and mourning it will enable the work of remembrance. 
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II. The Haunting Sense of Beauty 
This chapter will be looking at the (im) possibilities of memory in relation to 
the planned Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. The development process of the 
memorial will be examined from the first idea and proposal through to the 
chosen design, and from the first (failed) competition through to the 
parliamentary debate that voted for the current design. The chapter discusses 
the possibilities and impossibilities of the two winning designs that the 
'Findungskommission' decided on, and the two proposals that were finally put 
before Parliament. 
Underlying the examination is the prevailing question that Andrew 
Benjamin asked: 'Could a sculpture entail the Shoah? ''I The possibilities and 
impossibilities of the various designs, the scopes of artistic creativity and 
expressiveness in view of the Shoah are examined. The implications of 
dedication and inscription are placed against the possibilities of language and its 
limits. The plans of a national 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe' are 
discussed in view of the complexity of issues at stake in the German 
remembrance process that have filtered through from the readings in the first 
chapter. The monument and the accompanying debates provide valuable 
information and insight into the historical conscience and social consciousness 
of current German society at large and well document the history of reception of 
the re-presented historical event. We will be looking at the usefulness of the 
monument/memorial as a tool for the building and stabilisation of historical 
constructs. The choice of the monument's site and the scale of the design are 
considered against the importance of the event that comes to be re-presented. 
log Benjamin, Andrew, 1997. Present Hope (London: Routledge), p. 104 
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Likewise, any inscription and textual dedication will lend interpretation to the 
past event that is being remembered. 
When examining the artistic design and the metaphors and symbols 
used, the question of condensation in analytical terms and elevation of history 
through monuments will be discussed. Those groups which erect monuments 
are driven by very different motives and are warranted with different instruments 
of political, financial and social powers. So the political and social agendas and 
motives that drive the decision-making process are part of what might constitute 
'national memory'. 
Extensive media coverage for over a decade has created a huge public 
interest and awareness in what is known generally as the 'Holocaust- 
Mahnmal'10. In the German language there are two different expressions to 
describe such a monument: Denk-mal and Mahn-mal. A'Mal' is a sign or symbol 
that marks something, anything. The 'Denk-mal' is a sign which invites or 
requests the onlooker to 'think', to recollect, and to remember, it takes the 
meaning of a monument. The 'Mahn-mal', on the other hand, reminds, warns 
and admonishes. The German word 'mahnen' means to remember a guilt and to 
demand a redemption of this guilt. A 'zentrales nationales Mahnmal für die 
ermordeten Juden Europas' is a 'central, national memorial to the murdered 
Jews of Europe': Mahnmal is translated as memorial 
- 
thus a memorial erected 
as a warning, an admonition to future generations. The choice of the medium of 
the Mahn-mal rather than the Denk-mal seems intentional and can well be 
interpreted as a political statement for the form of remembrance that was aimed 
for. 
170 The terminus Holocaust-Denkmal' or 
, 
Holocaust-Mahnmal' was used in the debates and 
became generally accepted. I will continue using the terminus although it contextual point of 
reference to the planned 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe' is far from precise. In the 
following I shall be referring to the concepts of 'Holocaust-Denkmal' and 'Holocaust-Mahnmal' 
synonymously. 
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Against the backdrop of German re-unification, over the course of two 
competitions, endless public discussions, academic debates and numerous 
citizen's initiatives, the notion of what constitutes national memory in the country 
that accepted responsibility for its father's deeds is by no means clear - if 
anything, it has rendered the process of identification, mourning, remembering 
and re-presentation ever more complicated for future generations. 
For a long time the question of the possibility of expression and depiction 
of the Shoah was at the centre of the debates around national memory and the 
planned 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe'. The inadequacy, the 
breaking down, the surrender of language, art and science in view of the Shoah 
seemed the central problem. The problematics of representation, inherent in the 
various forms of language and art, have to be positioned against the politically 
motivated attempt of creating the entity of a national memory. The re- 
presentability of the Shoah as such was questioned. Since conscious 
remembering was assumed a priori it seemed only too natural to refer to the 
'unsayable' until the 'unutterable' became the alibi for many not to engage at all. 
As the readings of the concluding chapter will show and with regard to 
future memory, a decisive change within our working-through of the past, a 
transposition in the possible ways of coming to terms is needed. No longer is the 
ability to express and to communicate the experience of the Shoah alone being 
questioned; in addition to that, we also have to reflect upon the forms of 
representation, its pre-requisites and consequences. Memories are complex 
matters, especially with regard to communal or national memories, as David 
Carroll notes in his foreword to Lyotard's 'Heidegger and the jews": 
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Memory itself guarantees nothing; it all depends on what kind of 
memory and how, within memory, one goes about combating the 
revenge the memory of injustice often calls for. "' 
The involvement of the different Federal Governments in matters of the 
Holocaust Memorial seems to be indicating an assumption of a national 
memory. 
How, more than fifty years later in Germany 
- 
the country of the 
perpetrators 
-, can any memorial remind us of the genocide and the crimes of 
the Nazis and thus invoke the indelible guilt? Can the monstrous nature of the 
Holocaust be symbolised at all? Are six million murdered Jews 'reificatory'? 
Taking into consideration the dimensions of the historical event and its 
immanent impossibility for conclusion, any concept and aesthetic possibility of 
reflection must fail. General suspicion is mixed with the fear that the future 
generation will lack any understanding of this memorial. 
The chapter does not attempt a complete presentation of the debates and 
of planning procedures of the memorial since these have been documented 
already in detail". This chapter attempts an interpretation of the processes at 
"11 Lyotard, Jean-Frangois, 1997. Heidegger and 'the Jews' (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. ix 
172 see Perspektive Berlin (ed. ), 1995. Für ein Holocaust-Mahnmal in Berlin: Dokumente einer 
Auseinandersetzung (Berlin); Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen (ed. ), 1995. 
Künstlerischer Wettbewerb Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas' (Berlin); 
Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (ed. ), 1997. Colloquium, Denkmal für 
die ermordeten Juden Europas': Dokumentation (Berlin); Cullen, Michel S., 1999. Das 
Holocaust- Mahnmal: Dokumentation einer Debatte (Zürich: Pendo-Verlag); Rosh, Lea, 1999. 
, 
Die Juden, das sind doch die anderen`: Der Streit um ein deutsches Denkmal (Berlin: Philo); 
Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Sefrens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Das Denkmal? Der 
Denkmalstreit: Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas 
- 
Eine 
Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo); Kalbe, Riki & Zuckermann, Moshe (eds. ), 2000. Ein Grundstück in 
der Mitte: Das Gelände des künftigen Holocaust-Mahnmals in Wort und Bild (Göttingen: 
Wallstein) et. al. 
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work based on a systematic analysis of Germany's major daily newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Neue Züricher Zeitung (NZZ), Tagesspiegel (Tsp) 
and tageszeitung (taz); the weekly magazine Der Spiegel and the weekly 
newspaper Die Zeit. The choice of quotes is a sample and does not claim 
completeness. 
More than 10 years ago, shortly before the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
Berlin journalist Lea Rosh called for a central, national memorial to the murdered 
Jews of Europe. In October 1993 Helmut Kohl's government set aside a 20,000 
sq. m site in the centre of Berlin. 2,000 artists and architects participated in the 
first competition in 1994. In June 1995 chancellor Helmut Kohl vetoed the 
winning design of a huge gravestone bearing the names of all known Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust (see Figure 2). After a second competition in 1997, 
open only to invited architects and artists, Peter Eisenman's original design (see 
Figures 3,4 & 5) found support but Kohl requested a 'smaller, greener version' 
of it (to become known as Eisenman II, see Figure 6). After Gerhard Schröder 
was elected chancellor in Autumn 1998, the plan stalled and at the request of 
the new State Minister for Culture and Media Matters, Mr Naumann, who initially 
opposed the memorial, Mr Eisenman modified his design yet again, reducing its 
size and incorporating an information centre and a museum (Eisenman III, see 
Figure 7& 8)'1. It involved a smaller field of gravestones (the reduced version of 
Eisenman II) and a large complex called 'House of Remembering' which was to 
consist of a documentation centre, a museum, a research establishment and a 
library. In October 1998, set off by Martin Walser's (in)famous speech attacking 
the planned memorial, a fierce debate about Germany's attitude to its post-war 
173 Henceforth, I shall refer to the different SerralEisenman-designs by their numerical indication. 
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history and its visions on the 'Berlin Republic'". started out where the entire 
nation, spurred on by the incredible media coverage, became involved in the 
questions of remembering and re-presenting National Socialism and its deeds in 
Germany. 
Due to public and media pressure the decision on the memorial's design 
and form, on its site and place in the new 'Berlin Republic' was put into the 
hands of the Parliament. On June 25,1999, the German Parliament 
(Bundestag) decided to erect a central national memorial to the Jewish victims 
of the Holocaust in the centre of Berlin. With the move of the seat of the Federal 
Government from Bonn to the new capital Berlin, the new government set out to 
re-invent the old-new 'Berlin Republic'. Thus, after more than ten years of 
discussions and heated debates, a quick decision on the memorial question was 
sought before the move of the Parliament from Bonn to Berlin. The Bundestag 
voted for a design by the New York architect Peter Eisenman which was widely 
known as Eisenman II: a field of 2,700"5 concrete columns enlarged by an 
information centre (whose content has not yet been defined) to be built on five 
acres in the former no-man's land next to the Brandenburg Gate in the centre of 
Berlin. The costs are expected not to exceed the budget of 15m German Mark 
174 'Berlin Republic' as euphemism means the united Germany with its capital Berlin. 'Berlin 
Republic' as such is a derogatory term, coined by the media when referring to governmental 
decisions regarding the Federal Republic's representation via its new capital. 
175 The sources come up with different numbers of columns for the reduced Eisenman design; 
some mention 2600 pillars, others 2700. Young even speaks of a reduction 'from forty-two 
hundred to three thousand'. See Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the 
Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 210 
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(ca. £ 5.2m) and are to be paid for by the patrons, the Federal Government and 
the city of Berlin'm. 
The cultural committee of the Parliament submitted only two designs for 
the parliament to vote on in June 1999: Eisenman II and the proposal by the 
theologian Prof. Dr. Richard Schröder. The proposal of the then state minister of 
culture, Michael Naumann, the so-called Eisenman III, was ruled out and not 
put before parliament. The memorial design accepted by the majority of 
members of the parliament was widely seen as a compromise between the two 
designs. 
Motions for different solutions to the debate were put forward. 115 
deputes were supporting the proposal not to build a memorial at all, but to offer, 
instead, better financial support to the already existing monuments: the 
commemorative site 'opography of Terror (Topographie des Terrors), the 
Gestapo Headquarters, and the Wannsee Villa' where the decision on the 'Final 
Solution' was taken; the site 'Bendler Block' remembering the resistance under 
the National Socialists; the former concentration camp and now a 
commemorative site, Oranienburg/Sachsenhausen; the Jewish Museum with the 
new annex by Daniel Libeskind. 161 members of parliament opted for the design 
of a field of concrete blocks without any information centre. 
The debate was further complicated when the Berlin theologian Prof. Dr. 
Richard Schröder put forward an alternative proposal for a memorial with the 
inscription of the biblical commandment "Thou shalt not kill" 
- 
in Martin Buber's 
translation "Thou shalt not murder" 
- 
in various languages, including Hebrew. 
188 members of parliament were in favour of this proposal. 
176 On 25 June 1999 in the vote on the fundamental principle a majority of 439 members of the 
parliament (out of 669 deputes) decided in favour of a memorial in general. 314 voted for the 
Eisenman design. 209 were against it and preferred a different solution or were against a central 
memorial all together 
- 
parliamentary minutes. 
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This chapter looks at the implications of the chosen medium of the 
monument, at implicit and explicit forms and theories of memory in the 
monumental form of re-presenting the Shoah. I wish to identify the demand for 
recognition of the limits of the form of the memorial in particular. Against the 
backdrop of the changing political parameters of a re-united Germany, we need 
to thematise the chances and possibilities of these very limits and to address 
anew the question of What does it mean: coming-to-terms with the past? ' when 
the generations to come will have no biographical links to the event that is being 
re-presented. 
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1. The Architects of National Memory 
- 
The Problematics of 
Intentionality 
In the following I will name the various views expressed and positions 
taken in the memorial discussions. It has become clear that these were 
approached by contrary premises that were not sufficiently elaborated. Never, 
however, was a project of memory, as such, questioned. Questions arise 
- 
and 
will keep arising even after the memorial is finished 
- 
over the content of such 
memory: what can 'memory', in the 'country of perpetrators', consist of? The 
terminus 'country of perpetrators' or even 'nation of perpetrators' bears its 
problematics when attempting to justify the necessity of mourning and 
remembrance today. Exclusively to link mourning to guilt would mean to exclude 
the possibility of an all-embracing mourning that works beyond the confinement 
of groups and time. Beyond the particular remembrances and memories of 
different groups, it should be possible 
- 
especially for future memories 
- 
for all 
people to mourn together such an elementary loss. For Germans that means 
that historical mourning has to address the responsibility for the deeds that 
present a continuous part of their own 
- 
if not biographical 
- 
history. But as 
Andrew Benjamin asserts: 
A fundamental part of mourning is the proximity of the loved object. 
It must be familiar, almost in every detail. It must be known, almost 
absolutely. What is known has to do with a body, one that touches, 
was touched, but now no longer reaches out; a mouth that opened, 
but now is silent; a body that was animated and is animated no 
longer. It is almost as though knowing both states of animation 
- from the quick to the dead 
- 
is essential for mourning. While the life 
in question may have been fantasmatic it could always be 
contrasted to death, to its own death, to its own having died. Here, 
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knowledge is essential. Its link to mourning is inescapable, as is 
mourning's dependence on the structure of knowledge. ' 
That these questions have still not found answers is part of the ongoing 
remembrance process that will keep the questions of thinking the Shoah open 
- 
open to future repetition in the form of remembrance and representation. 
Habermas claims, `the ceremonial act which tries to find expression here, 
there is no better medium than art whose unwieldy taciturnity protects best of all 
from embarrassment and playing down. '13 For Raul Hilberg the building of the 
memorial has to be a work of art but for a very different reason: `like any building 
which is important to society. Of what does the building/design remind you if it is 
seen later? That is the central question which needs to be answered. "' 
Aesthetic discourses are not led with the expectation of a definite 
perspective onto the work of art in question because it would render it to the lost. 
One characteristic of modern art is its neediness for commentary. It needs 
translation, explanation and interpretation 
-a constant re-working - and only in 
that form is it possible as a memorial. The work of art does not accept any 
interpretative reading as authentic 
- 
it is far ahead of any attempt to explain. Any 
well-meant attempt to confine the work of art is crushed since the work of art 
annexes what was meant to limit: the work of art absorbs the commentaries in 
order to remain in need of commentary and examination. The question of the 
aesthetic presentation will remain controversial for good and valid reasons. 
177 Benjamin, Andrew, 1997. Present Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism (London: 
Routledge), p. 20/21 
178 Aber für den Akt, der hier seinen symbolischen Ausdruck sucht, gibt es kein besseres 
Medium als das der bildenden Kunst, deren spröde Verschlossenheit noch am ehesten vor 
Peinlichkeiten und Verharmlosung bewahrt'. Habermas, Der Zeigefinger. Die Deutschen und ihr 
Denkmal. Die Zeit (1 April 1999) 
179 wie jedes Gebäude, das für eine Gesellschaft wichtig ist. An was erinnert der Bau, wenn 
man ihn später sieht? Das ist die zentrale Frage, die beantwortet werden muß'. Rau! Hilberg, 
Tagesspiegel, 23 April 1999 
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The question why a national monument to the 'Murdered Jews of Europe' 
should be erected in Berlin has its answers in the political, cultural and historical 
context. The idea of a memorial as such bears finality and conclusion; both are 
qua definition not appropriate to the process of mourning and remembering. So 
the form of a memorial as such bears its problematics in view of the issues at 
stake. Is the use of a monument the appropriate and correct way to approach 
the German process of remembering? Without any doubt, the attempts of the 
commemorative places, of exhibitions and of research institutions to come to 
terms and to work through, are invaluable. Their work is necessarily de- 
centralised and oriented towards the historical site, on the one hand, and the 
formations of contemporary society on the other. The art historian James Young 
confirmed that it was better to have 'thousand years of Holocaust memorial 
competitions in Germany than a final solution to Germany's Holocaust memorial 
problem. Instead of a fixed icon for Holocaust memory in Germany, the debate 
itself 
- 
perpetually unresolved amid ever-changing conditions 
- 
might now be 
enshrined"'. Young has given a chapter in his recent book the title 'Germany's 
Holocaust Memorial Problem 
- 
and Mine', where he tells the story of the 
decision-making process on the memorial and his own involvement. 
In fact, deliberations and considerations have gone far beyond the 
polemical debate over whether there should be a monument or not. The issues 
themselves have been discussed openly and vigorously for years in the press 
and in conferences. By now it seems that the general public and intellectual 
consensus have gathered around the profound need for a national 'Memorial for 
the Murdered Jews of Europe'. 
180 Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn 1999, p. 166; see also Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's 
Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press) 
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The question whether this should be a memorial or a didactic space of 
learning has been addressed at length18'. I believe that Germany has a crucial 
need for a permanent monument in addition to the many interpretative and 
educational institutions already in place. Jurgen Habermas wants the monument 
to signify that'the memory of the Holocaust remains a constitutive feature of the 
ethico-political self-understanding of the citizens of the Federal Republic of 
Germany' (Habermas, Die Zeit, 1999). According to Habermas it is in 'modem 
art' with its multi-facets, open and pluralistic readings that a work can fulfil these 
demands. 
Ideally the memorial should reflect the present generation's cautious 
attempts to remember. Such a memorial site does not relieve the government 
from the political and financial responsibility it bears with regard to the various 
other memorial and pedagogical sites around the country. To ignore these sites 
of destruction would mean to ignore Germany's history. Ways and possibilities 
need to be found to use the memorial as a deliberate act of remembrance, a 
strong statement that memory must be created for the next generation, not only 
preserved, so that it is dynamic and not static and ossified. In this way the 
memorial works as part of an active remembrance process. What kind of 
memory this is does not depend on the fact that there is a national memorial, 
and neither does it depend on its form, nor its site or place. The meaning of the 
memorial's content needs to be filled with the ever-changing form of memory 
according to the generation in question. As such the memorial is not a purely 
symbolic gesture and does not completely block out history and memory from 
consciousness. It remains to be proven whether the chosen memorial design 
can actually express the problematics and impossibilities of the German 
remembering process. 
181 see footnote 23 
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Perhaps Germany's memorial dilemma is essentially irresolvable. How 
does a nation of former perpetrators mourn its victims? How does a divided 
nation reunite itself on the memory of its crimes? Since no other nation has ever 
attempted to reunite itself by founding its raison d'etre on the memory of its 
crimes or by commemorating its crimes in the topographical centre of its old and 
new capital, it cannot come as a surprise that the process itself would be 
inherent with difficulties. 
Profound suspicion and mistrust concerning the monument was 
expressed in the fear that such a monument would recall aspects too closely 
associated with fascism itself and in the scepticism, that such a monument 
reminded one of 'commissioned art' (Auftragskunst) after Hitler, Stalin and 
Mussolini. Totalitarian regimes commemorate their achievements through art 
like monuments of self-aggrandizing delusions of eternal truth and permanence 
and authoritarian tendency to reduce the viewer to a passive spectator. How 
then is it possible to remember the victims of fascism in an art form like the 
monument? Can the doubts about the usefulness and ability of memorials as 
such be made visible in the chosen memorial design? 
The recent debates have been enlightening, informative and insightful; 
yet, at the same time, the changed political parameters and the current political 
climate seem to have given rise to a strong Neo-Nazi movement, whose 
ideology aims at forgetting and denying the Nazi crimes. I agree with James 
Young who claims that the debates have created plenty of 'shame' in Germany; 
not so much shame about the crimes committed more than fifty years ago, but 
shame about an undignified and tasteless argument. Young further argues that 
academic preoccupation with the fascinating issues of the memorialising 
process at stake might keep the argument going. However, it also creates a 
certain indifference towards the memory of the mass murder of Jews and the 
void it left behind. James Young asks whether we really want the reunited 
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'Germany to return its capital to Berlin without publicly and visibly acknowledging 
what had happened the last time Germany was governed from Berlin''. Berlin 
is and has been a mere construction site for the last 10 years: With all these 
new buildings 'could there really be no space left for public memory of the 
victims' of Germany's Nazi regime? t°' 
But can such a memorial really remind and admonish the Germans and 
the world of the crimes committed, of the terrible deed of nearly erasing the 
Jewish culture from the German cultural landscape and consciousness? James 
Young remarks that 
the problem was that in voiding itself of Jews, Germany had 
forever voided itself of the capacity for a normal, healthy response 
to Jews and their ideas. Instead, it was all a tortured bending over 
backwards, biting one's tongue, wondering what "they' really 
thought of Germans. It is a terrible, yet unavoidable consequence 
of the Holocaust itself, this Jewish aphasia, a legacy of mass 
murder. Thus, I began to grasp just this need for a foreigner and a 
Jew on the Findungskommission. Without a Jewish eye to save it 
from egregiously misguided judgements (like the winner of the first 
competition), anything was possible. '' 
The murdered Jews can answer to this political gesture, however 
courageous and difficult, only with a massive silence. The burden of response 
does fall on living Germans and future generations 
- 
and 'a foreigner and a Jew 
on the Findungskommission'. Will it enable the visitor to address the void left 
behind by this destruction? Will it point out to the visitor its own responsibility for 
memory itself? 
182 Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary 
Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 195 
183 ibid., p. 195/196 
184 ibid., p. 196 
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A. What is Implied by the Form of a Memorial? 
Remembrances and memories can be and have been expressed in 
different forms of re-presentations, e. g. the eyewitness account, the novel, the 
work of art, the monument, the film but also historical and philosophical 
discussions. In the context of the planned memorial in Germany we not only 
have to examine the possibilities of re-presentation and expression but also the 
form of re-presentation. What valid criteria should be used to judge the different 
memorial proposals? Should there be an abstract memorial without inscription? 
Is there going to be a monument to remember the victims or is it going to be an 
admonishing memorial? 
Any monument will deliver and will function as an interpretation of, and 
provide information about, the event it comes to represent. In many ways it aims 
to achieve identification with one group while at the same time aiming to gain 
legitimacy for a certain concept and opinion. The decision for a national 
memorial represents the current state of public affairs of German political self- 
understanding and tries to project these into the future. I can identify two major 
aspects of reaction to the monument: there could be the affirmative form of 
reception in forms of rituals of either public commemorative celebrations or the 
laying of a wreath; or the memorial could be rejected as such and subjected to 
commentary in the form of spraying, painting or dismantling. How and in what 
form is the general public going to accept 
- 
visit 
- 
the memorial, only time will 
show. The concluding chapter of the thesis is looking at the possibilities of future 
memory of the Shoah. An important aspect of the remembrance process is its 
representation in public rituals'; it remains to be proven that the non-ritual 
185 For a profound examination of the ritualising aspects of the memory process see Frevert, Ute 
& Assman, Aleida, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit (Suttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt) 
107 
reception, which could be its purely artistic reception, of the monument inevitably 
leads to the forgetting of the monument as such and with it the forgetting of the 
event it came to represent. In a monument the past becomes static; the 
monument is a static interpretation of the past. Thus can it present a message 
adequate to the complex systems and sets of questions at stake? The re- 
reading of Walter Benjamin opened up the various possibilities of asking the 
questions of the Shoah thus initiating a constant re-petition in the form of 
remembering. 
In the sphere of mass murder, what is a monument? If it was the stony 
attempt to fix a binding notion of history and to transfer it on to the collective and 
into the future, what purpose does such a form of remembrance serve? Can a 
notion of history that has been made visual and thus presents a certain political 
understanding, be of eternal duration? Many aspects are decisive in order for a 
memorial to be received by the public in general: the choice of site and 
dedication are important factors. The 'Mahnmal' (memorial) is erected to 
admonish, to warn, to remember a past event, the repetition of which needs to 
be prevented. 
B. Jürgen Habemias: the Problem of German Self-Conception and 
Dedication of the Memorial 
The current social and political climate in Germany questions and 
challenges the claim for a national German memory after the Shoah. The 
Historians Dispute in 1986 argued for a 'discontinued' past. Such a claim, 
however, can only mean a rejection of the past 
- 
only to find oneself confronted 
with 'a past that will not pass' (Historian's Dispute). In an article for 'Die Zeit', the 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas discusses the issues of German self- 
108 
understanding in view of its National Socialist past and with regard to the 
memorial plans'. According to Habermas, the break in the continuation of our 
leading tradition is the condition for Germany's regained self-respect. Habermas 
recognises a unique chance in the history of the Federal Republic where a 
parliamentary vote on the planned memorial could act as 'a sign for the 
reformed collective identity of the Germans projecting far into the future'. 
More than half a century later guilt and shame 
- 
or the rejection of the two 
- 
still mark the moral imperative when addressing the questions of the memory 
of the Holocaust. In what way can this be symbolically expressed in the name of 
the entire German nation? Whether there is a link between representative 
culture of memory and the memorial's design needs to be investigated along 
with the question of how far the memorial can fulfil the function of continuous 
enlightenment and political self-questioning. Admittedly, the boundaries between 
exoneration, intoxicated with sentiments and emotions and moral intellectual 
responsibility, are obscured. The impossibility of finding an aesthetically and 
politically convincing consensus until today marks the ongoing debate. 
The invitation to participate in the first competition in 1994 set the 
following criteria: 
Contemporary artistic force should combine symbiotically the 
change of direction in mourning, distress and respect with the 
reflection in shame and guilt. Cognition should be able to arise, 
also for future life in peace, freedom, equality and tolerance. 187 
188 Habermas, Jürgen, 1999. Der Zeigefinger. Die Deutschen und ihr Denkmal. Die Zeit, 1. April 
1999, p. 42 ff. 
187 Heutige künstlerische Kraft soll die Hinwendung in Trauer, Erschütterung und Achtung 
symbiotisch verbinden mit der Besinnung in Scham und Schuld. Erkenntnis soll erwachsen 
können, auch für künftiges Leben in Frieden, Freiheit, Gleichheit und Toleranz. (Öffentliche 
Ausschreibung, 1994) see Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Sefrens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Das 
Denkmal? Der Denkmalstreit: Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas 
- 
Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo) 
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The initiators of the memorial plans are asking for primarily private 
emotions to be transformed by an artistic design into something universal. The 
difficulty that arises is that 'emotions' are not set off in the same way with 
everybody. The inclusivity of the general memorial struggles on the borderline 
between private and public, between individual and universal, between warning 
off and reflection, between ambiguity and contradiction. Can a single building or 
work of art evoke and trigger off so many, and at the same time, universally 
orientated emotions? Do forms of expression exist which have the same solemn 
and monumental affect on every human being, which make us pause and think? 
It is pretentious to claim that a piece of art is not ambiguous, that its content is 
never contradictory. All-inclusive general monuments for the moral self- 
discovery of a nation are rare, if they exist at all. According to those responsible, 
the task that the not-yet-erected-memorial is burdened with is to provoke 
apprehensiveness but to fascinate at the same time. 
Out of more or less contingent causes Germany was plunged into a 
decade of public controversy which touched on the political self-understanding 
as a nation. The society's notion of what it is and what it wants to be seems to 
be threatened. In Germany, most recently the occasions have multiplied: the 
Wehrmacht-Exhibition; the Goldhagen-Debate'; and the knowledge of the 
involvement of banks and large companies in the Nazi extermination practises. 
Despite increasing virulence, from the start the discussions have concentrated 
on the one question, as Jürgen Habermas points out: 
Do we, who stand as citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany 
in the political, legal and cultural succession of the state and 
188 The thesis' concluding chapter is places the event of the Wehrmacht'-Exhibition and of the 
controversy that Daniel J. Goldhagen's book 'Hitler's Willing Executioners' prompted in relation 
to the debate that followed Martin Walser's speech. 
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society of the generation of perpetrators, accept the historical 
liability for the consequences of their deeds? Do we make the self- 
critical remembering of "Auschwitz" 
- 
the reflection on the events 
connected with that name still kept alive 
- 
explicitly part of our 
political self-understanding? Do we accept the worrying political 
responsibility as an element of a broken national identity which for 
the `later-born' arises from the break with civilisation committed, 
supported and tolerated by the Germans? 119 
It has been argued that the memorial is not needed and is, indeed, 
superfluous, since, not far from the allocated area, another monument to 
commemorate the 'Victims of War and Tyranny', the 'Neue Wache'190, already 
exists. The simultaneous dedication of the 'Neue Wache' to victims of war and 
persecution bears an intolerable abstraction'9'. The danger lies in the fact that 
the crimes of persecution are hidden behind the victims of war. The dispute 
189 Obemehmen wir, die wir als Bürger der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der politisch- 
rechtlichen und kulturellen Nachfolge des Staates und der Gesellschaft der "Tätergeneration" 
stehen, eine historische Haftung für die Konsequenzen ihrer Tat? Machen wir die selbstkritische 
Erinnerung an "Auschwitz" 
- 
die wachgehaltene Reflektion auf das mit dem Namen verbundene 
Geschehen 
- 
explizit zum Bestandteil unseres politischen Selbstverständnisses? Akzeptieren wir 
die beunruhigende Verantwortung, die den später Geborenen aus dem von Deutschen verübten, 
unterstützten und geduldeten Zivilisationsbruch erwächst, als Element einer gebrochenen 
nationalen Identität? ' Habermas, Jürgen, 1999. Die Zeit, 1. April 1999 
190 The 'Neue Wache', build by Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1816-1818) for the Prussian King, 
functioned as a guardhouse until 1918. In the Weimar Republic it became a monument for the 
soldiers killed in action of WWI. Hilter annually placed a wreath on "(Heroes') Remembrance 
Day" (Heldengedenktag). The GDR dedicated the'Neue Wache' 1960 to the'victims of Fascism 
and Militarism'. On 27 January 1993, the Parliament decided to reconstruct the Schinkel building 
in the converted form of 1931. A copy of the statue by Käthe Kollwitz 'Mother with dead Son' 
(1937), four times bigger than the original, was placed inside and the monument was dedicated 
to the 'Victims of War and Tyranny'. 
191 see also Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Sefrens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Das Denkmal? Der 
Denkmalstreit: Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas 
- 
Eine 
Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo); Kirsch, Jan-Holger, 2001. Trauer und historische Erinnerung in 
der Berliner Republik. In Liebsch, Burkhard & Rüsen, Jörn (eds. ), Trauer und Geschichte (Köln: 
Böhlau Verlag), p. 339-374 
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arose over the question of whether to dedicate the planned memorial to the 
Jews only or to all groups of victims. Jürgen Habermas points out that: 
in our memory we cannot again sort the victims according to those 
points of view, according to which they were selected by the 
henchmen and subjected to differentiated torments. 192 
Does the exclusive reference to the murdered Jews ignore the sacrifice of 
the other group of victims? On the one hand such an exclusive dedication 
becomes problematic because it could indeed implicate an injustice to the 
gypsies, the homosexuals, the politically persecuted, the mentally ill, the 
deserters etc. to name just a few. Has Parliament missed the historical chance 
to dedicate the memorial to all groups of victims? Later decisions on further 
memorials might indeed lessen the importance of the monument in question and 
the content it is to represent. Interestingly enough, the 'Neue Wache' was 
dedicated long before a decision on a national Holocaust Memorial could be 
reached. 
However, as Jürgen Habermas rightly points out, we may not ignore the 
elements that explain why "Auschwitz" has so overwhelmingly been connected 
to the Holocaust of the European Jews: 
The moral intuition to which the universalists righteously appeal, 
clashes with another, if one wants ethical intuition in relation to the 
own collective. If we were to leave aside the special relevance of 
the Jews for the social and cultural life of the Germans, the 
historically momentous, very specific proximity and distance of the 
two different poles, would we not again be guilty of false 
abstractions? ' 13 
192 Wir dürfen die Opfer im Gedenken nicht noch einmal nach Gesichstpunkten sortieren, nach 
denen sie von den Schergen selektiert und abgestuften Qualen unterworfen worden sind. ' 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1999. Die Zeit, 1. April 1999 
193 Die moralische Intuition, an die die Universalisten mit Recht appellieren, kreuzt sich mit einer 
anderen, wenn man will ethischen, auf das eigene Kollektiv bezogenen Intuition. Wenn wir von 
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Had the Germans not perceived the Jews with a different and special 
relevance, the motivation for the murderous deeds would have been missing. A 
difference in the treatment of victims, who, in the end, all shared in the same 
fate, can not morally be justified whether in the artistic form of remembering or in 
any other way. To disregard the special significance the Nazis had attributed to 
the Jews would lessen the fatality of this anti-Semitic differentiation and 
exclusion. An understanding of such fatal differentiation and exclusion must be 
built into the self-critical memory. 
We are, nevertheless, left with the question of whether the 'country of 
perpetrators' could possibly restrict itself to remember 'only' the murdered Jews, 
thus excluding all the other victims. With the erection of one memorial the 
danger of believing that all "duties" of mourning and remembering have been 
met, and that the task of mourning has been rendered obsolete, should not be 
underestimated. Where do we place the other murdered in our space of 
remembering 
- 
the other millions who likewise were gassed, slain, shot or killed 
in any other way? Are they meant to be spared from the official national act of 
mourning? Does the parliament's decision on the exclusive dedication to the 
'murdered Jews of Europe' entail a moral and political commitment to remember 
the other groups of victims in other memorials? Salomon Korn believes that the 
German nation has given away the unique chance of an all-including dedication: 
Even if Germany was to build next to the `memorial to the 
murdered Jews of Europe' further memorials for the other group of 
victims, at the end there will be lack of the central memorial with 
der besonderen Relevanz der Juden für das gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Leben der 
Deutschen, von der historisch folgereichen, ganz spezifischen Nähe und Ferne der beiden 
ungleichen Pole absehen würden, machten wir uns dann nicht wiederum einer falschen 
Abstraktion schuldig? ' Habermas, ibid. 
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which the National Socialist crimes are remembered not by way of 
instalments but as a whole. ' 
There are many and striking arguments to call special attention to the 
extermination of the European Jews by emphasising its uniqueness. It is crucial 
not to 'continue' the selective process deadly relevant for the Nazis. 
Nevertheless, there is an understanding of the outstanding social and cultural 
role of the Jews for the Germans that does not neutralise the irrefutable moral 
precept of equal respect when remembering all victims. 
"Auschwitz" has become the synonym for mass murder. Perhaps this is 
an inadequate association since it diverts or even removes the cruel reality of 
other places of NS mass murder from our attention. Today the name 
"Auschwitz" is used almost interchangeably with the later adopted term 
"Holocaust". As a pars pro toto it means the complex process of extermination 
on the whole: 'The term "Holocaust" has become nothing less than the universal 
instrument against which any discourse about crime and justice is measured. '' 
194 Denn selbst wenn Deutschland neben dem 'Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas' in 
Zukunft für all übrigen Opfergruppen Denkmäler errichten sollte, so wird am Ende doch das 
zentrale Mahnmal fehlen, in dem der nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen nicht ratenweise, 
sondern in ihrer Gesamtheit gedacht wird'. S. Korn in R. Koselleck, Die Widmung, FAZ, 3 March 
1999 
195 Andreas Huyssen, 1999. Der Holocaust lehrt keine Hoffnung, Tagesspiegel, 20 April 1999 
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C. Who is Erecting the Memorial for Whom? 
The German parliament decided in principle on the memorial's purpose, 
name, place, and form. The procedure is often regarded as devalued for its 
supposed lack of democratic legitimacy. What makes a monument/memorial 
"legitimate"? Is it public acceptance that decides on the legitimacy as Michael 
Berenbaum, now director of the Jewish Museum in Berlin, claims? 196 
The Memorial Museum Yad Vashem in Israel keeps the memory of all the 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust alive. In many other countries Jewish and non- 
Jewish descendants of victims of the Nazi terror have created places of 
remembrance. In Amsterdam, for example, the memories of the murdered 
homosexuals and the gassed gypsies are kept alive through impressive 
monuments. There are various memorials to remember the murdered Polish, 
Russians, Serbs, Greeks, Italians, Belgians, French, Danish and Norwegians. 
They all implore 
- 
more or less successfully 
-a lasting rejection of all genocide, 
as James Young convincingly argues. 197 
A memorial that might just as well be in Jerusalem, London or 
Washington has missed its goal. The remembrance in the country of the 
perpetrators and victims must be different to the remembrance in the countries 
of those who escaped and survived. Foremost and in contrast to various 
memorials and monuments in the whole world, erected by the descendants of 
the Nazi victims, the German national memorial needs to remember the 
perpetrators and their deed. Having accepted the political liability and, in a moral 
sense, also the guilt, a memorial erected by the perpetrators' nation does 
remember something different (unless the perpetrators slip into the role of the 
196 Tagesspiegel, 20 April 1999 
197 see Young, James E., 1993. The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning 
(New Haven: Yale University Press) 
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victim). The German role as perpetrator 
- 
and as descendant of the generation 
of perpetrators 
- 
must be visualised if the monument was to gain legitimacy; if 
anything 'Auschwitz' has taught us to protect human dignity regardless of all 
criteria of distinction or discrimination. The national memorial must visualise or 
re-present something that keeps the heterogeneity of perpetrator- and victim- 
memory alive. At stake here is the attempt to re-present memories that are 
mutually exclusive. 
The past naturally separates the descendants of the perpetrators from 
those of the victims. Only if one convincingly assumes liability for deeds and 
circumstances, a mutual coexistence could become a possibility. The problem 
for the later German generations lies in the conflict of interests between grief for 
the victims, the sheer horror when confronted with the horrors and the love for 
their own (grand)parents as the past fifty years of German post-war memory 
have shown. 
An exclusive concentration on that which deed and perpetrator mean to 
us 
- 
the current generation 
- 
would undermine the moral core of compassion for 
the victims. The moral impulse to remember must not be relativised in the 
context of self-ascertainment: 'the value of the weak, even futile strength of 
anamnesic solidarity will definitely be lost if the self-reference narcissistically 
becomes independent 
- 
and the memorial becomes a "monument of 
disgrace". '198 It is very idealistic of Habermas to believe that the memorial will not 
be built to fulfil the expectations that other groups of interest or nations might 
have of the Germans: 
Those who see Auschwitz as "our shame" are interested in the 
impressions the others have of us, not in the image that the 
1g8 
, 
Der Wert der schwachen, ja vergeblichen Kraft anamnetischer Solidarität geht erst recht 
verloren, wenn sich der Selbsttbezug narzißtisch verselbstständigt 
- 
und das Denkmal zum 
"Schandmal" wird'. Habermas, Die Zeit, 1 April 1999 
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citizens of the Federal Republic form themselves in retrospect to 
the break of civilisation in order to be able to face and respect 
themselves. ' 
The cultural memory of a nation should not be confused with 'private', 
individual remembering. I would like to argue that it demands some kind of 
symbolic reification. The discursive mediums of historical writing, literature and 
teaching are not sufficient for the continuation of remembrance. According to 
Habermas, the German cultural nation only developed a convincing attachment 
to universalistic constitutional principles after and through Auschwitz. However, 
Habermas is adamant that the 'ramp of Auschwitz' should not become the focus 
of our attention in such a way that the cultural memory is blocked and does not 
reach beyond the Nazi period: 
But any reasonable historical reflection upon Auschwitz should and 
cannot fix the gaze of the citizens (and it is their political self- 
understanding which is at stake here, not the historical research! ) 
onto "the one" which takes no account of the other. 200 
199 Wer Auschwitz für 'unsere Schande' hält, ist an dem Bild interessiert, das andere von uns 
haben, nicht an dem Bild, das die Bürger der Bundesrepublik im Rückblick auf den 
Zivilisationsbruch von sich ausbilden, um sich selbst ins Gesicht sehen und gegenseitig achten 
zu können'. Habermas, ibid. 
200 Aber der historische Rückbezug auf Auschwitz soll und kann den Blick der Bürger (und nur 
um deren politisches Selbstverständnis geht es, nicht um die historische Forschung! ) nicht auf 
'das einem fixieren, das alles andere ausblendet'. Habermas, ibid. 
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D. Memory in 'No-Man's Land': The Site of the Memorial versus The Site 
of Remembrance 
Remembrance is the recollection of things past. What happens to the 
place that is chosen as the site of future institutionalised remembrance, a site 
that in its immediate history was the garden of Hitler's Ministries and the bare 
strip of land that divided the East from the West? The immense dimensions, as 
well as the positioning of the site in the centre of the capital, imbue the memorial 
project with 'national' importance and symbolism. 
Long before the monument is erected the place loses its innocence: 
Martin Walser might have expressed what many have felt when he spoke of the 
'monumentalisation of disgrace' and the 'concreting of the centre of the capital 
with a nightmare the size of a football pitch'201. Complementary to this stands 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's trivialising postulate of a site, which the 
Germans 'enjoy to visit'202. The site loses its neutrality through such ideological 
insistence. In the very centre of the re-united Berlin no site can be neutral a 
priori. The ideological discussions and insistence will have given indications for 
the political climate of German 'coming-to-terms' demanding either 
'normalisation' or the infamous 'clean break'. Thus the locality and size of the 
site can never remain indifferent. That, which is to be remembered, is of such 
universal importance that questions regarding the general possibility of 
'adequate' representation and ideologically influenced fears emerge, whether 
201 Walser, Martin, 1998. Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede. Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 12 October 1998 
-'Experiences while creating a Sunday Speech' 
202 Kalbe, Riki & Zuckermann, Moshe (eds. ), 2000. Ein Grundstück in der Mitte: Das Gelände 
des künftigen Holocaust-Mahnmals in Wort und Bild (Göttingen: Wallstein); see also Heimrod, 
Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Sefrens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Das Denkmal? Der Denkmalstreit: Die 
Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas 
- 
Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: 
Philo) 
118 
such a 'monumentalisation of disgrace' would have to be present in the very 
centre of a capital, which is rebuilding its new republic on past events and old 
memories. 
Benjamin claimed that the materiality of the Parisian Arcades stood for 
and manifested the hell, which interweaved the Nineteenth Century. Moshe 
Zuckermann concludes that a symbolic allocation of meaning cannot suffice but 
that we have to decode the material and historical as well. The chosen location 
is rich in history and materiality. What are the consequences for the abstract, 
symbolic dimension of the site? 
No-Man's Land (or Death-Strip) was the name for the area between West 
and East, the empty strip of land preceding the Wall from the West. In his 
Negative Dialectics, Adorno has a sub-chapter entitled 'No Man's Land'. 
Discussing the ontological thinkings of Heidegger in particular and in German 
idealism of Fichte and Schelling, Adorno here examines the understanding of 
'the judgement that history passed on the identity thesis' by Heidegger and 
Husserl. Adorno writes: 
Being is the contraction of essence. Ontology's own consistency 
takes it to a no man's land. It must eliminate each a posteriori; it is 
not supposed to be logic either, in the sense of a doctrine of 
thought and a particular discipline; each thinking step would 
necessarily take ontology beyond the only point where it may hope 
to be sufficient unto itself. In the end, there is hardly anything it 
would dare aver longer, not even about Being. What shows in this 
ontology is not so much mystical meditation as the distress of a 
thinking that seeks its otherness and cannot make a move without 
fearing to lose what it claims. Tendentially, philosophy becomes a 
ritualistic posture. Yet there is truth stirring in the posture as well: 
the truth of philosophy falling silent. 214 
203 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 77 
204 ibid., p. 78 
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The problematic Adorno conceives in the ontological thought of 
Heidegger is the attempt to seek otherness but out of fear of loosing self- 
identity, thinking becomes ritualised and thus silent: 'Auschwitz confirmed the 
philosopheme of pure identity as death'. What happened in Auschwitz 
involved the collapse of all previously gained civilisation. For Adorno, it also 
meant the withdrawal of inner meaning of philosophy. Philosophy had to fail in 
understanding the 'occurrence of Auschwitz' - the 'break of civilisation'. Thus 
philosophy had to engage in thinking its own abolition. History forced upon 
philosophy the necessity to correct its axioms. However, the impossibility of 
philosophy after Auschwitz again necessitated a philosophy that would not tire of 
fighting against the conscious refusal of memory. 
Adorno had made poetry the paradigm of a culture that, in opposition to 
the barbarity of Auschwitz, was utterly helpless and powerless. 
The following criteria were used in deciding on the site: 
" conceptual and historical aspects which give reason for or against the site 
" 
features and structure of the site, like for example size, aligning, building, 
plants, trees etc. 
" elements of the surrounding area which could influence the meaning of 
the site and its usage 
" getting to the site (already existing/planned connections) 
" urban contact of the site with regard to town-planning 
" availability (property, opposing town-plans etc. ) 
According to these criteria of evaluation the sites Ministergärten 
(Ministers' Gardens), Tiergarten (Goethe-Monument), Platz der Republik, 
205 ibid., p. 362 
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Bebeiplatz, Marx-Engels-Forum, Topography of Terror, former Jewish Cemetery 
(Große Hamburger Straße) were considered. 
The chosen site of the Minister's Gardens, the terrain through which the 
wall ran, has often been criticized for its enormous size. Regarding the issues at 
stake, I consider the location perfectly situated in the heart of the centre of the 
old-new capital, thus very much part of the national memorial landscape where it 
is connecting the Reichstag, Brandenburg Gate, Unter den Linden, Potsdamer 
Platz, Tiergarten et al. 
The question of the 'correct' choice of site of the monument touches onto 
some of the issues regarding the meaning and content of the monument. The 
majority of the Germans saw themselves as 'victims of National Socialism' 
- 
the 
placarding of the absolute evil in the form of the Nazis, the Other. Perhaps it is 
the temporal distance of more than half a century that allows a change in this 
'defence mechanism' of many Germans. The site and its urban context become 
important. In that sense, a confrontation between the monument and other 
symbols of German history makes its focus on perpetrator and deed 
unmistakably clear and thus connects it to German present and future. 
The Shoah as an event is so monstrous that no representation seemed to 
be adequate enough, no memorial site central enough. Within the context of 
defining a site for future commemoration, the new meaning allocated to the 
chosen site is decisive. Perhaps Moshe Zuckerman is right when he claims that 
from the moment of decision about its future definition, the 'no-man's land' 
became imbued with historically symbolic values and meanings. Although the 
location itself has a history of its own 
- 
from Nazi Germany to a topographical 
position in the post-war West-East conflict 
- 
with the new dedication the site has 
been re-interpreted and given a new importance and responsibility. 
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2. Aesthetic Transformation 
- 
Some Problematics of 
Representation 
The recent disputes regarding the planned Holocaust Memorial in Berlin 
have centred around the question of whether such a memorial would be a sign 
of 'shame' or a symbol of historical responsibility. In the idea of the planned 
Memorial, erected precisely at the chosen location, the essential motives of 
more than fifty years of public workings-through are concentrated. The motives 
are historio-philosophical, theological, moral and aesthetic ones. At least three 
dimensions are part of the public debates: Is a central memorial actually 
needed? Ought such a memorial be dedicated exclusively to the murdered Jews 
of Europe? Does the chosen memorial design fulfil the idealistic criteria and 
notions? 
Every individual who attempts to explain and interpret has a theoretical 
premise. Any discussion of or any speaking about, any re-presentation of the 
Shoah carries with it the index of possible disappearance within the 
representation itself. A central motive for every place of admonition is the fear of 
forgetting, as Imre Kertesz justly pointed out: 'From the first moment the 
Holocaust carried the dreadful fear the fear of forgetting. '. The 1990s in 
Germany with its furious and heated debates on German self-understanding in 
the shadow of the Shoah have proven that the fear is still very much present. 
To remain a persistent part of memory means that the memorial needs to 
incorporate a constant factor of interruption and irritation to disturb indifference. 
The memorial is conceptualised by contemporary interests of memory. If it was 
to sustain its validity beyond the now it would by subjected to changes, 
206 Kertesz, Imre, 1994. Der Holocaust als Kultur. Sinn und Form, 46, vol. 4, p. 562 
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modifications and transformations. The phase of transition from 'communicative 
memory', based on personal experience of history, to a 'cultural memory' is 
marked by the challenge to find a form of culture that helps forming and shaping 
an identity of memory and that does not run counter to such an attempt. Only 
'modern', contemporary art with its long reputation for the provocative can break 
open the empty and stereotyped agreements of remembering. The artistic 
medium with its openness and self-reflexivity, even autonomy, can put the edge 
onto the political intentions behind the memorial and work as an intensive 
communicator by aiming beyond the political. 
First of all, we have to unravel the various levels that are at work in the 
German discussions. An early concern about the possibility of art after 
Auschwitz was voiced by Adorno in the 1950s when he said that to write poetry 
after Auschwitz was barbaric207. He meant nothing less than that the possibilities 
of re-presentation in the times of mass annihilation are limited and subjected to 
constant re-working. Can there be aesthetics after Auschwitz? What inscription 
has Auschwitz left on aesthetic representations and imagination? The debates 
surrounding the planned Holocaust memorial in Berlin have shown that this 
question still stands with the same validity since it was posed originally by 
Adorno. However, it is generally accepted that there have been few forms of 
artistic creation that have proven that art after Auschwitz does not disappear in 
false metaphysics (arguably Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah and Rachel 
Whiteread's Memorial for Vienna for example). 
The second problem, the debates in Germany have been struggling with, 
is the question of the possibility of re-presenting the Shoah, which as such ties 
in with Adomo's dictum. This is what Andrew Benjamin's question meant when 
207 Adorno, Theodor W., 1951. Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft. in Petra Kiedaisch (ed. ), 1998. Lyrik 
nach Auschwitz? Adorno und die Dichter (Stuttgart: Reclam), p. 49 
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he asked whether sculpture could entail the Shoah208. How far can Auschwitz be 
inscribed onto aesthetic representation and imagination? In many ways the 
memorial will fulfil functions of compensation for guilt of the crimes of the Shoah. 
Whether the monumentality of the chosen design is evoking references to 
National Socialist architecture or not, ties in with the question of what can be re- 
presented and where the perpetrators' memory or memories lie. As the 
examination of the Walser-Bubis controversy will make clear, the necessarily 
and essentially frayed discussions around the questions of remembrance are 
diametrically opposed and thus can never be bundled up and tied down in one 
monument. As we shall see in detail in the third chapter, the political emphasis 
on the monumental form of remembrance needs to be acknowledged but such 
re-presentations form an essential part of the complex process of remembrance 
and 'coming-to-terms'. 
On a third level, we have to address the question of what it is that comes 
to be re-presented. The manifold expressions of interest and power are inherent 
to the German process of erecting a national memorial to their deeds. So Sybil 
Milton is right to argue that the whole memorial process, in many ways, qualifies 
as 'a reflection of national culture, political ideology, artistic merit'209. The Berlin 
memorial is set against a tight political and geographical background: we are 
confronted with an attempt to create a symbolic re-presentation of past national 
crimes 
- 
an allegory in the Benjaminian understanding, as discussed in the first 
chapter. In its essence, I would like to argue that the chosen memorial design is 
fundamentally self-serving, full of nationalistic representations and public 
expectations. A true chance to engage future generations with the problematics 
at stake in the Germany's remembering process has been missed. More than 
208 Benjamin, Andrew, 1997. Present Hope (London: Routledge), p. 104 
209 Milton, Sybil, 1991. In Fitting Memory: The Art and Politics of Holocaust Memorials (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press), p. 7 
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fifty years after the Shoah, Germany finally decides to erect a memorial. 
Necessarily all the questions of 'for whom? ', and 'what is going to be 
remembered? ' need to be asked. The whole process, however, is nothing less 
than the prolongation of the 'alibi' of the first generation who claimed that they 
had received the 'mercy of late birth' ('Gnade der späten Geburt' coined by 
Helmut Kohl), and therefore that they had no responsibilities for the crimes 
committed and also no need to remember because the sheer horror was too 
overwhelming. 
Involved in the competition for the planned memorial in Berlin was yet 
another later generation who had no biographical links with the historical event 
of the Shoah. Their designs not only engaged with the problematics and limits of 
representation, they also worked-through the 'trauma' of the first generation. It is 
this generation that takes up Lyotard's concern to create a language that finds 
and establishes links with Auschwitz without evoking it. 
In the debate surrounding the instrumentalisation of the Shoah various 
interests are connected with the politics of remembrance. Jean-Francois Lyotard 
thus reminds us that attention needs to be paid to the knowledge that any form 
of shaping memory at the same time means an interpretation of that which 
comes to be memorised: 
Here to fight against forgetting means to fight to remember that 
one forgets as soon as one believes, draws conclusions and holds 
for certain. It means to fight against forgetting the precariousness 
of what has been established, of the re-established past; it is a 
fight for the sickness whose recovery is simulated. 210 
The question of authenticity in relation to the aesthetic re-presentation 
cannot be inappropriate. For later generations the Holocaust is an event that is 
210 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 1997. Heidegger and `the jews' (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. 10 
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mediated, not least through mass media. Any discourse about Holocaust 
remembrance moves around 'right' and 'wrong' forms of cultural re-presentation, 
around 'appropriate' remembrance and 'correct' interpretation of the past. 
Lyotard understands Auschwitz as a model: 'the experience of a language which 
gives support to the speculative discourse. 1211 
Lyotard claims that one could no longer speak of 'experience' and that it 
thus becomes is essential to 're-establish the unthinkability of Auschwitz'. A 
language needs to be found, which without evoking 'Auschwitz', ties and 
establishes links with it. Yet, past Auschwitz, these rules for the association of 
language after Auschwitz have to be newly constructed. To Lyotard it is clear 
that 'after Auschwitz' no subject remains which could claim to name itself by 
naming the very experience. What does Lyotard's and Adorno's post-Auschwitz 
philosophyentail for the possibilities of re-presentation in art? 
Both Lyotard and Adorno have made clear that within the philosophical 
context it is possible to arouse, address and name the experience of limits. 
Within the philosophical Lyotard has made a cultural-political concept of 
representation or prohibition to depict possible. The recent debates in Germany 
have proven that the claim of the un-representability of the Holocaust is as much 
part of the ongoing dispute as the quest for narrative and figurative solutions 
are. 
Lyotard's writing is concerned with the authenticity of the concepts of 
representation; it is the power of expression that Lyotard seeks formulated in 
those sentences after and linked with Auschwitz. For Jean Amery the 
experience of Auschwitz can be communicated but never shared and mediated; 
the extinction of spirit and civilisation that the inmates suffered through sheer 
211 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, ?. Streitgespräche oder Sprechen nach Auschwitz (Bremen: ? ), p. 14 
- 
from Les fuis de L'homme. A partir du travail de Jaques Derrida (Paris, 1981) 
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physical terror cannot be parted with. He protests that there can never be a 
rhetoric or allegory of experience: 
The pain was that that it was. There is no more to say. Qualities of 
feeling are as incomparable as indescribable. They mark the limit 
of linguistic powers of communication. Who wanted to im-part his 
bodily pain, would be doomed to inflict it and thus to become a 
torturer himself. 212 
Lyotard sees the reason for the authenticity of Amery's text in the 'break 
of speculation'. This experience of suffering and torture that the own body was 
subjected to, Lyotard calls the pathos of the primary, and this can never be 
disputed. Re-presentations of the Holocaust of those who were born later can 
only then gain authenticity if they closely 'study' the experience of the Shoah. 
Problematic for the concept of re-presentation is that 'Auschwitz' as a direct, 
primary experience does not exist. Thus the secondary thematises the plurality 
of experiences, of artistic creation and mediated and narrated experiences. 
Contemporary artistic creations often work around the limits of 
representation of witness testimony of the Shoah and later generations' re- 
212 Der Schmerz war der, der er war. Darüber hinaus ist nichts zu sagen. Gefühlsqualitäten sind 
so unvergleichbar wie unbeschreibbar. Sie markieren die Grenze sprachlichen 
Mitteilungsvermögens. Wer seinen Körperschmerz mit-teilen wollte, wäre darauf gestellt, ihn 
zuzufügen und damit selbst zum Folterknecht zu werden'. Amäry, Jean, 1997. Jenseits von 
Schuld und Sahne: Bewältigungsversuche eines Oberwältigten (Stuttgart: Kleff-Cotta), p. 63 
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presentation or imagining of the testified 213 
. 
All possible, thinkable links with 
Auschwitz in words, sentences or images have to be of such substance that 
they do not surmount Auschwitz as the 'in-associable' but that they allow it to 
stand as the un-removable traumatic experience. Memory has to be deprived of 
its subjective and medial condition and of its random appearance in order to 
regain a form of the remembrance. 
Lanzmann's film itself is dear about the limits of the different media of 
representation: for him the limit of representation as such is no longer of 
concern. The film brings into question the various ways and methods of 
representation employed by later generations of artists, writers and politicians. 
Most of all, the film succeeds in questioning perspective as such, by 
asking: With whose gaze am I looking? '. The 'trauma' of the generation of 
perpetrators continues to have a lasting effect on the constant attempts of re- 
presenting, of creating the 'impossible links' with Auschwitz. Despite and in 
opposition to universalistic claims, the condition of the secondary demands 
213 Manuel Köppen and Klaus Scherpe convincingly argue that Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah 
(1985) gains authenticity through a radicalisation of the 'prohibition to depict'. Lanzmann does 
not allow for a 're-produced' similarity with the actual events and facts. Lanzmann visits the 
places of destruction; he takes his witnesses (victims, perpetrators and bystanders) back to the 
actual places. The only form of re-production and re-presentation Lanzmann allows is the 
speech, the remembering words of the witnesses: 'He directs the speeches of his witnesses to 
fill the space of memory of his film; not with images but with sentences, statements, gestures 
and facial expression that mark that which is absent 
... 
Lanzmann not only makes his witnesses 
remember, he asks them to react, to embody, to recreate as bodily and linguistic scenes. 
Mimesis, with its quality to work in the present, takes the part of the rejected illusionism of the 
representation: the mimetic quality of the play, the reactivation of sensory and magic relation to 
the things and events which cannot or no longer be formulated using language. ' (Köppen, 
Manuel and Scherpe, Klaus R. (eds. ), 1997. Bilder des Holocaust (Köln: Böhlau), p. 3/4). See 
Benjamin, Walter, 1991. Ober das mimetische Vermögen. GS II, 1 
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various and specific re-presentations so that Auschwitz does not become a 
'terrifying cliche', the 'para-sig n'2'". 
In the German process of remembrance, the generation of perpetrating 
and on-looking witnesses is silent. How will we 'distinguish' works of 
representation and works of 'experience'? How do we tell apart works by those 
who had borne witness and not only by the first or second generation of the 
survivors? In various attempts of re-presentation Manuel Köppen and Klaus 
Scherpe discover 'methods of profanisation' which are employed in order to 
liberate 'the complexity of Auschwitz' from its 'symbolic burden of meaning'215. 
Perhaps we have come as close as possible to a way of remembering in which 
the trauma of Auschwitz continues to have a lasting influence as an emotional 
sign of the very self and individual ability to remember and to experience. 
In the long process of addressing and working-through the Nazi crimes in 
Germany, identification with the victims seem to have been the culturally 
accepted form of remembrance. Much more problematic is the identification with 
the perpetrators; but in a country of perpetrators that aims at erecting a 
'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe' memory and remembering needs to 
address the social conditions that made Auschwitz possible. 
The anti-monument movement in Germany questions the possibility of 
representation, and fiercely rejects a language of symbols and meaning. What 
seemed not re-presentable, became something that was not able to be 
experienced and thus a challenge for the (artistic) creation process. 
For images to become 'experiences', a twofold 'link' is possible and 
thinkable, according to Manuel Köppen and Klaus Scherpe. First, there are 
those attempts to depict that 
214 Köppen, Manuel and Scherpe, Klaus R. (eds. ), 1997. Bilder des Holocaust (Köln: Böhlau), p. 
4 
215 ibid., p. 5 
129 
in the remote discourses or arbitrary daily actions, in the cultural 
patchwork, re-create the trauma affectively, thus negating the 
officially valid Holocaust memory culture. 
... 
on the other hand 
attempts to depict which connect to the anonymous code number 
of the camp inmates: the common usage of letters and numbers, 
the "extension of the system" which was Auschwitz (Lyotard). 
Auschwitz, thought as the climax of modernity and as the break of 
civilisation, makes the subjective experiences and individual 
sentences disappear. $1® 
In many ways re-presentations and attempts to depict are part of the 
process of coming-to-terms; they work against forgetting, against the loss of 
experience in order to find a connection with the not-experienced, but yet 
radically felt past. 
With the planned memorial in Berlin, the question of re-presentation still 
very much ties in with the question of the authentic, true experience. In Berlin a 
search had begun yet again for appropriate forms that could communicate and 
re-present the event or the impossibility and in-authenticity of re-presentation as 
the only possible approximation. As my reading of the design of Gesine 
Weinmiller (architect) will make clear, later generations feel a radical presence 
of the Shoah and consider the very presence of the Shoah as part of their reality 
of life from where they then claim truth for their artistic creations. Here the event 
'Holocaust' is always true as a 'quote' and as thus questions the symbolism and 
meaning the images have been charged with in the process of their 
reproduction. 
The later generation of artists acknowledge some kind of 'in-authenticity' 
in their work that symbolically refers to something they cannot bear witness. 
Here the past is only present in the form of quotes and references, as Lyotard 
writes: 
216 Köppen, Manuel and Scherpe, Klaus R. (eds. ), 1997. Bilder des Holocaust (Köln: Böhlau), p. 
6/7 
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a past located this side of the forgotten, much closer to the present 
moment than any past, at the same time it is incapable of being 
solicited by voluntary and conscious memory 
-a past Deleuze says 
that is not past but always there 
... 
But this slaughter pretends to be 
without memory, without trace, and through this testifies again to 
what it slaughters: that there is the unthinkable, time lost yet 
always there, a revelation that never reveals itself but remains 
there, a misery. 21 
How can words reveal to us what the actual moment must have been to 
the witness? What remains can never be a conventional memory because 
conventional memory cannot 'remember the forgotten moment, can never be 
the memory of the not remembered. Art after the Holocaust forms an aesthetic 
of the memory of the forgotten: 'What art can do is bear witness not to the 
sublime, but to this aporia of art and to its pain. It does not say the unsayable, 
but says that it cannot say it. '218 In the inability to help and in the phases of 
anguish lies the melancholic truth, with which the survivors especially must 
continue to live, and we all must continue to approach the event we call 'Shoah'. 
If 'Holocaust' art, or art after the 'Holocaust' was concerned with finding any form 
of aesthetic after Auschwitz, Lyotard claims that we must be content with an 
'anaesthetic'. 
In the art works of later generations the presence is characterised as 
'homelessness' 
-'homelessness' as the ambiguity of being historical. For Walter 
Benjamin the strength of the Trauerspiel lies in its use of the allegory which 
reintroduces the image. On the one hand he describes 'beauty' as being caught 
in the ruins or fragments (of time) where it is given the appearance of something 
eternal within the particular 
- 
the transfiguration into permanence; on the other 
217 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 1997. Heidegger and "the jews" (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. 12 & 23 
218 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 1997. Heidegger and the Jews" (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. 47 
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hand, he considers the image of beauty which to him, in its transience, stands in 
a dialectical relationship to permanence: 
Truth never forms a relation and, in particular, no intentional 
relation. The object of recognition as defined in the concept's 
intention is not truth. Truth is an intentionless being, which is 
formed by ideas. The conduct appropriate to it therefore is not the 
thinking within the recognition but a dealing with it and 
disappearing. Truth is the death of intention. The fable of a veiled 
picture, of Sais, could mean precisely this: with its revelation the 
one collapses who thought to ascertain the truth. It is not the 
enigmatic horridness of the matter which brings this about but the 
nature of truth in front of which also the purest fire of a search goes 
out as if under water. 219 
The world can only be held as a whole when considered with the 
melancholic gaze of the Benjaminian Angel of History. Only then the fleeting, 
transient moment of history becomes eternal 
- 
however, Lyotard kills Benjamin's 
Angel 
... 
: 
As I said, the hatred directed towards "the jews", as old as their 
"history", seems to have been appeased in Europe by their 
conversion, expulsion, extermination. It has gone much too far. 
Too far, precisely, to be forgotten. The Jews murdered en masse 
are, absent, more present than present. They remain "the jews". 1 
219 Wahrheit tritt nie in Relation und insbesondere in keine intentionale. Der Gegenstand der 
Erkenntnis als ein in der Begriffsintention bestimmter ist nicht die Wahrheit. Die Wahrheit ist ein 
aus Ideen gebildetes intentionsloses Sein. Das ihr gemäße Verhalten ist demnach nicht ein 
Meinen im Erkennen, sondern ein in sie Eingehen und Verschwinden. Die Wahrheit ist der Tod 
der Intention. Eben das kann ja die Fabel von einem verschleierten Bild, zu Sais, besagen, mit 
dessen Enthüllung zusammenbricht, wer die Wahrheit zu erfragen gedachte. Nicht eine 
rätselhafte Gräßlichkeit des Sachverhalts ist's, die das bewirkt, sondern die Natur der Wahrheit, 
vor welcher auch das reinste Feuer des Suchens wie unter Wassern verlischt'. Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels', GS I, 1, p. 216 
220 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 1997. Heidegger and `the jews" (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. 39 
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The symbolism of the 'Holocaust' is present in the arts, yet at the same 
time this symbolism asks us to search for signs and wants us to keep the 
memory alive through our examination and experience of the material, body and 
space. It is the challenge of the work of art to call for remembrance and memory 
while at the same time representing this very memory in the memorials of the 
Shoah. Is the memorial the politically shaped appeal of remembrance? Perhaps 
part of the problematics of monumental re-presentation lies in the fact that that, 
which ought to be remembered over, is handed over to the forgotten. 
However, I do not need to point out here that memory and remembrance 
cannot be taken for granted. Remembrances are vital and necessary for our 
understanding of the event, especially for those who have no biographical links. 
Primo Levi, who was captured as a member of the Italian anti-Fascist resistance 
and reported to Auschwitz, described his experiences in works like, for example, 
`The Drowned and the Saved'. He reminds us that those who survived question 
their own memories: 
I must repeat 
- 
we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. 
... 
We 
survivors are not only an exiguous but also an anomalous minority: 
we are those who by their prevarications or abilities or good luck 
did not touch bottom. Those who did so, those who saw the 
Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute, 
but they are the `Muslims', the submerged, the complete 
witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have general 
significance. ' 
The true, complete witness to the horrors of Auschwitz is surrounded by 
silence, is mute, and cannot make itself understood. Primo Levi reminds us of 
this 'uncomfortable notion'. He, whose writings belong to the most exceptional 
221 Levi, Primo, 2000. The Drowned and the Saved (London: Abacus), p. 63/64 
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accounts of re-presenting the 'questions of the Shoah'm, claims not to have 
been able to bear witness. What does that entail for the problematics at stake at 
the German memorial process? Primo Levi engaged with a constant re-thinking 
of the questions of the Shoah to show the very limits of each of its re- 
presentations. Levi asserts that there can be no true re-presentation of the 
events. 
The same must apply to the perpetrators bearing witness: whatever the 
memorial in Berlin stands for, 'it must be changeable if it is not to be all'M. To 
remember means to interpret the past; any past thus becomes a construction of 
the present, a present's construction. Memory cannot be a static place of 
storage or for that matter an archive; within the context of a social and public 
frame it functions as a dynamic force. The occurrence of the Shoah not only 
questions customised forms of remembrance, it also makes the necessity to 
remember a central issue. 
Despite lengthy debates and arguments, no definition for appropriate 
memorial art for public sites could be agreed on. At stake here is the complexity 
of memories that come to be re-presented 
- 
the dialectic of remembrance that 
cannot be mediated but, for that reason, may never be forgotten or brushed 
aside. How can one possibly represent the Holocaust accommodating the 
different starting points? To interpret a certain moment in history in monumental 
form means not only to refer back to the event but also to read that very event in 
the light of current political and social circumstances. Those who are still alive 
and those born later who have no biographical connection to the event in 
question, erect the memorial. In essence they decide on the interpretation of 
222 I have borrowed this phrase from Andrew Benjamin (Present Hope). It refers to the 
complexity of issues at stake in the process of remembering and coming-to-terms with the 
Shoah. I have elucidated and explained the importance of this phrase in relation to the issues 
concerned in the first chapter. 
223 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 398 
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mass murder and death. It is an attempt to remember the dead who did not die a 
natural death but who were murdered in large numbers. For whom is the 
memorial going to be erected, though? The claim to be speaking for the dead 
has to validity because the murdered have no power over the interpretation and 
those who interpret. The dilemma in the Berlin memorial is multi-layered. More 
than fifty years after the Shoah, the Germans are still not able to articulate what 
constitutes their national memory. 
How is it possible to symbolise that which enlightened humanity scattered 
to such an extent that one felt compelled to introduce the term of 'break in 
civilisation' (Zivilisationsbruch), as Moshe Zuckermann asks? The centrality of 
debates over the years, the Holocaust Memorial ratified by the German 
Parliament, mark a 'qualitative leap', claims Moshe Zuckermann 224; but is this 
really the leap over the 'break of civilisation'? 
The evaluation of the aesthetic (and didactic) effectiveness of the 
monument is usually measured by subjective criteria because, primarily, 
memory is a very personal possession. In the case of the Berlin memorial the 
sheer impossible task is not to commemorate suffering experienced but to 
commemorate suffering caused, to admonish the deed and not to fall back onto 
the escape mechanism of joining the victims. To build a national reminder for a 
national deed that is utterly unbearable, demands a political climate of courage 
and balance. 
The traditional conventions to mourn the heroes and victims of war 
cannot be appropriate rituals or symbols to mourn the mass murdered. In 
addition to the absence of a commonly accepted definition of how to present the 
Shoah, such lack of conventions delivers fertile grounds for discussions; thus 
keeping the site of remembrance open. A commonly agreed style or convention 
224 Kalbe, Riki & Zuckermann, Moshe (eds. ), 2000. Ein Grundstück in der Mitte: Das Gelände 
des künftigen Holocaust-Mahnmals in Wort und Bild (Göttingen: Wallstein) 
135 
to mourn the mass murdered of the Nazi regime would confine the event and 
render it forgotten. More than fifty years later, at the threshold when most 
survivors and eye-witnesses will have gone soon, when remembering is left to 
second and third generations, there is no common denominator to remember 
- 
worse, it is disconcerting that there is no mutual agreement to remember in the 
first place. We still are not able to express or articulate our expectations of what 
this 'memory' should consist. Inherent to the questions of re-presenting the 
Shoah is the complexity of attempts to imagine and the necessary lack of a 
norm. For Jean Amery the experience of Auschwitz has led to 'utter collapse of 
the aesthetic of the idea of death'. 
In her essay 'The Aesthetic Transformation of the Image of the 
Unimaginable', Gertrud Koch argues that the attempt to imagine aesthetically 
the persecution and annihilation of Europe's Jewish population can only be 
misguided, a delusion. Historically the limits of imagination in social terms have 
long been delineated. Gertrud Koch asserts that the hope for an aesthetic norm 
of re-presentation from an object that itself is an 'event at the limits' is 
'authoritarian'. She insists that we need to investigate how this very limit is 
reflected in the work of art itself: 
However, the irreducible condition of the aesthetic is the pleasure 
contained even in the most resistant work of art 
... 
A pleasure 
culled from transformation into the imaginary that enable distance, 
the coldness of contemplation 
. 
227 
225 Amery, Jean, 1997. Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines 
ÜberwOltigten (Stuttgart Klett-Cotta), p. 39 
226 Friedlander, Saul (ed. ), 1992. Probing the Limits of Representation (Cambridge, MA Harvard 
University Press), p. 3 
rn Koch, Gertrud, 1989. The Aesthetic Transformation of the Image of the Unimaginable: Notes 
on Claude Lanzmann's Shoah. October48, p. 20 
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Koch confirms that 'the imaginary is the presence of an absence that is 
located outside the spatio-temporal continuum of the image'. The 
representability of the annihilation is not the issue, because what cannot be 
imagined cannot be re-presented. Can there be an aesthetic transformation of 
the image of the unimaginable? 
Sybil Milton argues that 
at locations where no substantial ruins remain, such as the 
Warsaw ghetto or the Treblinka killing centre, the role of the 
sculpture and landscape architect is essential to the symbolic 
representation of mass murder. 
... 
Sculptors, architects, and 
landscape designers had to find individual and collective symbols 
that would facilitate an understanding of the past in order to 
represent it for the present and for the future. Memorials for the 
Holocaust thus had to be designed as special places separated 
from the flow of everyday life while simultaneously communicating 
emotion and instruction. 228 
There can be no individual and collective symbols, least of all will they 
facilitate an understanding of the past. At stake here is the possibility of re- 
presenting the insurmountable contradiction between that which has proven to 
be socially possible and that what can be humanly imagined: 
The earthquake of Lisbon sufficed to cure Voltaire of the theodicy 
of Leibniz, and the visible disaster of the first nature was 
insignificant in comparison with the second, social one, which 
defies human imagination as it distils a real hell from human evil. 
Our metaphysical faculty is paralysed because actual events have 
shattered the basis on which speculative metaphysical thought 
could be reconciled with experience. 229 
228 Milton, Sybil, 1991. In Fitting Memory. 
- 
The Art and Politics of Holocaust Memorials (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press), p. 8&9 
zýg Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 3611362 
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Only this very presence of an absence within the imagination of the past 
makes an image of the unimaginable possible if the flashes of the past are 
accepted as present's concerns. 
James Young identifies the importance of balancing the needs of the 
public against the demands of contemporary art and, at the same time, ensure 
governmental approval: What does the German public need? Who could 
possible tell them what they need and not be authoritarian? What does 
contemporary art demand? Why would it be important to ensure governmental 
approval? How is governmental approval ensured? Young quotes Henry Moore, 
who as the chairman of the competition launched by the International Committee 
of Auschwitz for a monument for official commemorations and ceremonies, 
announced the following decision: 
The choice of a monument to commemorate Auschwitz has not 
been an easy task. Essentially, what has been attempted has been 
the creation 
- 
or, in the case of the jury, the choice 
- 
of a monument 
to crime and ugliness, to murder and to horror. The crime was of 
such stupendous proportions that any work of art must be of an 
appropriate scale. But, apart from this, is it in fact possible to 
create a work of art that can express the emotions engendered by 
Auschwitz? It is in my conviction that a very great sculptor 
-a new Michelangelo or a new Rodin 
- 
might have achieved this. The odds 
against such a design turning up among the many maquettes 
submitted were always enormous. And none did. Nor were any of 
the purely architectural 
... 
projects fully satisfactory. There were, in 
the end, three projects, all of which were judged good, but none of 
which was considered entirely adequate. The jury considered that 
its primary task was not to award a prize, to decide which of these 
three was the best, but rather to ensure that the finest possible 
monument to be built at Auschwitz. 230 
p0 Young, James E., 1993. The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New 
Haven: Yale University Press), p. 135 
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Moore seems to suggest that there could be an appropriate iconographic 
and aesthetic tradition that could be applied to such a memorial. Such creations 
could naturally only be attempted by canonised artistic geniuses. By leaving 
such a creation to the fateful appearance of a genius, Moore focuses on the 
artistic challenge of the project. Thinking the questions of the Shoah, however, is 
an ongoing task. The problem here is that Moore renders any criteria useless 
because he falls back onto the Romantic's notion of a genius 
- 
and thus moves 
dangerously close to a National Socialist vision, as I now explain. 
The Austrian sculptor Alfred Hrdlicka chose a spectacular event to re-tell 
history in his monument 'Cap Arcona'. On 3 May 1945,7500 prisoners, mainly 
inmates of the concentration camp Neuengamme, were crammed onto a boat 
and shipped onto the Baltic Sea. Still in the bay of Lubeck the boat was bombed 
by the British; those who survived and managed to swim ashore were shot dead 
by the Nazis on the beach. Hrdlicka carves human bodies and torsi into marble; 
they are plunged into each other by the roaring sea, which buries everything. 
Hrdlicka claims that his work deals with the experiences of the Shoah and the 
Second World War. He aims to represent in his artistic creation 'the horror of the 
individual, that which people honestly experienced"'. 
Hrdlicka aims at representing the personal dimension of the catastrophe, 
the 'personal dismay'. Hrdlicka vehemently opposes the concept of the anti- 
monuments. Hrdlicka understands his art as a provocation that is more than 
mere decoration: 'Truly significant art 
- 
in contrast to the decorations of the 
abstract and serial art of today 
- 
faces the actuaVreal. '232 Simon Wiesenthal 
fiercely rejects Hrdlicka's 'Memorial against War and Fascism' on Albertina- 
Place in Vienna for its depiction of a Jew scrubbing the street and remarks that 
231 quoted after Werner, Gabriele, 1988. Welche Realität meint das Reale? Zu Alfred Hrdlickas 
Gegendenkmal in Hamburg. Kritische Berichte, 311988, p. 57 
232 Werner quoting Schubert, ibid. 
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'his memorial and the 'Jewish additions' of the street-scrubbing Jew could for the 
majority of the Jews not present an adequate monument for the greatest crime 
of this century 
- 
the Holocaust'". 
Through the aestheticisation of chaos, violence and destruction Hrdlicka 
claims truth and credibility. However, that which he assumes as 'realistic', is 
concentrated in the portrayal of the victims. ` Gabriele Werner sees in such a 
discourse a ridiculing of the experience of National Socialism. She claims that 
Hrdlicka's art plays in to the hands of an historicism that provides a theory of 
Fascism as a fateful apocalypse and does not mention the well-planned politics 
of destruction of the Third Reich's ideology. ' Hrdlicka claims to rescue 
individuality 
- 
if not the individual experience! 
- 
which he understands to be 
extinguished through the typified monument. James young writes that Hrdlicka's 
'real achievement was merely the unveiling of sore feelings, 
repressed memories, anger, and controversy. Painfully and self- 
consciously wrought, his monument belongs wholly to those who 
want to remember without drawing too much attention to their 
memory-art. Instead of relieving past trauma, memory becomes its 
own trauma, perpetually deferred. ' 
Hrdlicka's attempt to artistically juxtapose the individual experience, the 
`horror of the individual', with the industrialised mass murder of the Nazis is 
problematic because it refers to the emotional. Gabriele Werner is right when 
p' Wiesenthal, Simon (ed. ), 2000. Projekt: Judenplatz Wien (Wien: Paul Zsolnay), p. 9 
234 The transfiguration of suffering is part of Christian iconography an art. There is no such thing 
in the Jewish tradition. There can be no transfiguring interpretation of the Shoah, no symbolic 
expression or meaning-saving 'glorification' of Jewish suffering whose sole purpose is to stir 
emotion. 
xis Werner, Gabriele, 1988. Welche Realität meint das Reale? Zu Alfred Hrdlickas 
Gegendenkmal in Hamburg. Kritische Berichte, 3/1988, p. 57ff. 
pa Young, James E., 1993. The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press), p. 112 
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she claims that Hrdlicka's art can never be anything other than an abstraction 
with regard to the millions it names. On the contrary, I am convinced that the 
figurative, the kind of art Hrdlicka stands for, could never achieve the impossible: 
to aesthetically and artistically re-present the event and to communicate an 
understanding of that which happened. 
To face the real artistically and aesthetically 
- 
especially in terms of 
monumental art 
- 
does not mean to rely on the figurative. Gabriele Werner 
mentions that to Hrdlicka only the principle of creation with an emphasis on 
technicality and craftsmanship seems important: 'Truly significant art 
- 
in 
contrast to the decorations of abstract and serial art of today 
- 
faces the 
real(istic). ' Only this art that faces 'reality' is granted a future 
- 
thus excluding a 
broad spectrum of art: 
Everything that Breker created is empty like the paintings of a 
Mondrian or Newmann 
... 
He thus remains a forerunner of Minimal 
Art without conforming totally. His Reich's-motorway-kilometre- 
thinking, in Viennese dialect 'the empty kilometre', becomes 
established in nearly all common trends in art intensified after the 
war monochrome painting, Op Art, Hard Edge etc. Everything 
infinitely repeatable, serial, as if cut out from one piece, paintings 
by the metre 
... 
Meanwhile many 
-isms have registered and de- 
registered; what distinguished them without exception is the 
possibility of their imitation, similar to an industrial product. 
Flooding the market for a short term, production and interpretation 
march in rank and file 21' 
Hrdlicka asserts that the presence and future of his creation lies in its 
difference to the Avant-garde 
. 
He, as well as Moore, does nothing less than re- 
formulate an artist's image as a creating genius whose creations are arguably 
autonomous. The justification of Hrdlicka's works of art reads as nothing less 
than Goebbels' propaganda: 
23' Hrdlicka, Alfred, 1984. Die Asthetik des automatischen Faschismus. Schaustellungen: 
Bekenntnisse in Wort und Bild (München), p. 110; s. also Werner, p. 6213 
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According to his nature the artist works with his heart and not 
through logic. And it is therefore his grandest and greatest virtue to 
remain naive and simple. His appeal is, therefore, generally not 
addressed to the small ruling class of national intellectualism 
- 
the 
artist's appeal generally regards the entire nation. As he comes 
from the people so he speaks for the people. He is, so to speak, 
the appointed spokesman of the national people's soul. 
For this reason, art, for the person who practises and enjoys 
it, is something holy and obliging. It does not spare those who 
engage themselves in its service. One must serve it completely or 
better not at all. And to be inspired by it means fate and vocation. 
Only to a few does it grant a life free of trouble and anxieties. The 
others, though, the many, have to serve it and have to suffer for it. 
And still they can never free themselves of it: it (art) is the very 
demoniac urge within these human beings. It helps them feel, 
foresee, sense and create and elevates them into higher spheres 
from which most others are excluded. A people, however, 
recognises in its art the deepest and greatest expression of its 
nature. It is not true that art, as such, is international. Its effects can 
be international. Its roots lie within the Volkstum and therefore 
within the nation. 
But the questions of a relation between the aesthetic and the Shoah 
remain, when Habermas claims that 'only a memorial can testify the will and the 
message of its founders. And only art that does not compromise provides the 
appropriate language for such an undertaking'. The question remains of 
whether art, in the form of a monument/memorial, is capable of portraying the 
questions of the Shoah aesthetically. When does art 'compromise'? More 
importantly, what does a compromise in relation to the subject matter mean? As 
it has already been established there cannot be a commonly shared context 
wherein traditional symbolic forms of expression and ritual practises could 
generate a collective force without rationalising: 'The effect of a memorial that 
238 Dr. Joseph Goebbels at the 'Festival of the Reich's Theatre' in Düsseldorf on 14 June 1937, 
British Library/National Sound Archive T1133OWR (starting ICLOO 66313) 
2" Nur ein Denkmal kann den Willen und die Botschaft seiner Stifter bezeugen. Und nur eine 
kompromißlose Kunst bietet dafür die geeignete Sprache'. Habermas, Die Zeit, 1 April 1999 
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does not fail aesthetically, today always lives off the wavering reservoir of those 
reasons which have lead to its erection. "'0 
In his essay'The Author as Producer, Benjamin considers the problem of 
form and content and their importance and co-dependence: 
I would like to demonstrate to you that the tendency of poetry can 
only then be politically correct if it is correct literally. That means, 
that a politically correct tendency includes a literary tendency. And 
- 
to add to this 
- 
this literary tendency that implicitly or explicitly is 
contained in any correct political tendency 
- 
this literary tendency 
and nothing else makes out the quality of the work. Thus, the 
correct political tendency of a work includes its literary quality 
because it includes its literary tendency. 241 
We need to examine to what extent the form of a work of art in its 
monumental form is static and what meaning it could have for future societies (if 
different). Benjamin's concept of art implies that 'effective' art works against 
finality, but it is a concept that does not necessarily fall back onto 'traditional' or 
even figurative artistic media. Art that takes a clear political stand - thus facing 
the 'real', true and correct 
- 
provokes. To face the 'real' within the medium of art 
also and ever more so means to face that which is not depictable, which cannot 
be re-presented. What is more 'real' than the historical event of the Holocaust? 
240 Die Wirkung eines Denkmals, das ästhetisch nicht mißlingt, zehrt heute immer auch vom 
schwankenden Reservoir der Gründe, die zu seiner Errichtung geführt haben'. Habermas, ibid. 
241 Zeigen möchte ich Ihnen, daß die Tendenz einer Dichtung politisch nur stimmen kann, wenn 
sie auch literarisch stimmt. Das heißt, daß die politisch richtige Tendenz eine literarische 
Tendenz einschließt. Und, um das gleich hinzuzufügen: diese literarische Tendenz, die implicit 
oder explicit in jeder richtigen politischen Tendenz enthalten ist 
- 
die und nichts anderes macht 
die Qualität des Werks. Darum also schließt die richtige politische Tendenz eines Werkes seine 
literarische Qualität ein, weil sie seine literarische Tendenz einschließt'. 
- 
Benjamin's emphasis. 
, 
Der Autor als Produzent', GS, Il, 2, p. 68415 
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Art that wishes to intervene has to consider seriously that the 'real' and 
'true' can exist in abstract forms, unclarity and unvividness of the concrete. 
Otherwise, as Gabriele Werner points out, its methods and technique would be 
banal and anachronistic in relation to the technical and logistic systems of those 
using violence and terror'42. Only by working-through and coming-to-terms with 
the event is a future possible. Like Benjamin's Angel, who is a witness to the 
'real', 'true' destruction, we are faced with a history that caused the utter 
disintegration of values. In the willingness to endure such disintegration (also in 
artistic terms), in the continued gaze upon the destruction lies the possibility of 
re-presentation. 
Throughout the debates in Germany, there seems to have been a latent 
distrust at work regarding the complex language of contemporary art, especially 
with regard to art after the Shoah. At moments the questions of the aesthetic 
dimensions had counter-productive effects on the debate itself. The debate was 
superimposed with innumerable other discussions where the work of art was 
only marginally present: 'Art is a question of taste - it is idle to discuss it. But will 
this abstract work of art be understood by the people? ', Ariel Muzicant wrote in 
1997 with view to the planned memorial in Vienna. 243 
What has to be 'understood'? Is it the actual facts of the historical event 
or the intentional message, expression and implications behind the design(er) 
and the commissioner? Contemporary memorial art seems to face a profound 
antinomy: between its function as a reminding memorial and its claim as an art 
form. A national monument has to generate and give rise to some kind of 
242 Werner, Gabriele, 1988. Welche Realität meint das Reale? Zu Alfred Hrdlickas 
Gegendenkmal in Hamburg. Kritische Berichte, 311988, p. 63 
243 Ariel Muzicant was then vice-president of the Israeli Cultural Community in Vienna. Muzicant, 
Ariel, 1997. Rasch entschieden. Wiener Journal, Oct. 1997, p. 12 
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communal or communicative appeal if it is intended to re-present more than a 
sign of indulgence or a sedative for the conscience. It has to implore 
commemorative activities whether in the form of pathos or antipathos, austerity 
or emphasis, whether as a simple piece of 'popular art' or as a piece of unwieldy 
conceptual art. In any case its aesthetic dimension cannot be ignored or argued 
away. As such it holds clues to the contemporary surroundings where the 
political and intellectual concept of remembrance is expressed in the aesthetic 
dimension. 
The concept of 'aestheticisation' played an important role in the on-going 
debate, suggesting, in itself, a trivialisation of the horrors, a playing down of 
history, thus giving voice to the fear that through the 'aestheticisation' the 
horrors could be disposed of. However, the assumption that any aesthetic form 
can satisfy a representation 'adequate' to the horror is fraught. On the other 
hand, I would like to argue that it is only artistic creation that can permanently re- 
present the affects that accompany mourning and horror. The 'quality' of the 
memorial needs to be judged by its representation of uncertainty and loss of 
valid experiences; only then might it be able to counter the danger of memorial 
kitsch. 
A well-meaning duty to remember cannot be enough when these two 
extreme positions meet: during the course of the intense public debate it has 
been argued that 'the discussions around the memorial's erection would be the 
true monument"". Implied is a demand for conclusion, and an explicit claim that 
an actual building seems questionable and that the quest for an adequate 
aesthetic solution seems pointless, as Reinhart Kosselleck argued: 'once the 
244 Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary 
Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 193 
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debate is visualised, it brings about a sealing conclusion'2'*. Both positions grant 
language certain powers; on the one hand, language is granted a productive 
power while, however, the language of the image is rejected; on the other hand, 
language appears as medium that obscures and hides. Any kind of social 
consensus, however, in relation to the horrors of the National Socialist regime 
and society's involvement in the guilt complex has to be questioned 
fundamentally. Intrinsic to every memorial process is the suspicion of symbolic 
exoneration. 
But is there really more clarity in the written word than in the untouchable 
language of art? The British sculptress, Rachel Whiteread remarks that 
having read extensively about the Holocaust it struck me that it is 
really a subject beyond comprehension and that any attempts at 
"explaining" it are doomed to fail. If art 
- 
and sculpture 
- 
is 
expression by other, non-verbal means, then it is a good way of 
overcoming this verbal deadlock. 
... 
In addition to the symbolism of 
the sculpture there is, of course, the added symbolism of the 
location. 248 
245 Kos, Wolfgang, 2000. Erinnerungspolitik and Ästhetik. Projekt: Judenplatz Wien, Wiesenthal, 
Simon (ed. ) (Wien: Paul Zsolnay), p. 77 
246 Rachel Whiteread in Judenplatz Wien 1996 
- 
Competition: Monument and Memorial Site 
dedicated to the Jewish Victims of the Nazi Regime in Austria 1938 
- 
1945 (Wien: Folio), p. 85. 
The Austrian procedures of building a Memorial to Austria's murdered Jews seems to have been 
equally complicated and controversial as the German process. In December 1994, Simon 
Wiesenthal pointed out that the city of Vienna still had no adequate memorial that remembered 
the murdered Jews of Vienna and Austria. The city's major, Peter Hauple, agrees to erect a 
memorial on the Judenplatz. In the autumn of 1995, an international jury, chaired be the Austrian 
architect, Hans Hollein, decided on the cometition details and invited nine architects and artists 
to participate. On 25 January 1996, Rachel Whiteread is announced as the competition's winner. 
In June 1996 a major controversy starts; it was argued that the discovery and excavation of the 
medieval synagogue would make a better memorial. Simon Wiesenthal defends the 
competition's chosen memorial concept and the planned site. In September of the same year, 
the planned memorial becomes an election theme. Only on 25th October 2000 are the memorial 
finally unveiled and the museum and the archaeological site opened. 
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The mistrust against the image is not directly opposed by a similar 
prejudice against the manipulative potential of language. The lengthy discourse 
fails to recognise the dangers of pathos, kitsch and linguistic stereotypes. 
During the long controversies it was argued that there was no 'common 
ground' anymore, no commonly recognised aesthetic rules and conventions. 
The dialectic at work here between presence and absence, between 
remembrance and forgetting cannot be solved by an objective, universally valid 
demand which could re-present the challenge at hand. On what concept of 
memorial or monumental art are we supposed to fall back onto? Are we to judge 
the memorial by the concrete and personal (work)experience of the artist? Does 
art's predicament and dictate rival the public need or has art disqualified itself for 
political-ethical concerns because of its self-reflexivity? Wolfgang Kos seems to 
be implying the latter: 
The example [Whiteread in Vienna] shows that in a public 
monument the agenda of art clearly reaches beyond the design. 
Artists become curators and mediators of their own ideas, they 
have to prove themselves in a public process 
- 
be it with 
uncompromising precipitousness or with elastic pragmatism. The 
quality of the memorial can also be measured against the 
sovereignty with which they are acting this role. 247 
If there are no figurative conventions of monumental rhetoric, yet the 
communicative potential of contemporary art has been recognised, what kind of 
meaning could be ascribed to the metaphorical? Should it be to evoke horror but 
not to depict it? The text for the competition in Vienna mentions a reservation for 
a figurative solution which was also argued by Simon Wiesenthal: 'a figurative 
portrayal cannot be taken into account' 
- 
and Hans Hollein, the president of the 
jury, argued that it was 'appropriate to aim for a non-figurative form of 
247 Kos, Wolfgang, 2000. Erinnerungspolitik und Ästhetik. Projekt: Judenplatz Wien, Wiesenthal, 
Simon (ed. ) (Wien: Paul Zsolnay), p. 80 
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expression in view of the difficulty to re-present the indescribable event. '248 With 
the example of Vienna at hand why does Berlin not seem to be able to avoid the 
glut of well-meaning art of symbolism? ' The question of context seems 
explosive, yet banal within a public art filled with moral intentions. 
The counter-monument group's concept questions the true premises of 
the existence of figurative solutions. The creating artist convincingly proposes a 
moral duty to remember. Monumental reification is rejected and the project in 
itself becomes ephemeral. Yet can the planned memorial in Berlin display some 
of the Benjaminian auratic robustness to the changes of memory? 
The current discussions in the countries of perpetrators regarding liability 
and responsibility are part of the process of working-through and coming-to- 
terms; regardless of feelings of shame and guilt, the last decade in Germany 
has proven that there is an increasing will and need to remember. The 
impossibility to let go, the not wanting to let go, the not being able to forget, 
points to the fact that, around the sign 'Auschwitz', 'something remains to be 
phrased which is not, something which is not determined'250. I have often 
wondered what a society without memory would be like; to Adorno it would have 
been a 'terrible vision of a society without memory'. Memory is not instructed 
248 see Kos, Wolfgang, 2000. Erinnerungspolitik and Ästhetik. Projekt: Judenplatz Wien, 
Wiesenthal, Simon (ed. ) (Wien: Paul Zsolnay), p. 80; Heinrich Heine said that for the Jews the 
Torah resembles a 'portative fatherland' (see Assmann, Jan, 2000. Das Volk des Buches. 
Projekt: Judenplatz Wren, Wiesenthal, Simon (ed. ) (Wien: Paul Zsolnay), p. 101). The exiled Jew 
could inhabit the spiritual realm of the Book to keep the memory of Jerusalem alive during the 
Babylonian Exile. 
249 During the course of my research in Berlin I was so fortunate to be permitted to look at 
'private', non-public correspondences of politicians who themselves had voiced an opinion on 
the memorial design during the parliamentary debates. The amount of response to their public 
statement by 'well-meaning' citizens was overwhelming 
- 
and dauntingly naive, full of pathos 
and symbolism, beyond kitsch. 
250 Lyotard, Jean-Frangois, 1988. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. 13/4 
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from above, although the erection of a national monument and public 
ceremonies could imply as much. Memory can not be heteronomous, and is not 
reference to the gaze of the other on-looking countries, as Jan Assmann argues: 
'Memory comes from within, from a longing to know and to hold onto'. 25' The 
German term 'Erinnerung' (memory) wants to internalise something (innen), it 
wants to bring something back to the conscience. As Lyotard says 'Erinnerung' 
is 'the memory that interiorizes'2s2. 
How can a monument re-present and re-store that which is supposed to 
be within our own conscience? Assmann makes clears that there is yet another 
dimension to the concept of memory. Memory also demands an outside world 
and support, places of memory where memorable events took place and 
unforgettable people lived, as Jan Assmann claims: 'Man will das, woran man 
sich erinnert, vor Augen haben. 
- 
That which one remembers one wants before 
one's eyes. " 
The following explanations on the slight difference in concepts of 
remembering and memory in the various languages, I have borrowed from Jan 
Assmann. The English term 'to remember' is based on the notion that something 
broken and torn, something dis-membered needs to be restored, to 'recollect' 
scattered and dispersed debris. Assmann notes that if 'Erinnerung' wants 'to 
retrieve the outer into the inner world of the heart and the conscience, 
remembering and recollection focuses on the gathering and unification of the 
scattered pieces of the past'. 'Erinnerung' is the action of a remembering 
subject, whereas remembering and recollection concerns the remembered past 
251 Assmann, Jan, 2000. Das Volk des Buches. Projekt: Judenplatz Wien, Wiesenthal, Simon 
(ed. ) (Wien: Paul Zsolnay), p. 98/9 
252 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 1997. Heidegger and 'the jews" (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. 29 
253 Assmann, Jan, 2000. Das Volk des Buches. Projekt: Judenplatz Wien, Wiesenthal, Simon 
(ed. ) (Wien: Paul Zsolnay), p. 99 
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and thus the dead. A society that remembers often searches for the one 
concluding and all-explaining picture that re-assembles the debris of the past. 
The passive character of memory, Jan Assmann asserts, is expressed in 
the French term 'se souvenit'. This type of remembrance is a central momentum 
in the virulent memory of the Holocaust. This past often afflicts itself upon us; it 
strikes and torments us because it is entirely independent of all subjective 
attempts to remember. This part of memory lies deeply hidden, beyond all 
understanding and coming-to-terms. To this kind of memory we cannot react 
with suppression and silence 
- 
it will come back to haunt us if not addressed 
and internalised. 
The process of remembering is a dynamic one. Jan Assmann has made 
clear that when we speak about memory all these concepts are part 
- 
often 
subconsciously 
- 
of the complex process. He continues by arguing that in order 
to remember the disposed of, the alienated, and in order to recollect the 
dispersed and to evoke that which urges from the subconscious, we need signs. 
The planned memorial in Berlin could be such a sign 
- 
the sign of the 
`never again' that will help us to remember 'so that Auschwitz will not repeat 
itself, so that nothing similar will happen'. This hope we may never renounce 
because it makes a future possible that links past, present and future through 
the constant attempt of remembering. 
When Germany's former President of State, Richard von Weiszäcker, 
famously delivered his speech to the fortieth anniversary of the end of war on 8th 
Mai 1985, he was the first to speak of 'remembrance as the secret of 
redemption'. The memorial site Yad Vashem in Israel, until recently255, used to 
254 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 365 
255 On a later visit to Yad Vashem in Spring 2000, the plaque had been removed and we found it 
on a pile of debris and rubbish in the corner of the room in the dust. 
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exhibit a plaque with a text by Baal Shem Tov, the founder and first leader of 
Hasidism (1700-1760), in its'Hall of Remembrance': 
Forgetfulness leads to exile, 
Remembrance is the secret of Redemption. 
The Hebrew text, so Prof. Dr. Rolf Rendtorff explained, is constructed 
around a chiasmus: at the beginning of the first line stands the G61ah, the exile. 
The second line ends with the word GB'ülläh, 'redemption'. Between the two 
concepts exists a clear dissonance which is not expressed in the English 
version. At the beginning stands the exile, not the forgetting. Thus a more 
accurate translation would be: 
The exile is prolonged through forgetting, 
Remembrance is the secret of Redemption. 256 
One thing here needs to be addressed clearly: to use this sentence 
- 
often only the second part is quoted 
- 
in connection with the planned Holocaust 
Memorial in Berlin is utterly inappropriate. The memory of the victims will 
redeem nobody; the remembrance of Auschwitz cannot redeem anybody. As the 
reading of Walter Benjamin's text have shown, redemption can only figure as a 
category of hope, in relation to'mindful remembrance'. 
The text of Baal Shem Tov is concerned with the religious remembering 
of the Holy Land and the destroyed Temple in Jerusalem, the redemption of the 
soul that is separated from God and becomes aware of that separation. 
I would like to argue that Germany (also the united Germany) has built a 
basis for national self-esteem on an ambivalent pride in its present as the utter 
rejection of the past. The remembrance of its horrific past is hugely self-serving 
256 A copy of the letter from Prof. Dr. Rolf Rendtorff to Prof. Dr. Richard Schröder explaining the 
text is in my possession. 
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in so far as its desire to form a national identity is based on a strict opposition to 
its past. In the shadow of the Shoah any notion of identity within the nation of 
perpetrators is uniquely problematic. 
If, for decades, the protection of memory was not the first priority of the 
political parties, its presence now within the political and historical 
consciousness is essentially created and intended to propagate the 'new' and 
'other Germany. The German population has to engage in a seemingly never- 
ending process of soul-searching without any hope of an eventual resolution. 
How does a nation live with the impossibility to master? To redeem its 
past back from history seems its constant task. With the construction of a 
(national) work of art an important attempt is made to close down some 
questions, to provide some answers. It is not why did it happen or how did it 
happen, it is an attempt to provide an answer to the question: how do we come 
to terms with it? What does coming-to-terms with it mean and entail for us and 
the future generations? 
To remember in Germany also means to be able to form a solidarity with 
the historical victims for their own sakes, as Walter Benjamin reminds us in his 
second thesis'On the Concept of History': 
The past carries with it a temporal index by which it is refereed to 
redemption. There is a secret agreement between past 
generations and present ones. Our coming was expected on earth. 
Like every generation that precede us, we have been endowed 
with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a 
claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply' 
To remember the victims in the country of perpetrators means to form a 
respectful link to the historical victim, and to reserve them the space within the 
community. The Berlin Memorial also needs to be a sign of public respect for the 
257 Illuminations, 1999, p. 245/6 
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victims of mass extermination. This respect is shown by the current German 
nation, a community that themselves is not guilty but stands in family and/or 
political relation to the perpetrators. The acceptance of responsibility is based in 
the understanding of being placed in a moral-political context. 
Other sites of remembrance fulfil different criteria. The places of deeds 
- 
for example, the `Topography of Terror, the Wannsee-Villa or the former 
concentration camp Sachsenhausen 
- 
are also places of remembrance but, 
primarily, they address the questions of working-through and coming-to-terms. 
Memorials that remember the unpleasant are rare. Public memory in Germany 
has to refer to that which unites all German citizens; it has to admonish the later 
born Germans 
- 
and the rest of the world 
- 
of what Germans did to German 
citizens 
- 
of that which is utterly unimaginable. 
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3. Indication of the Symbolic 
- 
Lack of the Obvious: the Designs 
A. Weinmiller's 'Metamorphosis of Immersion' 
In Gesine Weinmiller's memorial design (see Figures 9& 10) one 
descends into memory. The sloping field is enclosed on three sides. Between 18 
wall-like blocks of sandstone that seem to be scattered randomly in the field, 
one descends further into the depths of the unknown. While descending, the 
surrounding scenery of buildings and the noises of the city slowly go down, 
possibly disappear completely, and the horizon rises the further one descends. 
Through the broken wall one steps onto some stairs that lead back to the 
surface from where we began our decent. 
Here, on top of the stairs, looking backwards over the randomly scattered 
wall-like blocks 
- 
the pile of debris 
- 
the most striking and powerful encounter 
happens: at this point the blocks join together in a distorted perspective of an 
abstract star of David, only to fall apart immediately again as soon as one 
moves beyond that point 
- 
'it is the knowledge that the view of history which 
gives rise to it is untenable. ' In a perspective illusion the remembrance of the 
historical event flashes up to make the past part of our present. In the power of 
the memory of the individual visitor the void is closed for seconds, only to reveal 
again the real, carved out void at the heart of Germany's capital Berlin. 
The slabs can mediate a feeling of barbaric destruction standing almost 
unconnected, seeming, at first, randomly scattered. While they allow an 
association of threat, they equally point to refuge and shelter of some sort. One 
258 Benjamin, Walter, 1999. Illuminations (London: Pimlico), p. 249 
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can still look back onto the field of a carved out void and from a certain angle the 
field of destruction becomes, in a very abstract way, a unity again, not sharp, 
blurred contours and obscured outlines but an illusion, yet a brief terrifying 
moment in time where one could come as close as humanly possible to 
understanding, where the whole truth, the sheer horrifying truth of the elusive 
past seems to be falling into place. Here one could come close to 'the true 
picture of the past' as it'flits by', as Walter Benjamin reminds us: 
The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the 
instant when it can be recognised and is never seen again. 
... 
To 
articulate the past historically 
... 
means to seize hold of a memory 
as it flashes up at a moment of danger. ' 
According to the artist's rationale', submitted to the committee, the 18 
blocks of stone represent 'life' (chaff) in Hebrew numerical symbolism. The walls 
are rough and coarse, joined together loosely so that in the joints grass and 
moss can grow. The coarseness of the walls shows the joints of construction. 
James Young writes that 'the stacking of large blocks recalled the first 
monument in Genesis, a Sa'adutha, or witness-pile of stones, a memorial cairn; 
the rough texture and cut of the stones visually echoed the stones of the 
Western Wall in Jerusalem, the ruin of the Temple's destruction'. ' 
The rough texture and form of the stones are reminiscent of ruins. The 
gravel one is walking on transforms the steps into sounds and into footprints that 
are remain behind. On the front wall one might pause. Visitors may put candles 
down for their own private memory. On official occasions the wreath may be put 
259 Illuminations, p. 247 
260 see Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Sefrens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Das Denkmal? Der 
Denkmalstreit: Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas 
- 
Eine 
Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo), p. 889 
261 Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-images of the Holocaust in Contemporary 
Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 204 
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down here. An inscription is planned for the front. Weinmiller does not see this 
inscription as part of her area of responsibility; yet, she suggested a 'pragmatic' 
text, nothing poetic, but rather a `description of the facts'. The descent into the 
memorial space could mark a counter-movement to the possible rise of memory. 
In an interview with the Tageszeitung from 8 December 1997, Gesine 
Weinmiller voiced her concept of remembrance that is built upon individual 
moment'. She insists that memory and remembering, in the first place, are 
something highly private, which grows within the individual. It is her intention that 
the visitor moves away from the roaring hectic life of a city in order to be 
immersed, and wrapped up in the memorial where one experiences the loss of 
horizon, even the loss of impressions. 
For Weinmiller there exists a certain order in which the memorial 
becomes accessible: one can observe it from the outside, one enters, and at the 
end one comes to the wall of remembrance. The visitor is walking down towards 
and into his memory, listening to one's own footsteps and movements on the 
pebbles 
- 
the process of remembering made into a physical movement. 
Weinmiller's site is part of the town but at the same time it is separated from it. 
Gesine Weinmiller asserts that architectural elements were necessary to blend 
out outer, alien, any unrelated appearances that could distract. The traffic noise 
should be faded away if the memorial was to be erected at this site. She insists 
that in relation to one's own impressions perhaps a constant background noise 
would interfere less whereas the continuous stopping and starting of the traffic 
would render a remembering impossible. For that reason, her design does not 
intend the memorial to be on level ground. It is designed to create a place of 
quietness, a place where one needs to take a deep breath and then immerse 
oneself in the unexpectedness of memory. However, she attaches great value to 
262 Die Tageszeitung, 8 December 1997 
263 Weinmiller, Die Tageszeitung, 8 December 1997 
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the fact that her design connects to the now. It is in the vicinity of the 
Brandenburg Gate, the Potsdam Place, and the Reichstag. At the end one 
ascends through the wall of remembrance upstairs, back into the hectic city life - 
caught in 'the storm' that 'irresistibly propels into the future'264 where,, so often, 
there seems to be no space for memory. 
According to Gesine Weinmillerr, her design revolves around the 
following three elements: she does not want to leave the viewer in despair. The 
visitor should attempt to internalise the terrible event through remembering. 
Thereby no new images should be presented. Gesine Weinmiller asks the 
viewer to 'live' through the motives that the viewer has already internalised. Her 
work does not seek to compensates for the Shoah in architecture; the beautiful 
illusion dissolves as soon as it is created. Because her aesthetic stylisation is an 
illusion it does not leap into idealisations. Her artistic creation is essentially 
imagination; her illusive re-presentation claims autonomy over its own project by 
transcending it and thus allowing for the mute, speechless to reappear. The 
strongest and most persuasive part of her design is the magical moment where 
the visitor 
grasps the constellation which his own era has formed with a 
definite earlier one. Thus he establishes a conception of the 
present as the `time of the now' which is shot through with chips of 
Messianic time. 
Gesine Weinmiller was criticised precisely for the aesthetic 'beauty' of her 
design; the design itself was too 'harmless', it was lacking the aggression of the 
264 Illuminations, p. 249 
265 see Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Seferens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Der Denkmalstreit 
- 
das Denkmal? Die Debatte um das 
Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas" - eine 
Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo), 
266 Illuminations, p. 255 
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Serra/Eisenman conception. The 'affect-calming solemnity' would be 
inappropriate' Weinmiller did not want the 'pleasant' aspects of her site to be 
read as 'considerate treatment'. On the contrary, she asserts that one would 
need a peaceful and quiet place for the terrors of history to reach one, to be 
approachable by the memory of such events. The memorial needs to ascertain 
its place standing in dialectic with the urban situation and city life. 
Gesine Weinmiller is adamant that the memorial cannot fulfil didactic 
purposes. That would be the task of the neighbouring institutions such as the 
'Topography of Terror', 'The Jewish Museum', 'History of German Resistance', 
and the memorial sites of the former concentration camps. Neither does her 
design attempt to deliver an answer or an explanation; accordingly a reduction 
to a common denominator of aesthetic representation is not possible268. She 
offers a space where one can work-through and try to come-to-terms with one's 
past, but she does not provide answers. A memorial cannot have any 
reconciliatory purposes; it cannot be the place where Jews and non-Jews meet 
by chance and shake hands, Weinmiller asserts. This would depend entirely on 
a private initiative. 
'In principle architecture is innocent', Weinmiller said and subsequently 
tried to defend her audacious statement when she was invited to present her 
design to the committee and the public269. Gesine Weinmiller was asked, in front 
of cameras and descendants of the victims, to justify how she could create a 
287 see Der Tagesspiegel, 25 January 1998, Die Tageszeitung, 26 January 1998, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 January 1998, Berliner Zeitung, 26 January 1998; most of the mentioned 
articles are also published in Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Seferens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. 
Der Denkmalstreit 
- 
das Denkmal? Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden 
Europas` 
- 
eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo), p. 1000 
268 Müller-Wirth, Moritz, 1998. Die Macht meiner Häuser": Gesine Weinmiller, Shooting-Star der 
Architektenszene, agiert oft kontrovers, Der Tagesspiegel, 19 March 1998 
269 Der Tagesspiegel, 19 March 1998 
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design for a memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe only on her own 
biographical experiences270. 
It is, as Moritz Muller-Wirth writes in the Tagesspiegel, 'the momentum of 
her own insecurity [in regard to the questions at stake] that contribute to the 
understanding of her memorial design' 2" It is this momentum of most intimate 
truth that makes her design most persuasive: the openly admitted concern of a 
generation that has no biographical connections and yet is confronted with this 
urgent need to remember. She admits to the existence of an absence, to the 
insecurity of not knowing what it is; but her memorial design transcends and 
thus re-presents this difference between the unimaginable presence of the 
annihilation and that which is humanly or aesthetically imaginable. The 
uniqueness of her design lies in the fact that she does not attempt to answer 
questions that have arisen from the occurrence of the Shoah as such. The 
strength of her project ultimately is based on the understanding that, to address 
current questions, to address matters of the Now, to confront the present 
momentum, can never avoid the continuous insistence of the Shoah. It is the 
insecurity of not knowing, of not being familiar with every detail, the impossibility 
of such task that she is aware of and makes part of her project while, at the 
same time, opening a space for remembrance and mourning. 
In her own explanation, it is essential to 'boil down one's own thoughts so 
much that one reaches the essence of the project'. 272 She is asking the question 
of the relation between knowledge and remembrance, especially with regard to 
the generations to come, whose 'knowledge' is passed on via information and 
270 She claimed that impressions from school and encounters with a rabbi friend in Amsterdam 
had predominantly shaped her access to the complex thematic of the Holocaust and helped her 
to come-to-terms with it as a later born generation. 
271 Müller-Wirth, Moritz, 1998. Die Macht meiner Häuser": Gesine Weinmiller, Shooting-Star der 
Architektenszene, agiert oft kontrovers, Der Tagesspiegel, 19 March 1998 
m Der Tagesspiegel, 19 March 1998 
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sources that have been handed down: 'I would like to mediate the memorable 
form of the Holocaust. Perhaps, I and my children will not need the monument 
but future generations will in any case. '273 Gesine Weinmiller has noted the 
presence of a problem and it is the question of how to continue after the 
Holocaust, how to remember it if there is no one left to bear witness. It is the 
presence of that pröblem that informs her work. 
Gesine Weinmiller was thirty-four years old when she took part in the 
competition, Muller Wirth describes her as 'some kind of shooting star in the 
German architectural scene'. 274 She had already become second in the 
competition for the alteration of the Reichstag; she won the commission for the 
rebuilding of the governmental villa of the president of parliament; the federal 
industrial tribunal in Erfurt is also her design. However, she became well-known 
through her participation in the competition. 
The slabs re-present an image of the distorted star of David. The image is 
never visually sharp which, to me, makes it profoundly ungraspable; its truth 
remains unknown to most of us. The walls on the ground reminds me of wailing 
walls but Weinmiller claims that such a religious reference is not intended. The 
walls are scattered in the area. As a design it neither provokes fear nor is it too 
'monumental'. Only after having moved down onto the sloping site and arriving 
at the lower end, does one notices how much taller (7m) the 'single', 
comparatively 'small' walls at the upper end have become. It is this feeling of 
presence which Gesine Weinmiller calls 'metamorphosis of immersion'; this 
metamorphosis is more important than images one has seen before275. 
2n Ich möchte die herausragende Form des Holocaust vermitteln. Vielleicht brauchen ich und 
meine Kinder kein Denkmal, aber die nachfolgenden Generationen auf jeden Fall. ' Die 
Tageszeitung, 26 January 1998 
274 Müller-Wirth, Moritz, 1998. Die Macht meiner Häuser": Gesine Weinmiller, Shooting-Star der 
Architektenszene, agiert oft kontrovers, Der Tagesspiegel, 19 March 1998 
275 Die Tageszeitung, 8 December 1997 
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For Weinmiller the size of the site is an advantage; this vast area is taken 
from the city 
-a part of the city is 'missing' in terms of urban planning - re- 
presenting the very part that was taken from our society through the Holocaust. 
The emptiness that remains from the loss of many people is made obvious by 
choosing such a prominent location. From the distance one would not be able to 
see much of the Weinmiller design: the Reichstag, the Brandenburg Gate, the 
American Embassy, a void, the Representation of the Counties, and Potzdam 
Place. 
In the debates concerns repeatedly were voiced about the enormous size 
of the site. Weinmiller does not consider this problematic: 'I think that this is one 
of the reasons why architects cope far better with such a task than artists: after 
all, we do not do anything else but deal with space, be it in size, height or 
proportion. 'ng It is her architecture that is capable of shaping public space and 
memory aesthetically by transcending the insurmountable difference between 
the historically and socially possible and the humanly unimaginable. Maybe this 
memorial comes as close to achieving the impossible task of memorialisation as 
humanly possible. 
B. Serra/Eisenman's Cemetery-Like Monumentality 
Their original design (see Figures 3,4 & 5) claims to be challenging the 
idea that it could be possible to depict the mass murder with emblems of 
individual mourning: `Whoever wants to 
... 
free forms from the memory of their 
prior meanings and use them anew must work precisely against theses 
276 Die Tageszeitung, 8 December 1997 
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associations. '27 Eisenman and Serra created a new, overwhelming space that 
formally echoes a cemetery motive whereby the form of such a cemetery is 
magnified and exaggerated so that it is turned against itself. The 4000 pillars 
form a waving field of gravestones, V2 to 5m tall, and 92cm removed from each 
other. The land sways and moves between the pillars so that each one is some 
3° off the vertical. The visitor has to find his or her own path between the pillars 
of memory. (see Figure 5) 
This is what Eisenman calls its Unheimlichkeit (eeriness)'; a sense of 
unease is generated in such a field, as we are urged to find our way in and out 
of memory. Unlike the Weinmiller design, the scale of this installation will hardly 
allow an over-all perspective from the ground. The visitors need to enter the 
memorial space and live through their experience. Because there are multiple 
entrances and exits through which the visitor can approach the site of memory, it 
is a memorial without a narrative beginning, middle and end, thus creating a 
sense of incompleteness. In their multiple and variegated sizes, the pillars are 
both individuated and collected: the very idea of 'collective memory' is broken 
down here and replaced with collected memories. 
Over time the Eisenman/Serra design gathered the force of consensus2'9 
among commissioners, the Chancellor's office (Helmut Kohl) and the public at 
277 Klicker, Wilhelm, 1982. Abschied von der Architektur-Moderne?. Der Architekt, No. 2,1982, 
p" 64 
18 Young translates 'Unheimlichkeit' with 'uncanniness'. I think 'eeriness' is the more appropriate 
expression since it implies the feeling of mystery and fear that the German word 'unheimlich' 
carries. Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in 
Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 206 
279 Unfortunately, I was not able to find out why, suddenly, the consensus gathered around the 
Eisenman/Serra design. Young claims that the consensus was far from 'unanimous'. He implies 
that it was reached because of political pressure. See Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's 
Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press), p. 208 
- 
The implication that one very powerful German politician, the 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, could just voice his preferences and that would decide on the winning 
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largem, as the most powerful and appropriate of the four announced finalists2e'. 
In January 1998, Eisenman and Serra were asked by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to 
introduce a few changes to their model. As a result of such suggestions, Richard 
Serra withdrew from the project, insisting that changes would be a threat to his 
work's internal logic and integrity, and that the project would, effectively, no 
longer be his work. 
Kohl requested that both the size of the individual pillars and their number 
be reduced and the area intended for public commemoration be enlarged. As a 
result, the number of pillars decreased to around 2700, and the height of the 
lowest pillar was raised to approximately half a meter tall. At the same time, a 
row of evergreen trees was introduced; this has the effect of demarcating the 
space from the rest of the city, as well as integrating it by connecting it visually 
with the Tiergarten on the west side; a design known as Eisenman 11 (see Figure 
6). 
In the summer of 1998, national elections were looming but deadlines for 
the Chancellor's announced decision on the design passed without comment. In 
design, ridicules the democratic principle of the deciding body and renders the whole competition 
useless. Gesine Weinmiller daringly designed the psychological status at stake in the German 
remembrance process by tentatively approaching aesthetically the unimaginable. Helmut Kohl, 
who only a few years earlier had coined the phrase of the 'Gnade der späten Geburt' (mercy of 
late birth 
- 
implying that his generation was born too late to have anything to do with National 
Socialism and thus did not need to engage with it further), may have felt some confirmation of 
his politics and belief through the Eisenman/Serra design. Kohl was not the only one for whom 
the insistence on the sheer monstrosity of the event, which lies far beyond human imagination, 
functioned as an alibi not to engage and work-through at all. 
280 It is difficult to use a term like 'the public'. I suppose, here I am referring to the views of the 
public as expressed in reports, commentaries and suggestions by journalists and others in the 
media whose views might not necessarily be those of the public as a whole. 
281 To the designs by Weinmiller and Eisenman/Serra recommended by the 
Findungskommission, the memorial's organisers (Auslober) added the works of Jochen Gerz 
(Warum? ) and Daniel Libeskind (Stone-Breath) in order to keep the debates and choices as 
open as possible. 
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the heated debates over the 'correct' design it soon became clear that, as an 
electoral issue, the memorial would only ruin any politician who actually had an 
opinion on it. So the final decision was deferred until after the election date of 
23rd September. With the victory of the Social Democratic. Party (SPD) 
- 
the 
party with a strong tradition of remembrance, the party of Willi Brandt - one 
might have expected changes in the memorial debate with a sincere statement 
on the process of memorialisation. Throughout the election and after, Culture 
Minister Michael Naumann's282 opposition to the winning design and his 
repeated suggestions for alternatives or alterations brought along huge 
confusion. Naumann wished for an 'interpretative, library and research centre' to 
be added. When asked by Mr. Naumann, Eisenman presented yet another 
model with a possible archive and library complex. This design has widely 
become known as Eisenman III (see Figures 7& 8). However, after long 
discussions and debates, it was agreed that, only after the Bundestag took a 
vote on the Eisenman II design and approved it, would the 'Auslober' consider a 
proposal to add a library and research centre. In June 1999, the Parliament 
voted to erect the Eisenman II design as a 'Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe'. 2'3Nothing has happened since. 
This design does not represent both the scale of destruction and the void 
left behind as demanded by the invitation to the competition. Neither does it 
allude to the monumentality of Nazi architecture. The design's inability to take up 
282 This is Germany's first State Minister of Culture since the Third Reich, admittedly without any 
constitutional rights yet. To this day, cultural matters (including educational ones) are still dealt 
with by the Länder, not the state. 
283 As expected, not much has happened since then. Berlin's own bank went bankrupt. As a 
consequence, the city of Berlin is now insolvent and can no longer pay its institutions, least of all 
in the cultural sector. However, with a delay of only one year, the foundation stone to the 
'Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe' was finally laid in January 2001. And there is still this 
huge, gaping hole in the centre of Germany's old-new capital Berlin... 
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the past as a concern of the. present will render future generation's 
preoccupation with memory difficult, if not impossible. 
Richard Serra takes part in the ongoing debate of whether a work art is 
capable of expressing, adequately, the tragedy and extent of the Shoah. Rather 
than approaching the subject from an artistic view point, he engages in the 
ideological examination of what has to happen in Germany; he understands that 
'the context always rubs off on to the content of what one is doing, and that 
there is nothing with regard to the called-upon content that would be as strong 
as the camps themselves'. a If Peter Eisenman's work has its origin in an image 
of the Jewish cemetery in Prague and is thus trying to evoke a certain content, 
Serra's work is neither based on the attempt to arouse feelings nor does it refer 
to an image: 'I usually start with the site and try to find out what kind of sculpture 
might be necessary but I do not start with an image or a preconception of how to 
evoke feelings. '' Serra reminds us that historical or political art or monuments 
were never part of his work. Despite having worked on the project for months, if 
not years, Serra considers it impossible to design an iconography for the 
collective annihilation of people. 
Serra claims to have left the team purely for artistic reasons. He claims 
that his problems arose from the fact that Eisenman's design is based on a 
minimalist principle in order to become a post-modern monument: 
He [Eisenman] used works by Donald Judd, Carl Andre or me like 
a pastiche for the content and feeling the memorial was to express. 
284 Serra, Richard, 1998. Zum Holocaust-Mahnmal in Berlin 
- 
archival manuscript (Kunsthalle 
Hamburg: Reden Ober Kunst) 
285 Serra, Richard, 1998. Zum Holocaust-Mahnmal in Berlin 
- 
archival manuscript (Kunsthalle 
Hamburg: Reden Ober Kunst), p. 3 
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At that point I had to get out, because I have no intention to 
plagiarise or to parody my own, abstract work. ' 
Serra insists on a stark contrast between monument and abstract 
sculpture. In his definition monuments are static; they represent time, place or 
event. His memorial design revolves around time and present, premonition and 
memory. Only art can work as the catalyst for a rethinking. Their iconography for 
the Nazi genocide was based on the structures and principles of minimalism: 
it became an eclectic torso, and that was one of the reasons why I 
left. I do not know what could be suitable for this iconography. I do 
not think that pictorial quality or illustration would be capable. I do 
not believe that figuration could do it. "' 
The more Richard Serra protested against the political monopolisation of 
his art, the more Peter Eisenman seemed to be willing to comply with certain 
political demands. To what extent, however, is art in public spaces politically 
influenced? With Gesine Weinmiller's design it becomes obvious that the work 
has to assert its position and space next to the everyday life of a European 
capital and its governmental district. The work has to assert its place within the 
reality of life, it has to resist the ideological framework of politics and set itself in 
juxtaposition to it. Serra understands such political or ideological framework as 
'some kind of cultural catalyst'. In Peter Eisenman's notion, however, the 
memorial design does neither remember the victims nor the deeds of the 
perpetrators: 
286 Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Seferens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Der Denkmalstreit 
- 
das 
Denkmal? Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas« 
- 
eine 
Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo), p. 1169; see also Serra, Richard, 1998. Zum Holocaust-Mahnmal 
in Berlin 
- 
archival manuscript (Kunsthalle Hamburg: Reden über Kunst) 
287 Serra, Richard, 1998. Zum Holocaust-Mahnmal in Berlin 
- 
archival manuscript (Kunsthalle 
Hamburg: Reden über Kunst), p. 4 
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It [the memorial] does not pose these questions. It does not 
condemn. Those who understand themselves as victim or 
perpetrator can feel whatever they want. 
... 
The memorial calls 
guilt into question, it does not project guilt forward. 2m 
Serra mentions the German 'left', starting with Günter Grass, and its claim 
that no symbol or sign can deal with the guilt that people feel. To him they are 
pleading 'their guilt' as an excuse, something they do not want to be reminded 
of: 
I do not believe that the Germans really want this memorial. In my 
view there exists a certain political correctness, especially with the 
left, which says: We ought to build the memorial'. But if you 
analyse their arguments, like those from Günter Grass, they do not 
express anything else but that there cannot be a symbol that can 
express the guilt, and the guilt needed to be expressed. Thus I 
believe, the left ultimately does not want the memorial because it 
does not want to be remembered of its guilt. 
... 
Kohl used the 
whole thing as a political football, he did not mind whether the one 
or the other design comes to be realised, he only thought of the 
headlines. If the project helps him politically, he takes part in it. 
That he did not want to stand by the plan to build it last January or 
Spring, is grounded in his fear to alienate the entire right. And so 
he could give it back to major Diepgen who did not want to build it 
anyhow. 
... 
I think the big problem of this monument is that 
stretches along the grounds of four blocks of houses and that it 
contains 4000 single elements, that it became a terrifying place 
and a possibly critical statement. Having said that I do not want to 
take anything away from the necessity to build the monument, but I 
believe that the psyche of the Germans does not want to be 
confronted with it everyday. ' 
288 Peter Eisenman 
- 
Interview in Die Zeit, 10 December 1998 
289 Serra, Richard, 1998. Zum Holocaust-Mahnmal in Berlin 
- 
archival manuscript (Kunsthalle 
Hamburg: Reden über Kunst), p. 2/3; also Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Seferens, Horst 
(eds. ), 1999. Der Denkmalstreit 
- 
das Denkmal? Die Debatte um das 
Denkmal für die 
ermordeten Juden Europas` 
- 
eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo), p. 1169 
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He, however maintains that no sign, symbol or monument has to deal 
with 'their guilt'. For Serra the unmodified memorial would deliver a critical 
statement and this he sees as problematic. 
Peter Eisenman speaks of a dual interpretation of his design that, initially, 
seemed peaceful and quiet: 'Perhaps like the beginning of the National Socialist 
movement in the eyes of many Jews. '290 For him, the so-called failure of art in 
the context of the Shoah does not mean that there is no possibility of political 
criticism. He is less concerned with the aesthetic re-living (Erlebnis) than with a 
critical, understood and immediate experience (Erfahrung). In his memorial 
design spirit and body, which have been separated by our media society, get in 
contact again; here, in the space of the design, the body will be able to feel 
something. Eisenman understands the memorial as a spiritual place where the 
question 'why did this happen? ' is posed. He claims that the memorial sites of 
former concentration camps deal with the 'how' and 'what', but that they do not 
ask'why'. His design, on the other hand, would be posing the question of 'why'. 
Habermas makes clear that we have to accept the design towards which 
the political discussions have been running since there is no clear and better 
alternative. At the same time, he lets us know that the Eisenman II is not his first 
choice. He even goes so far as to imply that the choice of a Jewish American 
architect could be seen as the board's imperceptible evasion of a responsibility 
which the Germans have to 'come to terms with' alone, a responsibility they 
have to bear themselves'. It is the 'unobtrusive pathos of the negative' of the 
Eisenman design that finds Habermas' approval. 
For Peter Iden the field of pillars, however, is determined by an openness 
with which only art can react facing reality. Depending on the point of the 
perspective, the pillars form a conceptual framework, an alternating set of 
2m Peter Eisenman 
- 
Interview in Die Zeit, 10 December 1998 
291 Habermas, Jürgen, 1999. Die Zeit, 1. April 1999 
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patterns; Iden finds this set-up of pillars corresponding with the structural 
process of memory: 
But who proceeds into the small corridors inside the field will learn 
between the masses of stelae of the experience of sudden, 
continuously increasing loneliness and will have to endure it. It also 
means: he is risking his identity 
- 
like any individual or collective 
remembering necessarily questions the identity of the subject, the 
group or the society; on the other hand, it drags the past into the 
openness where it had once been as the present. 292 
The original design implied a certain sense of physical danger because of 
the sheer scale and form of its design suggesting `something more than a mere 
figure of threatening memory'. Monumental buildings and works of art could 
mirror something of the aesthetic of the Sublime; however, in the case of the 
Eisenman design, the monumental not necessarily places it in relation to the 
unimaginable of the mass extermination of the European Jews. The sheer 
monumentality and overwhelming dimensions might draw similarities with the 
problematics of the remembrance process. For me, that is also the problematic 
of the design, whether intentional or not. The event is so unimaginable, so 
impossible that the design does not even imply the limits of aesthetics and 
imagination, let alone pose the question `why'. The attempt to create an 
aesthetic illusion of the unimaginable cannot surpass the real 
- 
that which was 
socially and historically possible but which cannot be understood in human 
m Wer sich aber auf die schmalen Gänge innerhalb des Feldes begibt, wird zwischen den 
Massen der Steine die Erfahrung plötzlicher, dann zunehmender Einsamkeit machen und 
aushalten müssen. Das heißt auch: Er riskiert seine Identität 
- 
wie jedes individuelle oder 
kollektive Erinnern die Identität des Subjekt, einer Gruppe oder einer Gesellschaft notwendig in 
Zweifel, das Vergangene abermals ins Offene zieht, das es als Gegenwart einmal war'. Peter 
Iden, Wider die falsche Versöhnung, FR, 26 June 1999 
20 Young, James E., 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary 
Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 207 
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terms. The mere dimensions and use of form and symbols do not acknowledge 
the limits at stake. 
The boundary between the historically possible and the unimaginable are 
violated through an aesthetic depiction that does not acknowledge the very 
presence of an absence in human imagination. The horror or fear that one might 
experience when lost in the maze of individual remembrances and memories (all 
the individual pillars taken together form the collection of memories, e. g. 
collective memory) does not make the past part of the present. 
C. The Schröder Proposal 
The Berlin theologian Richard Schröder suggested that a simple tablet be 
installed in one of the memorial designs with the inscription of the biblical 
Commandment "Thou shalt not kill! " It should be written in Classical Hebrew 
letters, the originating language of the Commandments. For the admonition to 
be understood it needed to be written clearly in German and several other 
languages (all languages spoken by the victims) to show the European 
dimension of the Holocaust. Schröder suggested to use Martin Buber's 
translation of "Thou shalt not murder! " since the Hebrew and German language 
differentiate between killing and murder. ' 
294 Schröder's reasoning is that 2500 years ago when the Hebrew autograph originated there 
was not yet a legal definition of the different offences of killing. He argues that the equivalent 
word in Hebrew means a killing outside the law 
- 
never was it applied to the killing in wars and 
the death penalty. For that reason the translated inscription should say 'murder'. The prohibition 
to murder is indisputably the core of any prohibition to kill. Furthermore, it is correct to say that 
the prohibition to murder cannot be the only prohibition to kill. However, Schröder bemoans that 
the ability to differentiate is lost, that we carelessly equate killing and murder for the sake of 
provocation. A murder is committed if an innocent, defenceless human being is insidiously and 
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The striking simplicity of the idea, however, has got a twist to it on which 
some subsequent misunderstandings have been based. The 'prohibition to 
murder is indeed unoriginal and simple. However, human history has given 
ample proof that despite the simplicity of its demand we need to be reminded of 
it. 
Why use Hebrew letters? Could that not be (mis)understood as ridiculing 
the victims? Schröder rightly asked that consideration be made for the fact that 
in their everyday lives the victims have hardly spoken Hebrew but German, 
Polish, Yiddish etc. Since the Third Century classical Hebrew has not been 
spoken but has only remained as the holy language of the sacred writings of 
Judaism 
- 
similar to the role Latin played in the Catholic Church up until the 
Second Vatican Council. Zionism, when claiming the national homeland for the 
Jews, developed the new Hebrew language. With the foundation of the State of 
Israel 
- 
as such an indirect result of the persecution of the Jews in Europe 
- 
New 
Hebrew became the official language. 
Professor Schröder insists that `the prohibition to murder in the Classical 
Hebrew language is meant as a reference for the fundamental contribution of 
the Israeli-Jewish tradition to the culture of Europe'. Israeli-Jewish 
contributions to European culture have been abandoned from our collective 
cruelly killed. A murder needs to be set apart from other punishable and reprehensible offences 
of killing like manslaughter in a fight or by culpable negligence (e. g. drunk driving). A murder 
needs to be set apart also from those cases where the killing of a human being not only is 
unpunished but also morally necessary. Schröder gives the example of a policeman who kills 
somebody because he can in no other way prevent that person from committing a murder. In this 
case the policeman was shooting in defence and not committing a murder. In failing to act we 
make ourselves culpable in a moral sense because we are no less responsible for our failure to 
act than we are for our deeds. 
295 Das Mordverbot in althebräischer Sprache soll eine Referenz sein an den fundamentalen 
Beitrag der israelisch jüdischen Tradition für die Kultur Europas'. Richard Schröder, Die Zeit, 
Verbietet das Morden!, 29 April 1999 
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memory. Together with the Jewish people the Nazis also wanted to extinguish 
the Jewish culture in Europe. Schröder counters the argument that the Hebrew 
letters would make the commandment an appeal to the victims by drawing the 
readers attention to the Latin inscriptions at classical buildings: 'In reality they 
[Latin inscriptions] are a reference of classicism to the cultural inheritance of the 
antique Rome. ' Christians do not have their "own" ten commandments; they 
share them with the Jews. Schröder claims that the Hebrew letters were 
intended to give prominence to the Jewish victims without explicitly excluding 
other victims of the Nazi persecution. 
Not only did the Nazis no respect for this commandment, they 
systematically abused it. To quote one of the ten commandments from the 
Decalogue, from the Hebrew Bible, an European autograph pays reference to 
the fundamental contribution of the Jewish people to European culture, to its 
moral as well as legal culture. For Jews and Christians the commandment is 
God's commandment. For those who do not believe in God it will be a 
commandment of reason 
- 
something humanity has ascribed to. 
Nonetheless, the inscription "Thou shalt not murder! " is faced with the 
same problem of not including the 'sinners of omission', those who would claim 
later that they personally did not feel demonic, that at best they felt `seduced' 
- 
and now were burdened with the history. But is the word, in this case an 
inscription, really more precise in its message, more expressive, more durable 
than the artistic design? Is language less prone to give in to the changes of the 
time, less easily influenced by the changes of the Zeitgeist? Can words really 
make explicit the intention behind the memorial? 
The remembrance of the fates of individual victims can never be the task 
of a national, public monument or memorial. The emphatic remembrance of 
296 in Wahrheit sind sie (lateinische Inschriften) eine Referenz des Klassizismus an das 
kulturelle Erbe des antiken Roms'. Richard Schröder, ibid. 
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individual fates is passed on through biographies, films and encounters with 
witnesses. When claiming that 'in the deep compassion for the victims the 
German responsibility disappears', Schröder points to the long and suppressing 
struggle of remembrance in Germany. The National Socialists knew about the 
commandments, they knew about the 'prohibition to kill and murder'. Yet this did 
not prevent the almost total extermination of European Jewry `and because this 
was possible to such an extent, it is necessary to remember the `prohibition to 
murder in Germany, in a public place, in the centre of the capital, close to the 
parliament and government''. 
A memorial that symbolises and can easily be associated with a 
graveyard 
- 
what else if not gravestones are stelae - is out of place: 
The place does not exist where the victims have been buried. They 
were burned to death, the ashes were "disposed" of. Graveyard- 
compensation for the victims is not imperative but rather the 
admonition to the later-born Germans. ' 
The historian Raul Hilberg considers the admonition of the commandment 
unnecessary and pointless: `The sentence "Thou shalt not murder" is in this 
context one about the German past. Nobody is fearing nowadays that the 
Germans would kill another people. ' 
297 Und weil das in diesem Umfang möglich war, ist es angezeigt, das Mordverbot in 
Deutschland im öffentlichen Raum, im Zentrum der Hauptstadt und nahe bei Parlament und 
Regierung zu erinnern'. Richard Schröder, Die Zeit, Verbietet das Morden!, 29 April 1999 
298 Es gibt den Ort nicht, da die Opfer begraben wurden. Sie wurden verbrannt, die Asche 
'entsorgt'. Nicht Friedhofersatz für die Opfer ist geboten, sondern eine Mahnung an die 
nachgeborenen Deutschen'. Richard Schröder, FAZ, Du sollst nicht töten, 22 March 1999 
299 Der Satz "Du sollst nicht morden" ist in diesem Zusammenhang einer über die deutsche 
Vergangenheit. Heutzutage fürchtet keiner, daß die Deutschen wieder ein Volk ermorden 
werden'. Raul Hilberg, Tagesspiegel, 23 April 1999 
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Andreas Nachama, chairman of the Jewish community in Berlin, 
welcomed the debate initiated by Schröder. He expresses sincere concern that 
the Hebrew quotation of the commandment would be understood solely by 
theologians and the victims and thus be pure graphic decoration for the broad 
majority of visitors. Nachama asks the German version of the commandment to 
be placed in the more prominent position of the inscription: 'After all, the 
structures for the industrial murder of the European Jews was written in the 
language of Luther, Goethe and Schiller but not Hebrew. 13M 
Perhaps Schröder's proposal takes a certain knowledge of theology and 
history for granted. But he cannot be accused of reproaching the victims for the 
prohibition to murder. The fundamental cultural contribution of the Israeli-Jewish 
tradition to Europe should be remembered, especially in view of the National 
Socialist attempt not only to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe as such 
but also their culture and tradition. According to Hermann Rauschning, Hitler 
had the vision to free humanity from the demonic curse of the Decalogue: 'Ah, 
the god of the desert, this insane, moronic, vengeful Asian tyrant with his power 
to make laws! This whip of a slave-owner! This diabolic "Thou shalt, Thou shalt! " 
And then this stupid "Thou shalt not! " This has to disappear from our blood, this 
curse from the Mount Sinai. '301 Hitler wanted to wipe out any Jewish cultural 
contribution. The Biblical commandment is the first categorically, unconditionally 
formulated prohibition to murder of a_y history. Hebrew language is not only 
300 Schließlich waren die Baupläne für den industriellen Mord an den europäischen Juden in der 
Sprache Luthers, Goethes und Schillers, nicht aber im Hebräischen verfaßt'. Andreas Nachama, 
Tagesspiegel, Sinn und Spruch, 8 April 1999 
301 Ah, der Wüstengott, dieser verrückte, stupide, rachsüchtige asiatische Despot mit seiner 
Macht, Gesetze zu machen! Diese Peitsche eines Sklavenhalters! Dieses teuflische "Du sollst, 
du sollst! ", und dann dieses törichte "Du sollst nicht! " Das muß endlich aus unserem Blut 
verschwinde, dieser Fluch vom Berge Sinai'. Hermann Rauschning 
- 
see Richard Schröder, Die 
Zeit, Verbietet das Morden!, 29 April 1999, and Sibylle Tönnies, Das Töten soll einmal ganz 
aufhören, Berliner Zeitung, 25 March 1999 
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(and not in the first place) the language of the victims; it is also a world 
language. To inscribe the words of the commandment "Thou shalt not murderl" 
does not only include all the victims, but it also pays a particular and appropriate 
reference to the Jewish victims since they are attributed to the Mosaic God. 
Does the general formulation of the commandment detract from the 
uniqueness of the Holocaust? Habermas considers the sentence 'Thou shalt not 
murderl' to be universally applicable and sees the 'unsparingly specific meaning 
of the unimaginable disappear if the commandment was repeated in Hebrew 
and the other languages of the murdered'. 302 
Perhaps it is true that we will have to live with the violation of the Biblical 
commandment as long as humanity exists. Since (and before) the Second World 
War and its innumerable victims, no era of peace has ever commenced. The 
Middle East, Vietnam, Rwanda, Iran/Iraq, Kosovo 
- 
they have all paid their 
bloody contribution to history, as if Auschwitz and its perpetual admonition to 
humanity never existed. The prohibition to murder is a universally valid 
declaration to humanity. For the Germans, God's commandment will be an 
admonition and a reminder of the vital Jewish contribution to European culture. 
D. Naumann's'House of Remembrance' 
For Naumann, Germany's newly appointed minister of culture, the most 
fundamental problem of social remembrance lies in the fact that individual 
memory, relying on direct or passed-on experiences, and stately manifestations 
of history can not easily be brought together: 
302 Habermas, Jürgen, 1999. Die Zeit, 1. April 1999 
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On the contrary, in its stony reification in the memorial social 
mourning of the murdered seems to appear, as it were, officially. 
But at the same time the aesthetic, "official" remembrance 
threatens to fail in front of the artistically non-presentable event of 
the genocide of the Jews. 
Social anamnesis needs interpretation but that this may not necessarily 
be applied by academic standards, recent films, like the highly acclaimed 
'Schindler's List', have shown. There can never be a prohibition to remember. 
But will such aesthetic withdrawal precisely in its a priori-implied failure, end 
society's remembering in favour of ritualised remembering? Does a memorial - 
at least symbolically 
- 
not bring to an end the process of remembering with a 
socially accepted, artistic gesture? 
Narrative forms of anamnestic self-regulation in rites and myths, in 
stories, laws and sanctions could be understood as the generalisation of 
articulated individual experiences. In contrast to Habermas, Naumann claims 
that national and historical consciousness are a derivative term of private, 
individual and consequently subjective attention to the past: 
In this respect the "self-understanding" of a society is the concept 
of a compact or differentiating source of continuing, sometimes 
enlightening, more often however obscuring, sometimes regulating, 
more often confusing, religious, mythographical, philosophical, 
poetic, artistic, scientific and always political reflections on its right 
order in the present and history. 304 
w Im Gegenteil, in ihrer steinernen Verdinglichung im Denkmal scheint zwar gesellschaftliche 
Trauer um die Ermordeten gleichsam offiziell. Gleichzeitig aber droht das ästhetische, "amtliche" 
Gedenken vor dem künstlerisch undarsteilbaren Ereignis des Völkermordes an Europas Juden 
zu scheitern'. Naumann, FAZ, 1 April 1999 
304 Das "Selbstverständnis" einer Gesellschaft ist insofern der Begriff eines kompakten oder 
differenzierten Ablaufs kontinuierlicher, manchmal erhellender, öfter verdunkelnder, manchmal 
regulierender, öfter verwirrender religiöser, mythographischer, philosophischer, poetischer, 
artistischer, wissenschaftlicher und immer auch politischer Reflexionen über ihre richtige 
Ordnung in der Gegenwart und in der Geschichte'. Naumann, FAZ, Blick in die Tiefe der 
Täterschaft, 1 April 1999 
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From the point of strict phenomenology, a society on the whole does not 
remember, every process of remembrance is a subjective process of individual 
consciousness. Therefore, every society is in a latent state of self-oblivion. 
For that very reason, Naumann preferred a 'cognitive, enlightening' 
approach to the Shoah, which resulted in the design 'Eisenman III': the 
combination of memorial (smaller field of pillars), the Leo-Baeck-Institute, 
Spielberg's Video Archive and the 'Genocide Watch Institute'305. According to 
Naumann's idea, visitors would find, next to the appeal 'Never again! ', emotional 
and rational access to the question which in its intensity is still unanswered: how 
could that have happened? how was it possible? 
America, perhaps, has set the standards regarding museums' didactic, 
but the 'House of Remembrance' would have to develop its own perspective 
according to German history 
- 
regardless of Jerusalem and Washington, but with 
those in mind. Are these 'active aspects" really the only possible solution to 
avoid the danger of "covering", of the premature closure of a chapter in German 
history that many still find hard to 'come to terms with'? Michael Berenbaum 
calls the additions to the memorial 'utopian dreams of reconciliation'307. 
Naumann's 'House of Remembrance' cannot possibly give the definitive, 
final perspective on the Eisenman design. Art is limitless as long as it is 
understood universalistic; at the same time, however, it is limited provided it is 
understood historically. Following Adorno's dictum, a prohibition of depiction 
should have been imposed on the project of the Holocaust memorial. Are the 
crimes against the European Jews accessible through any kind of depicted 
305 Supposedly a research institute that can give advanced warning on further possible genocide. 
So far, it is a one-man enterprise in Bremen. 
306 «Lebendes Museum" 
- 
living museum, Raul Hilberg on the Washington Museum, 
Tagesspiegel, 23 April 1999 
307 Tagesspiegel, 20 April 1999 
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reification? For Adorno, in art the non-conciliatory reality can no longer tolerate 
appeasement with the object. Artistic modernity has very much followed this 
dictum. Art's intention can no longer be to create the essential totality 
- 
as little 
as any other interpretation of the world. Only an art form will be secured that ý 
does not fix and arrange its own interpretation and validation for the future. Does 
not the object, the Holocaust Memorial, forbid any other thought? 
In a letter to Eisenman, the philosopher Habermas implored the architect 
not to be tempted to amend his design: 
I hope that you are vaguely familiar with my name 
... 
I am writing 
to you with regard to your meeting with Mr Michael Naumann, 
December 19, in Berlin and would like to ask you not to give in to 
any alternative that might be offered to you. You are anyway well 
aware of the simple argument against Mr Naumann's proposal to 
replace a lasting monument by some sort of institution for historical 
instruction: Such a place can tacitly [be] turned into something 
else, once the climate shifts. Just now we envisage the devastating 
mental consequences of the debate between Martin Walser and 
Ignatz Bubis. It is for the first time that representation of the 
political and intellectual elite of this country bring to the fore a 
dangerous opposition between German/German and 
German/Jewish citizens. 
... 
I am deeply convinced that we, now 
more than ever, need exactly the kind of monument that you and 
Serra designed. The monument should be a sign that the memory 
of the Holocaust remains a constitutive feature of the ethico- 
political self-understanding of the citizens of the Federal Republic. 
... 
- 
a week before the Parliament in Bonn will debate the issue 
under the tense attention of the nation. 
... 
In this context it is, 
however, of decisive importance that the author of this project does 
not show the least sign of hesitance in the last minute. 
308 Letter from Jürgen Habermas to Peter Eisenman, 16 December 1998, published in Heimrod, 
Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Seferens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Der Denkmalstreit 
- 
das Denkmal? Die 
Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas" 
- 
eine Dokumentation (Berlin: 
Philo), p. 1185 
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Peter Eisenman did not seem to have received the letter; his ability to 
change and adjust his design to the given political demand is incredible, yet it 
raises questions about the ` genuineness' and 'originality' of the design. 
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III. `Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit? " 
- 
Questions of Identity and Coming-to-Terms in Post-War 
Germany 
The previous chapter looked at the implications of the chosen medium of 
the monument and at implicit and explicit forms and theories of memory in the 
monumental form of re-presenting the Shoah. The concluding chapter will 
examine various literary forms of remembrance and attempts of coming-to-terms 
in post-war Germany. It tries to identify their importance and implications for the 
historical-philosophical. By identifying the limits that the writings of Karl Jaspers, 
Hannah Arendt, Theodor W. Adorno, Margarete and Alexander Mitscherlich and 
Thomas Mann emphasised, I wish to establish the demand for recognition of the 
limits of the form of the memorial in particular. Against the backdrop of the 
changing political parameters of a re-united Germany, we need to thematise the 
chances and possibilities of these very limits and to address anew the question 
of 'What does it mean: coming-to-terms with the past? ' when the generations to 
come will have no biographical links to the event that is being re-presented. 
This chapter maps out the issues and problematics at stake in the major 
debates of working-through and coming-to-terms with the National Socialist 
murderous past that the 1990s in Germany witnessed. I will approach the 
problematics of the German history of memory in two different ways: I will 
examine the different memory formations of the individual on the one side and 
the collective culture on the other, where the role of the individual, its status of 
generation, the role of winner or loser, victim and perpetrator and the role of the 
309 What does it mean: coming-to-terms with the past? ' 
- 
Essay by Adorno (1959) in Adorno, 
Theodor W., 1997. 'Ob nach Auschwitz noch sich leben lasse": Ein philosophisches Lesebuch 
(Frankfurt/Leipzig: Suhrkamp), pp. 31-47 
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media are equally decisive factors. Further, I will introduce the implications and 
norms of a culture of shame and disgrace and discuss their meaning and 
relevance with regard to the reinforcement or rejection of memory. 
The centre of such analysis will be the author's, Martin Walser's, speech 
at the 'Peace Prize of the German Book Trade' in October 1998 and the 
subsequent dispute between the author and Ignatz Bubis, the chairmen of the 
Council of German Jews and a Shoah survivor. I do not intend to deliver further 
arguments for those on either side of the dispute or, indeed, try to mediate for it 
is this dialectical position which we have to come to accept in view of the 
complex memory process. Such undertaking is indeed only possible if the 
debate is placed in the broader context of the German history of memory and 
forgetting which can be traced back to the end of World War II, the so-called 
'Stunde Null' (Zero Hour) 
-8 May 1945. In the process of the an analysis I will 
be examining such catch phrases from Walser's speech as 'bottom line', 
'normalisation', 'positive/negative nationalism', 'moral club', 'instrumentalisation', 
'ritualisation', '(collective) guilt', 'conscience', 'shame', and 'disgrace'. 
In the following text I examine the different perspectives of post-war 
German memory in order to reconstruct the motivation behind Walser's speech 
and the dispute between Walser and Bubis. Therefore it is necessary to re- 
examine and re-define certain notions of what determines history, past and 
present, what memory is and what form it takes. For this purpose I shall be 
looking at major sources of post-war attempts to 'come to terms' in the writings 
of Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers and 
Thomas Mann. 
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1. West German"' Politics of `Coming-to-Terms' with the 
National Socialist Past 
In 1990, at the 'Frankfurt Lectures of Poetic', the German author Günter 
Grass considered the possibilities of 'Writing after Auschwitz'31. He concludes 
his lecture by confronting the efforts of German re-unification with the 
occurrence of Auschwitz: 
Against any trend of opinion, any trend that is intensified by public 
opinion which had been stirred up, against the purchasing power of 
West German economy 
- 
for hard (West) German Mark even the 
reunification is available 
-, yes, also against a right of self- 
determination to which other people are entitled unrestrictedly, 
against all this speaks Auschwitz; because one of the prerequisites 
for the horrible 
- 
next to other older driving forces 
- 
was a strong, 
unified Germany. Not Prussia, not Bavaria, not even Austria, could 
have, by themselves, developed and executed the methods and 
the willpower of the organised genocide; it had to be the whole 
Germany. We all have reason to fear ourselves as a unit that is 
able to act. Nothing, no patriotism, however idyllicly coloured, and 
no assertion of a later willingness can relativise, or even merrily 
supersede, the experience which we have made as perpetrators 
and which the victims have made with us as the united Germans. 
We cannot get around Auschwitz. We should not attempt 
- 
however strong the urge 
- 
such an act of violence; because 
Auschwitz belongs to us, because it is an eternal stigma of our 
history and because 
- 
as a gain! 
- 
Auschwitz has made an 
awareness possible that could say: finally, now we know 
ourselves. "' 
310 Predominantly, I will be studying the West German situation. To compare those findings with 
the situation in East Germany would burst the thesis' frame of reference. 
31 Grass, Günter, 1990. Schreiben nach Auschwitz. in Petra Kiedaisch (ed. ), 1998. Lyrik nach 
Auschwitz? Adorno und die Dichter, (Stuttgart Reclam), pp. 139-144 
312 Gegen jeden aus Stimmung, durch Stimmungsmache forcierten Trend, gegen die Kaufkraft 
der westdeutschen Wirtschaft 
- 
für harte DM ist sogar Einheit zu haben 
-, 
ja, auch gegen ein 
Selbstbestimmungsrecht, das anderen Völkern ungeteilt zusteht, gegen all das spricht 
Auschwitz, weil eine der Voraussetzungen für das Ungeheure, neben anderen Triebkräften, ein 
starkes, das geeinte Deutschland gewesen ist. Nicht Preußen, nicht Bayern, selbst Österreich 
nicht, hätten, einzig aus sich heraus, die Methode und den Willen des organisierten 
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The Wende' in 1989-90 radically transformed the existing order; the 
change of the political order had a profound effect on the self-understanding of 
the German people in its relation to its present, future and past 
It has long been argued that the working-through and engagement with 
the National Socialist past is more and more motivated by intellectual and 
scientific approaches and the Germans' relation to power could be less and less 
characterised by its rigid and paralysed view of Auschwitz313. Nicolas Berg 
mentions that possibly only an identity freed of the burden of its past would 
correspond to Germany's increasing significance as a politically and 
economically powerful nation after the re-unification through an appropriate 
execution of its newly claimed powers3t4. 'Normalisation' of its own relation to the 
past while holding onto the crucial experience of Auschwitz, Berg considers 
impossible. Yet, in my view, these are the very issues that have been informing 
and structuring the debates of the 1990s regarding the treatment of the Shoah in 
present attempts to remember. Berg wonders whether the Germans' relation to 
the Shoah will be increasingly of an intellectual and scientific nature. He 
continues by asking how, if that was the case, then could the event be 
Völkermordes entwickeln und vollstrecken können; das ganze Deutschland mußte es sein. Allen 
Grund haben wir, uns vor uns als handlungsfähige Einheit zu fürchten. Nichts, kein noch so 
idyllisch koloriertes Nationalgefühl, auch keine Beteuerung nachgeborener Gutwilligkeit können 
diese Erfahrungen, die wir als Täter, die Opfer mit uns als geeinte Deutsche gemacht haben, 
relativieren oder gar leichtfertig aufheben. Wir kommen an Auschwitz nicht vorbei. Wir sollten, 
sosehr es uns drängt, einen solchen Gewaltakt auch nicht versuchen, weil Auschwitz zu uns 
gehört, bleibendes Brandmal unserer Geschichte ist und 
- 
als Gewinn! 
- 
eine Einsicht möglich 
gemacht hat, die heißen könnte: jetzt endlich kennen wir uns. ibid., p. 143 
313 Frei, Norbert & Steinbacher, Sybille (eds. ), 2001. Beschweigen und Bekennen: Die deutsche 
Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag), p. 105 f. 
314 Berg, Nicolas, 2001. Der Holocaust in der Geschichtswissenschaft. in Frei, Norbert & 
Steinbacher, Sybille (äds. ), 2001. Beschweigen und Bekennen: Die deutsche 
Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag), p. 106 
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maintained in the focus of our own historical picture? In the following text, I 
argue that with the Wende' in 1989190 memory has increased and the attempts 
of working-through have intensified. Whether, however, the '(process of) 
mourning' has turned into what Berg calls 'a remembering culture of mourning', 
remains to be proven. 
West German post-war history and its attitude towards the second 
German state can roughly be marked by three different stages: when in the 
1950s the increasing East-West differentiation of the Cold War left hardly any 
hope for reunification, the West German government under Konrad Adenauer 
(CDU) opted for an alliance with the Western hemisphere. In 1949 the Federal 
Republic of Germany was 'provisionally' founded. The new republic took pride in 
its fundamentally democratic foundations (Grundgesetz) and categorically 
considered its political status of anti-Nazi nature. As a consequence the past 
crimes were not addressed and no attempts to 'work through' were initiated; the 
German government's lack of willingness to de-nazify resulted in the curious 
phenomenon that many former Nazis could continue their life unimpeded. 
In December 1966 the Adenauer era ended with a 'broad coalition' 
government between CDU and SPD. Through chancellor Willi Brand's initiative, 
the Federal Republic embarked on the so-called 'Ostpolitik' which finally resulted 
in the acceptance of the GDR as a sovereign state. 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the new, united Federal Republic 
of Germany is struggling to 'create' a German national identity; the problematics 
of which lie in the double history of National Socialism and the GDR regime of 
the two German states. 
The German past with its demand for memory, with its questions of guilt 
and atonement, have long been of interest for artists trying to address the issues 
at stake. Equally important to me seems the question: to what extent has art, 
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writing or philosophy influenced and shaped the subsequent decades of political 
attempts of dealing with the National Socialist past? 
The newly founded Federal Republic of Germany understood itself as the 
successor state of the National Socialist Germany. With the 'Reparation Treaty' 
(Wiedergutmachung) in 1953 the Federal Republic signalled a Western German 
willingness to assume general responsibility for the National Socialist crimes 
against the Jews, committed in the name of the Germans. Wiedergutmachung' 
was the absurd phrase for seeking to make amends. Politically and symbolically, 
the Treaty is in so far significant as Konrad Adenauer believed to be making 
'things good again'. But in 'return' German regained national strength and 
international respect. The 1960s were witness to fierce public debates regarding 
the statute of limitation (Verjährung) on Nazi crimes315. At the same time, a 
growing number of memoirs was published. Concurrently, artists and academics 
began to address the silenced past in their search for possible answers. 
Adolf Eichman was brought to trial in Jerusalem in 1961. The trial was 
broadcast on TV both in Europe and the United States of America. In 1964-65 
the Auschwitz trial was held in Frankfurt. Extensive media coverage of the trial 
reached the Western German population at the same time as Rolf Hochhuth's 
Der Stellvertreter and the social-critical theatre of Peter Weiss. But 
simultaneously, the 'clean' Hollywood version of 'The Diary of Anne Frank' 
(1959) or 'Judgement of Nuremberg' (1961) reached a wide audience. In 
addition, a growing body of memoires and histories was published. Reinforced 
by the trends in theatre, film and publishing, the scholarly interest began to rise; 
conferences, museums and exhibitions were to follow. 
Aleida Assmann, Professor of Literary Studies, identifies different key 
stages of the history of the remembrance process of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, each of which correspond to a certain phase of political 
315 It was finally abolished only in 1979. 
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stabilisation316. From 1945 to 1955 Germany was occupied by the Allies. While 
the Western German State was predominantly busy founding a new republic 
(1949) to regain the status of 'normality' within the world community, the Allies 
took it on themselves to de-nazify the Germans, and to address the question of 
guilt; in short, to set the process of working-through and coming-to-terms in 
motion. The years 1955 to 1989 were characterised by the existence of two 
German states and their individual approaches to coming-to-terms with a mutual 
past. Although Germany was no longer an occupation zone, the division of the 
two German states was the clear sign that this country was not a 'normal' one. 
The year of the re-unification in 1989 opened the so-far last phase in the 
memory process. It brought with it a transition of the concepts: 'normalisation' 
became the catch phrase and now came to mean 're-nationalisation', as Aleide 
Assmann claims317. For the first time, the head of state and the government had 
no immediate personal connection with the Nazi period and belonged to the so- 
called post-war generation. The post-unification period witnessed an enormous 
boom in memorial activities despite the gradual disappearance of the generation 
of victims and perpetrators. 
In 1986 the 'Historian's Dispute' re-opened the debates on the self- 
conception of the German Republic in view of the past; the debates should last 
for over a decade. The 'Historian's Dispute' began on the question of whether 
the Shoah could be equated with the crimes of other nations and/or people, 
including other genocides318. The philosopher of the Frankfurt School, Jürgen 
316 See Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlangs-Anstalt), pp. 59-69 
317 ibid., p. 63 
318 Ronald Reagan, before his visit to Bitburg with the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1985, 
had already expressed his view that `the German soldiers on the Eastern front were noble 
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Habermas, then claimed that such an argument would relieve the Germans of 
their historical burden and duty. He reproached the conservative historians for a 
playing down of the Third Reich, its deeds, events and philosophy. 
In 1993, the German author Botho Strauß publicly reproached the 'post- 
war intelligence' for their views on German history, because in his understanding 
they only recognised 'the badness of current affairs'. Strauß opposed the 
'guardians of conscience', the 'inhibiting German self-hatred', and the left-liberal 
conformism with its 'vocabulary of outrage' that always blamed society. Strauß 
castigated 'the critically enlightened who had no sense for the undoing', for the 
tragic and fatal that inhabits history319. 
In 1994, Spielberg's film 'Schindler's List' saw record numbers of cinema 
visitors. The following year, 1995, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation 
of many concentration camps and the fiftieth anniversary of the end of war 
which, especially in Germany, was commemorated in numerous Days of 
Remembrance. The diaries of the Jew, Victor Klemperer, were published and 
quickly heading the bestseller list for months in Germany. Klemperer 
meticulously described the (his) 'every day' life of Jews during the Third Reich in 
Dresden. 
In 1996, Daniel J. Goldhagen's book 'Hitler's Willing Executioners' caused 
new excitement. Although not yet published in Germany, the Germans fiercely 
debated and rejected his thesis of the 'eliminatory Anti-Semitism' of the ordinary 
defenders of the last bastion of Western civilisation against the Asiatic hordes of the Red Army 
and that German civilians at home were the innocent and unwilling subjects of a faceless 'fascist 
dictatorship' which no one appears to have supported and for which no one was responsible. ' s. 
Fulbrook, Mary, 1999. German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press) 
These words from the president of the United States of America in conjunction with the visit to 
the war cemetery in Bitburg where members of the Waffen-SS were buried, had already 
provoked enormous public attention and controversy. 
319 see also Weck, Roger de, 1999. Der Kulturkampf: Günter Grass, Jürgen Habermas 
- 
and 
ihre Widersacher. Die Zeit No. 41,1999 
187 
Germans. In its essence Goldhagen's thesis claimed that not only the leading 
Nazis, but most of all, the 'ordinary Germans', were to be blamed for the Shoah 
because their hatred of Jews was deadly different to the Anti-Semitism of the 
neighbouring nations. In March 1997, Goldhagen was awarded the 'Prize of 
Democracy of the "Blätter für deutsche and internationale Demokratie"' (Papers 
for German and International Democracy). 
On the initiative of Germany's President of State, Roman Herzog, an 
official Day of Commemoration for the victims of National Socialism was 
instituted in 1996. In a remarkable speech in Parliament for the Day of 
Remembrance on 27 January 1997, Herzog ascertained that a lasting form of 
remembering Auschwitz had not yet been found0. 
In 1997 the exhibition 'War of Destruction: The Crimes of the Wehrmacht 
1941-1944"321 generated yet another major public controversy. Nicolas Berg 
mentions that the exhibition beat all record numbers of visitors and that for the 
opening in Frankfurt on 13 April police protection was necessary. The exhibition 
- 
controversially, and scholarly, not always correct, as various reactions have 
shown' 
- 
revealed the involvement and collaboration of the German army in 
the vast machinery of destruction that rolled along the Eastern Front. Until then 
the 'Wehrmacht' had been given the status of innocence regarding the genocidal 
320 Rutz, Michael (ed. ), 1999. Roman Herzog: Die Zukunft der Erinnerung 
- 
Wegmarken 
deutscher Geschichte (Stuttgart: ? ); see also Berg, Nicolas, 2001. Der Holocaust in der 
Geschichtswissenschaft. in Frei, Norbert & Steinbacher, Sybille (eds. ), 2001. Beschweigen und 
Bekennen: Die deutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust (Göttingen: Wallstein 
Verlag), p. 107 
321 Wehrmacht were the German armed forces. 
322 See also Heer, Hannes & Naumann, Klaus (eds. ), 1995. Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der 
deutschen Wehrmacht 1941-1944 (Hamburg); Berg, Nicolas, 2001. Der Holocaust in der 
Geschichtswissenschaft. in Frei, Norbert & Steinbacher, Sybille (eds. ), 2001. Beschweigen und 
Bekennen: Die deutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust (Göttingen: Wallstein 
Verlag), p. 103 
-126 
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aspects, involved "only" in matters of traditional and pure conduct of war and 
warfare. 
Two years later, in 1998 the German author Martin Walser was awarded 
the 'Peace Prize of the German Book Trade' and subsequently gave his 
(in)famous speech in the St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt. Walser's speech defies 
'public acts of conscience', the 'instrumentalisation of our shame for 
contemporary purposes', and the 'threatening routine of accusations' in the 
media. 'Auschwitz-Club' and 'latent anti-Semitism' were the all-covering 
catchphrases of the public controversy that followed between Martin Walser and 
Ignatz Bubis, the chairmen of the Council of German Jews and a Shoah 
survivor; in their exchanges they sought fora new language of memory'32a 
Against the backdrop of this history, over the course of more than 10 
years, the German public has been discussing the purpose and meaning, form 
and content of the planned Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. The issues at stake 
have been discussed and are still being discussed 
- 
despite a parliamentary 
decision 
- 
with an extraordinary media, scholarly and public involvement3l. At 
times the debates themselves reach obsessive proportions as their participants 
seek recognition as members of a 'normal' nation or argue that this past should 
never be 'normalised' and hence 'relativised'. All of the public reactions are 
indicative of the tremendous interest in the issue of German history and 
memory. 
323 Walser, Martin, 1998. Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede. Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 12 October 1998 
-'Experiences while creating a Sunday Speech' 
324 Wir brauchen eine neue Sprache für die Erinnerung' 
- 
Das Treffen von Ignatz Bubis und 
Martin Walser. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 December 1998 
-'We need a new language 
for remembering'. 
325 See the chapter on the planned Holocaust-Memorial in Berlin. See also Heimrod, Ute, 
Schlusche, Günter & Sefrens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Das Denkmal? Der Denkmalstreit: Die Debatte 
um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas 
- 
Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo) 
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To be able to comprehend the positions of Bubis and Walser means to 
reconstruct the history of memory in Germany after World War II and, more 
importantly, it means to learn, to accept and to live with the tension between the 
dialectical positions of their individual arguments and memories. As we shall 
see, Martin Walser's speech was a reaction to the complex German history of 
remembering that followed World War 11.326 
Martin Walser's speech is important in so far that he managed the nearly 
impossible: he claimed to be listening to and expressing his "inner" voice; yet, 
this 'personal opinion' became the medium of a 'common need for expression' 
(allgemeines Ausdrucksbedürfnis), which, as he does not fail to point out, is 
evident from all the thousands of letters that he had received327. The importance 
of the event lies not in the speech itself 
- 
which ought to be placed in the 
category of demagogical and rhetorical masterpieces 
- 
but in the broad 
resonance that it provoked, be it a critical reply or an approving agreement. This 
phenomenon of collective resonance of attacks and/or declarations of sympathy 
needs to be closely analysed so that the debate as a whole can be placed in the 
context of 'coming-to-terms' with the National Socialist past, in the context of 
Germany's history of remembering. 
326 Only the latter part of this history of memory actually comprises the extension of my life 
history. Parental and extended family conditions, however, have clearly laid open the 
ambivalences and inner conflicts of this history. Yet, to be part of a history does not necessarily 
give the overall perspective. 
327 Wir brauchen eine neue Sprache für die Erinnerung' 
- 
Das Treffen von Ignatz Bubis and 
Martin Walser. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 December 1998. We are looking for a 
language of memory that does not yet exist'. That this language will never exist and ought never 
to exist, seems not to have crossed anyone's mind: On the contrary, memory is coded in many 
different languages, in the languages of art and literature, film and media, museums, 
monuments, buildings, commemorative places and archives. With all its monumentality, the 
planned Holocaust memorial will only be 'one language' under many. Thus the question of the 
form of its design seems to be far less important than the question of how many different 
'languages' of memory we keep alive and open towards each other. 
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2. The Literary Aestheticisation of the German `Trauma': 
Thomas Mann and his `Doctor Faustus' 
In view of the horrors of the Shoah, the Third Reich and World War II, 
Thomas Mann wrote his last novel 'Doktor Faustus' (1947) while living in exile in 
America. Mann's fascination with what he conceives to be 'German', what he 
understands as 'Germanness' is manifested in this novel: 'I have never felt as a 
deserter of Germanness and of the German fate, at the least in that time when I 
was writing the Faustus-Novel'. 328 Perhaps the novel essentially addresses the 
questions of the relation of fascism and art but, on a different level, Mann's 
protagonist also has to face the problematics of the relation between aesthetics 
(his art, his masterpiece) and guilt (his knowledge of how he got the 'inspiration' 
and at what cost). 
Towards the end of the novel Mann describes in detail a scene where the 
Allied forces lead the neighbouring German population through the liberated 
camps of Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald. Aleida Assmann claims that Mann's 
description 'entails all the core elements' of what might be conceived as the 
German 'trauma': the claims that no-one knew anything; the question of 
complicity and share of the responsibility and blame; the unwilling recognition 
and awareness of the horrors committed; the worldwide moral control; the 
involuntary negative collective identification; the devaluation of perceived 
German traditions; and the new concept of the Germans as outsiders and 
328 ich habe mich nie als Deserteur vom Deutschtum und vom deutschen Schicksal gefühlt, am 
wenigsten in der Zeit, als ich an dem Faustus-Roman schrieb. ' Thomas Mann, 1992. 
Selbstkommentare: Doktor Faustus' 
- , 
Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus', H. Wysling (ed. ), 
(Frankfurt: Fischer), p. 117 
191 
deserted people"'. In view of the German capitulation, Mann lets his novel's 
narrator utter the following words: 
A transatlantic general has forced the population of Weimar to file 
past the crematories of the neighbouring concentration-camp. He 
declared that these citizens 
- 
who had gone in apparent 
righteousness about their daily concerns and sought to know 
nothing, although the wind brought to their noses the stench of 
burning human flesh 
- 
he declared that they too were guilty of the 
abominations on which he forced them now to turn their eyes. Was 
that unjust? Let them look, I look with them. In spirit I let myself be 
shouldered in their dazed or shuddering ranks. Germany had 
become a thick-walled underground torture-chamber, converted 
into one by a profligate dictatorship vowed to nihilism from its 
beginnings on. Now the torture-chamber has been broken open, 
open lies our shame before the eyes of the world. Foreign 
commissions inspect those incredible photographs everywhere 
displayed, and tell their countrymen that what they have seen 
surpasses in horribleness anything the human imagination can 
conceive. I say our shame. For is it mere hypochondria to say to 
oneself that everything German, even the German mind and spirit, 
German thought, the German Word, is involved in this scandalous 
exposure and made subject to the same distrust? Is the sense of 
guilt quite morbid which makes one ask oneself the question how 
Germany, whatever her future manifestations, can ever presume to 
open her mouth in human affairs? Let us call them the sinister 
possibilities of human nature in general that here come to light. 
German human beings, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands 
of them it is, who have perpetrated what humanity shudders at; 
and all that is German now stands forth as an abomination and a 
warning. How will it be to belong to a land whose history witnesses 
this hideous default; a land self-maddened, psychologically burnt- 
out, which quite understandably despairs of governing itself and 
thinks it for the best that it become a colony of foreign powers; a 
nation that will have to live shut in like the ghetto Jews, because a 
frightfully swollen hatred round all its borders will not permit it to 
emerge; a nation that cannot show its face outside? 0 
The exile, Thomas Mann describes the views, the on-looking eyes; he 
continuously talks of `shame'. But Mann considers himself part of this nation that 
329 Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: 
Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlangs-Anstalt), p. 119 
330 Mann, Thomas, 1996. Doctor Faustus (London: Minerva), p. 481/2 
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has brought such evil into the world. Mann's narrator even compares the 
German people, who have lost all of their honour, with the Eastern European 
'Jewry of the Ghettos'. Such comparison seems strange and blatantly 
inappropriate, as Aleida Assmann rightly points out, "given the fact that, at the 
point of writing, those Jews no longer existed because they had fallen victim to 
the Germans' massive machinery of destruction". 33' Yet, Mann does not write of 
`guilt'. 
Mann describes the overwhelmingly passive behaviour of the Germans. 
Aleida Assmann continues by explaing that the collective subject of the 
Germans as such does not cast an eye because it chose not to watch and to 
know, but then it is forced to look. It is being pushed along the enormous piles of 
corpses and declared guilty. ' Mann insists on the collectively responsible 
German nation; he does not draw the line between Hitler's murdering elite on 
the one hand and the German people on the other. 
In her book 'Eichmann in Jerusalem', Hannah Arendt correctly defines (in 
passing) the concept of 'inner emigration' with great cynicism as such: 
The so-called "inner emigration" in Germany 
- 
those people who 
frequently had held positions, even high ones, in the Third Reich 
and who, after the end of the war, told themselves and the world at 
331 Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: 
Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten (Stutgart: Deutsche Verlangs-Anstalt), p. 119 
332 Rightly Aleida Assmann draws our attention to Thomas Mann's exile-situation and the country 
he was living in. She also refers to Mann's deep admiration for president Roosevelt who saw in 
the German Fascist State America's most important enemy. See Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, 
Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: Vom Umgang mit deutschen 
Vergangenheiten nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH). Thomas Mann 
strongly disagreed with those who insisted on a dividing line between the Hitler-Regime on the 
one hand and the normal German population on the other. After the war, when he was invited to 
return to Germany, Mann famously made clear that he could not support the notion of 'inner 
emigration', e. g. the claim to an uncorrupted core of German tradition ('Deutschland und die 
Deutschen' 
- 
speech to the congress in Washington, May 1945) 
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large that they had always been "inwardly opposed" to the regime. 
The question here is not whether or not they are telling the truth; 
the point is, rather, that no secret in the secret-ridden atmosphere 
of the Hitler regime was better kept than such "inward opposition". 
This was almost a matter of course under the conditions of Nazi 
terror; as a rather well-known "inner emigrant", who certainly 
believed in his own sincerity, once told me, they had to appear 
"outwardly" even more like Nazis than ordinary Germans did, in 
order to keep their secret. 
... 
Hence, the only possible way to live 
in the Third Reich and not to act as a Nazi was not to appear at all. 
... 
In recent years, the slogan of the "inner emigration" has become 
a sort of a joke. The sinister Dr. Otto Bradfisch, former member of 
the Einsatzgruppen, who presided over the killing of at least fifteen 
thousand people, told a German court that he had always been 
"inwardly opposed" to what he was doing. Perhaps the death of 
fifteen thousand people was necessary to provide him with an alibi 
in the eyes of the "true Nazis. 333 
Although the collective of all Germans might be guilty, the individual most 
certainly never seems to be. What good is a collective feeling of shame if the 
individual is completely free of it? Hannah Arendt mentions certain key reactions 
of the Germans to the re-surfacing of their past, to the confrontation with their 
immediate past: 
There is no doubt that the Eichmann trial had its most far-reaching 
consequences in Germany. The attitude of the German people 
towards their past, which all experts on the German question had 
puzzled over for fifteen years, could hardly have been more clearly 
demonstrated: they themselves did not much care one way or the 
other, and did not particularly mind the presence of murderers at 
large in the country, since none of them were likely to commit 
murder of their own free will; however, if world opinion 
- 
or rather, 
what the Germans call das Ausland, collecting all countries outside 
Germany into a singular noun 
- 
became obstinate and demanded 
that these people be punished, they were perfectly willing to oblige, 
at least up to a point. 334 
333 Arendt, Hannah, 1992. Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Penguin), p. 12617 
334 ibid., p. 16/7 
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Germany needed the help from outside to face its own crimes for which 
the entire people then felt the shame (of being discovered? ) but no guilt; to work 
through the deeds or even come to terms with them, was a totally different 
matter 
- 
to say the least, it raises questions of identity 
- 
and which, as we shall 
see, is still very much a process of the present regardless of age or generation. 
Thomas Mann was not prepared to be consoled by the thought of a 
'hidden', 'better' Germany. Instead he assumed the perspective of the collective 
and counts himself as part of the collectively condemned. As we all know, 
history has proven Mann wrong; the (West) Germans did not have to live in 
isolation. In the years of the 'Wirschaftswunder' the Federal Republic soon 
prospered economically. Not only the 'Reparation Treaty' brought the Federal 
Republic the sought-after political integration into the Western system of 
alliance. By assuming general responsibility for the Nazi crimes and by literally 
'paying' for it, the Federal Republic was able to create an aura of exoneration 
and innocence. Meanwhile the recent crimes seemed to disappear into the 
background of an obscured past and history. German Fascism no longer 
needed to be fought against as, soon after the war, the prime enemy of the state 
became Communism. The result of the state's willingness to 'take on the burden 
of the past' was a feeling of collective shame; it is curious to see, however, that 
there never was a collective admission of guilt. The acceptance of responsibility 
thus left its marks on the political self-understanding of the Federal Republic. 
In the above quoted text, Thomas Mann gives a detailed description of 
the political and socio-psychological situation immediately following the war. 
When, in the 1950s, the Nuremberg Trials (amongst others) brought public 
attention to the horrific details of the Nazi Regime, the Germans had to be made 
to look; they had to learn to look again 
- 
in many ways, it was a re-discovery of 
the past that went from one suppression into a new suppression. Perhaps it is 
intrinsic to the event of the Shoah that a confrontation with the horrors will 
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always (regardless of age or generation) result in shock. This, however, cannot 
function as an excuse to forget, or to engage with the horrors and not to place 
the renewed knowledge into a broader framework of understanding. 
In the concluding part of her book `Eichmann in Jerusalem', Hannah 
Arendt harshly comments on the excessive and essentially self-serving 
expression of guilt among the younger generation: 
Martin Buber called the execution a "mistake of historical 
dimension", as it might "serve to expiate the guilt felt by many 
young persons in Germany" 
- 
an argument that oddly echoed 
Eichmann's own ideas on the matter, though Buber hardly knew 
that he wanted to hang himself in public in order to lift the burden 
of guilt from the shoulders of German youngsters. (It is strange that 
Buber, a man not only of eminence but of very great intelligence 
should not see how spurious these much publicised guilt feelings 
necessarily are. It is quite gratifying to feel guilty if you haven't 
done anything wrong: how noble! Whereas it is rather hard and 
certainly depressing to admit guilt and to repent. The youth of 
Germany is surrounded, on all sides and in all walks of life, by men 
in positions of authority and in public office who are very guilty 
indeed but who feel nothing of the sort. The normal reaction to this 
state of affair should be indignation, but indignation would be quite 
risky 
- 
not in danger to life and limb but definitely a handicap in 
career. Those young German men and women who every once in 
a while 
- 
on the occasion of all the Diary of Anne Frank hubbub 
and of the Eichmann trial 
- 
treat us to hysterical outbreaks of guilt 
feelings are not staggering under the burden of the past, their 
father's guilt; rather, they are trying to escape from the pressure of 
very present and actual problems into a cheap sentimentality). 335 
Arendt's observations are intriguing in view of the problematics at stake. 
How, on the other hand, is a generation that, biographically, could not have 
been involved, supposed to come to terms with a past that their parents denied? 
In his essay 'Germany and the Germans', Thomas Mann asserts that it 
was impossible to differentiate the 'good' from the 'evil' Germany because the 
one was inseparably bound to the other. He was convinced that the 'evil' was at 
335 Arendt, Hannah, 1992. Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Penguin), p. 251 
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the same time the 'good', the 'good' Germany gone astray, heading for disaster 
and doomed for destruction: 'A completely undignified power had made 
Germany into a thick-walled chamber of torture'. The Germans could not be 
guilty; 'a power had taken control of them; 'a completely undignified power' had 
made them do all this. Mann manages his ambivalent attitude towards Germany 
by presenting Germany and 'Germanness' as something fraught with the tragic 
and the deeply demonic, by ascribing it to the mythical figure of his 'Doktor 
Faustus'. 
If the Nazi genocide was carried out, as Hannah Arendt suggested in her 
book on Adolf Eichmann, by a morally absolute indifferent sense of duty, then it 
has to be kept in our memories. Thomas Mann never distanced himself from the 
German nation as such; neither did he attempt to justify its actions (which again 
might make him fall under the same category Arendt is describing). For future 
memory 
- 
and in particular for future generations who will have no biographical 
connections and no witnesses to turn to 
- 
it is important to address the question 
of how to surpass this feeling of guilt, the status of being guilty? 
The principle subject of Mann's novel is the musician, Adrian Leverkühn, 
whose lifestory is told by his friend, Serenus Zeitblom. Adrian Leverkühn's 
biography in many ways corresponds to the time of National Socialism in 
Germany and the extermination of European Jewry. Adrian Leverkühn dies 
336 The correspondence of the novel's events with German history has been widely discussed. 
For a thorough examination see R. Wolff (ed. ), 1983. Thomas Manns Dr. Faustus und die 
Wirkung, vol. 1+2 (Bonn); L. Voss, 1975. Die Entstehung von Thomas Manns Roman, Doktor 
Faustus' (Tübingen); V. Hansen (ed. ), 1993. Thomas Mann: Romane und Erzählungen 
(Stuttgart); L. Lambrecht (ed. ), 1994. Geschichtliche Welt und menschliches Wesen: Beiträge 
zum Bedenken der conditio humana in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte (Frankfurt/Berlin); A. 
Stephan & H. Wagner (eds. ), 1985. Schreiben im Exil: Zur Aesthetik der deutschen Exilliteratur 
1933-1945 (Bonn); H. G. Rötzer (ed. ), 1993. themen"texte"interpretationen: der deutsche roman 
nach 1945 (Bamberg); E. Heftrich, P-P. Schneider & H. Wißkirchen (eds. ), 1994. Heinrich und 
Thomas Mann: Ihr Leben und Werk in Text und Bild, Exh. Cat. Heinrich-and-Thomas-Mann- 
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before the genocide begins. Gradually Leverkühn realises that music has 
reached a dead end in his century. His dislike of emotional warmth is exposed in 
his aversion to any music that presents itself as a spontaneous outpouring of 
feeling. However, before he can resolve the crisis of modern art with his 
masterpieces, Adrian Leverkühn must receive an infusion 
- 
something 
corresponding to the 'inspiration' he despises 
- 
from a mysterious, deadly 
source. So Adrian Leverkühn forms a pact with the devil. The terms of the pact 
dictate that Leverkühn's soul is forfeited and that, during his lifetime, he is 
forbidden to love anyone. Leverkühn's equivalent to Faust's pact with the devil is 
his liaison with the prostitute Esmeralda. Disregarding her warnings and well- 
meant threats that she is infected with syphilis, Leverkühn takes his pleasure 
with her. Leverkühn's last love and emotional relationship with the five-year-old 
boy Echo results in a disastrous end, as Echo dies of a terrifying illness. A 
visibly broken man, unable to conceal his disease, Leverkühn composes his last 
and greatest work Dr. Fausti Weheklag (The Lamentation of Dr. Faustus). In 
1930, having invited his friends to listen to extracts from it, Leverkühn delivers a 
personal confession and reveals his diabolic associations. At this point he 
collapses; the last ten years of his life are spent in a state of insanity, and, 
eventually, paralysis. Zeitblom visits him in 1939 
- 
'after the conquest of Poland' 
- 
at which point all traces of his former brilliance have disappeared from Adrian 
Leverkühn. Serenus Zeitblom concludes his narration imploring the Almighty to 
have mercy on his friend and his country: 
Germany, the hectic on her cheek, was reeling then at the height of 
her dissolute triumphs, about to gain the whole world by virtue of 
the one pact she was minded to keep, which she had signed with 
her blood. Today, clung round by demons, a hand over one eye, 
with the other staring into horrors, down she flings from despair to 
Centre/Lübeck (Lübeck); K Hasselbach, 1988. Thomas Mann, Doktor Faustus: Interpretation 
(München); M. Beddow, 1994. Thomas Mann. Doctor Faustus (Cambridge) 
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despair. When will she reach the bottom of the abyss? When, out 
of uttermost hopelessness 
-a miracle beyond the power of belief - 
will the light of hope dawn? A lonely man folds his hands and 
speaks: 'God be merciful to thy poor soul, my friend, my 
Fatherland'. ' 
Adrian Leverkühn's final masterpiece 
- 
art in its absolute form 
- 
addresses the philosophical relation between artistic representation and its 
relation to evil and horror. As Paul Eisenstein suggests, in Leverkühn's creation 
'symbolisation itself is pushed to the brink of horror'. The diabolic association 
and pact allows for the individual perspective to be de-limited; it allows for the 
particular to become universal. Like the population at Buchenwald, Adrian 
Leverkühn reaches the point where he is faced with the choice for eternal 
damnation or mercy. 
'For is it mere hypochondria to say to oneself that everything German 
... 
is involved in this scandalous exposure? Is the sense of guilt quite morbid which 
makes one ask oneself the question how Germany 
... 
can ever presume to open 
her mouth in human affairs? '9 German post-war history 
- 
Germany's rapid 
economic growth, its political stability, its strong integration into the Western 
system of alliance 
- 
has shown that Germany seemed far from eternal 
damnation. Nevertheless, the question of guilt remains problematic for the 
novel's narrator, at stake here for Thomas Mann is the very possibility of mercy 
(or damnation) in the context of a sheer incredible catastrophe that seems to 
shatter the very foundations for such a demand. Serenus Zeitblom's plea for 
mercy for his friend allows him to continue his friendship and admiration (beyond 
Leverkühn's death), a friendship that Leverkühn's association with the devil 
would otherwise have forbidden. Thomas Mann, through his narrator Zeitblom, 
337 Mann, Thomas, 1996. Doctor Faustus (London: Minerva), p. 510 
338 Eisenstein, Paul, 1997. Leverkühn as Witness: The Holocaust in Thomas Mann's 'Doktor 
Faustus'. The German Quarterly, 70,4, p. 327 
s Mann, Thomas, 1996. Doctor Faustus (London: Minerva), p. 481/2 
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joins the population of Buchenwald who are being led through the liberated 
concentration camp. Because he 'never felt as a deserter of Germanness and of 
the German fate', because he needed to retain his love for the very 'culture' he 
embraced, Zeitblom's plea for mercy becomes Mann's plea. 
By associating Leverkühn's life with German National Socialism, Mann 
forms a link between symbolic representation and the real. Leverkühn's final 
work claims totality in the form of a masterpiece. It testifies to the horrors of the 
world and, as such, it attempts the symbolisation of the un-presentable. By 
allowing for the idea of the total, all-inclusive work of art in Adrian Leverkühn's 
masterpiece, Mann recognised the fundamental imbalance and impasse 
between the historical, the real on one side and symbolic re-presentation of it on 
the other. Leverkühn's masterpiece went beyond the limit that prevents a total 
account, that necessitates the proliferation of more narratives of the horrors. The 
particularity of Leverkühn's representation can no longer be measured by what it 
eludes; it demands totality and does not acknowledge the particular. 
For Mann, it was not a question of guilt or blame, not even a question of 
collective guiltiness; Thomas Mann felt the same shame and guilt upon hearing 
about and seeing the atrocities. The "General's" declaration that the German 
population was guilty for the crimes they were now looking at, finds Mann's full 
approval 
- 
and he joins his countrymen from his exile when they are filing past 
the indescribable horrors. Guilt in Mann's Doctor Faustus functions as a unifying 
principle. 
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3. The Question of Guilt: Conscience, Morals and Judgement 
"The notion of collective guilt relates to the idea that, under Hitler, the 
entire German nation became guilty", Aleida Assmann writes: "'Collective guilt' is 
the anti-thesis to the idea of the 'exclusive guilt' of the Führer alone who had 
seized the power in Germany and who had subsequently subjugated the entire 
people with his criminal clique" 340. The search for a definition of 'guilt' in the 
context of the German past ties in with the questions of who was responsible 
and why did they do it. The psycho-analysts, Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich emphasised that 
the murder of a million defencelessly persecuted is composed of 
many culpable decisions and actions of individuals and can thus by 
no means be blamed on the superior, let alone the Führer 
himself. ' 
In 1996 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen renewed that idea of the collective guilt 
of all Germans by indicting the whole German people with a charge of an 
alleged anti-Semitic tradition over centuries; he, however, restricts his 
accusations to the generation in question. Aleida Assmann mentions a `long 
awaited "transformation" after the war that `seems to have happened here 
340 Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: 
Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlangs-Anstalt), p. 8314 
341 Mitscherlich, Alexander und Margarete, 1998. Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen 
kollektiven Verhaltens (München: Piper) 
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paradigmatically: after the generation of collectively guilty Germans, there came 
a post-war generation of collectively non-guilty Germans'. ' 
When Goldhagen was honoured with the 'Prize of Democracy 1997', 
Habermas was asked to give the eulogy. In his speech 'Über den öffentlichen 
Gebrauch der Historie' ('On the public use of Historia') the philosopher explained 
what he thought Goldhagen's real achievement was: 
What part we ascribe to people in historical retrospect, what part to 
circumstances, where we draw the line between freedom and 
constraint, guilt and innocence, also depends on the preconception 
with which we approach the event. The hermeneutical willingness 
to recognise the true extent of responsibility and knowledge varies 
according to our understanding of freedom 
- 
how we assess 
ourselves as responsible people and how much we expect from 
ourselves as politically acting people. With questions of ethical- 
political self-understanding this pre-conception itself is under 
discussion. How we see in historical retrospect guilt and innocence 
ascribed, also mirrors the norm according to which we are willing to 
respect each other as citizens of this republic. 
... 
And here lies 
Goldhagen's true contribution. He does not direct his gaze at 
implied anthropological universalisms, not at conformities to laws 
to which presumptively all people are subjected. Those may, as the 
comparative genocide research claims, explain a part of the 
unutterable. Goldhagen's explanation, however, relates to specific 
traditions and mentalities, to ways of thinking and perceiving of a 
certain cultural context. It does not relate to the unalterable, to 
which we have to resign, but to factors which can be changed 
through a transition of consciousness 
- 
and which have since then 
changed also through the political enlightenment. The 
anthropological pessimism which here in this country is in league 
342 Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: 
Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlangs-Anstalt), p. 301 
footnote 84 
343 The Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik' (Pages for German and International 
Politics), a forum for current and fundamental questions of dispute, awarded the 'Prize of 
Democracy 1997' to Daniel Goldhagen for his book 'Hitlers Willing Executioners' on the grounds 
that Goldhagen 'had given the public conscience of the Republic essential new impulses on the 
basis of the forcefulness and moral power of his presentation'. See Habermas, Jürgen 1997. 
Über den öffentlichen Gebrauch von Historie. Die Zeit No. 12,1997 
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with a fatalistic historicism, is more likely part of the problem whose 
solution it pretends to provide. ' 
To comprehend the event as permanent, diminishes the free man and 
fails to recognise his ability to act and to learn. After the war, political 
enlightenment has transformed the German consciousness so that now in the 
retrospect ascription of guilt and innocence, our conception of freedom becomes 
apparent, according to Habermas. 
The German philosopher and existentialist Karl Jaspers was one of the 
first to face the question of guilt. His book `The Question of Guilt: On the Political 
344 Welche Anteile wir im historischen Rückblick den Personen, weich den Umständen 
zuschreiben, wo wir die Grenzen zwischen Freiheit und Zwang, Schuld and Entschuldigung 
ziehen, hängt auch von einem Vorverständnis ab, mit dem wir an das Geschehen herantreten. 
Die hermeneutische Bereitschaft, den wahren Umfang von Verantwortung und Mitwissen 
anzuerkennen, variiert mit unserem Verständnis von Freiheit 
- 
wie wir uns als verantwortliche 
Personen einschätzen und wie viel wir uns selbst als politisch Handelnden zumuten. Mit Fragen 
der ethisch-politischen Selbstverständigung steht diese Vorverständnis selbst zur Diskussion. 
Wie wir Schuld und Unschuld im historischen Rückblick verteilt sehen, spiegelt auch die 
Normen, nach denen wir uns gegenseitig als Bürger dieser Republik zu achten willens sind.... 
Hier sehe ich Goldagens eigentliches Verdienst. Er richtet den Blick nicht auf unterstellte 
anthropologische Universalien, nicht auf Gesetzmäßigkeiten, denen präsumtiv alle Menschen 
unterworfen sind. Die mögen, wie die vergleichende Genozidforschung behauptet, auch einen 
Teil des Unsäglichen erklären. Goldhagens Erklärung bezieht sich jedoch auf spezifische 
Überlieferungen und Mentalitäten, auf Denk- und Wahmehmungsweisen eines bestimmten 
kulturellen Kontextes. Sie bezieht sich nicht auf ein Unveränderliches, in das wir uns zu schicken 
haben, sondern auf Faktoren, die durch einen Bewußtseinswandel verändert werden können 
- 
und die sich inzwischen auch durch politische Aufklärung verändert haben. Der 
anthropologische Pessimismus, der hierzulande mit einem fatalistischen Historismus im Bunde 
steht, ist eher Teil des Problems, dessen Lösung er zu liefem vorgibt. ' Habermas, Jürgen 1997. 
Über den öffentlichen Gebrauch von Historie. Die Zeit No. 12,1997 
345 Jaspers, who studied medicine and trained in psychiatry and pathology, became professor for 
psychiatry at the University of Heidelberg in 1916 and, from 1921 onwards, was Professor of 
Philosophy until he was removed from his post by the Nazis in 1937. Despite his open criticism 
of National Socialist ideology and his wife's Jewish descent, they remained in Nazi Germany. In 
1945, he was reinstated in his post as Professor of Philosophy in Heidelberg. 
203 
Liability of Germany was first published in 1946. It is an unsparing attempt to 
think through the issues at stake: horror and shame transform into helplessness, 
silence and anger. It is possibly the first answer to the idea of a collective 
German guilt. Jaspers differentiated between four concepts of guilt: criminal, 
political, moral and metaphysical guilt. For Jaspers, these distinctions are based 
on the extent of one's participation. Each of Jasper's four categories require 
complete and utter truthfulness before the respective 'courts': a legitimate court 
(as, for example, set up by the Allies), one's own conscience, and God. 
The individual is liable for any criminal guilt, for any violation of the law of 
his country or international laws' and can be held responsible before a court of 
approved jurisdiction. Moral and metaphysical guilt assume the loneliness, 
freedom and complete truthfulness of the individual. Moral guilt demands an 
examination of one's own conscience and asks that before one's own 
conscience one must bear responsibility of one's own deed. Morally guilty 
people should seek repentance and aim for the transformation of inner 
convictions. This conscience demands that one faces these responsibilities if 
one's past is indeed burdened with moral guilt. Metaphysical guilt is related to 
God. Guilt in the metaphysical sense, Jaspers explains, arises from a status of 
'solidarity among men as human beings' where each needs to accept a 'co- 
responsibility' for `every wrong and every injustice in the world'. lt is the guilt, 
Jaspers asserts, that the survivors often feel for having survived, a responsibility 
towards those who did not survive, those who suffered and died. It is also the 
3as This is my translation of the German title 
- 
Jaspers, Karl, 1996. Die Schuldfrage: Von der 
politischen Haftung Deutschlands (Munchen: Piper). In English the book is published under the 
title 
- 
Jaspers, Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press) 
34' Jaspers argued that Eichmann should not be tried in Israel but should be put before an 
international tribunal since the Nazi murders were crimes against humanity. 
348 Jaspers, Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 
26 
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feeling of guilt that the innocent bears for having been present or having known 
about the deed committed. It is the feeling of co-responsibility for having been 
an on-looker 
- 
for having chosen not to act. 
Jaspers' differentiation into political and metaphysical guilt to me remain 
crucially important for the issues at stake 
- 
for the question of remembering the 
National Socialist past for generations that will have no biographical connection. 
Political guilt exists as the collective responsibility of all citizens for the crimes 
that were committed in the name of their state. It applies to the citizens of the 
modem state where no individual can be a-political. One does not assume the 
status of being guilty as an individual but as the collective of a nation 
- 
and that 
includes co-responsibility. It deals with the question of participation in matters of 
the state (e. g. elections already make you responsible because one has the 
choice of whether to vote and what to vote for). Punishments that follow political 
guilt could come in the form of restricted political powers, the imposition of 
reparations, de-Nazification or compensation, and are to be carried by the entire 
nation. 
Jaspers insists on nobody being excluded from the clarification of the 
question of guilt; only then can the Germans free themselves from the status of 
'political dictatorship' and reach 'political freedom': 
for only consciousness of guilt leads to the consciousness of 
solidarity and co-responsibility without which there can be no 
liberty. Political liberty begins with the majority of individuals in a 
people feeling jointly liable for the politics of their community. It 
begins when the individual not merely covets and chides, when he 
demands of himself, rather, to see reality and not to act upon faith 
- 
misplaced in politics 
- 
in an earthly paradise failing of realisation 
only because of the others' stupidity and ill-will. 
349 Jaspers, Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 
114/5 
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Jaspers has made clear that we indeed have to work with the concept of 
'co-responsibility'. Jasper's differentiation of the guilt concept allows for a status 
of collective responsibility that does not speak the entity of all Germans 
universally guilty. With regard to the question of guilt it is not the national status 
that binds and units the Germans but their liability and responsibility as citizens 
for the crimes that have been committed in history: 
The destruction of any decent, truthful German polity must have its 
roots also in modes of conduct of the majority of the German 
people. A people answer for its polity. Every German is made to 
share the blame for the crimes committed by the Reich. We are 
collectively liable. The question is in what sense each of us must 
feel co-responsible. "0 
By introducing the term of political guilt, Jaspers substitutes the concept 
of collective guilt through collective responsibility. At the same time Jaspers asks 
us to remember that there is no a-political area for a citizen in a state. He further 
reminds us not to treat the concepts of guilt as non-committal issues but to 
accept the collective political guilt also individually. But 
- 
and this is the crucial 
dilemma 
- 
the Germans needed to accept their liability and responsibility not 
because of pressure from outside but because of an inner willingness. 
Chapter B of Jasper's 'Die Schuldfrage' is subtitled 'The German 
Questions'. Here Jaspers embarks on the questions and experiences that have 
led him to consider the problematics of posing the very question of guilt: 
The guilt question received its universal impact from the charges 
brought against us Germans by the victors and the world. In the 
summer of 1945, when in all towns and villages the posters hung 
with the pictures and stories from Belsen and the crucial statement, 
"You are the guilty! ", conscience grew uneasy, horror gripped 
many who had indeed not known this, and something rebelled: 
who indicts me there? No signature, no authority 
- 
the poster came 
350 ibid., p. 55 
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as though from empty space. It is only human that the accused, 
whether justly or unjustly charged, tries to defend himself. 
... 
This 
time the war-guilt question, in the foreground after 1918, is very 
clear. The war was unleashed by Hitler Germany. Germany is 
guilty of the war through its regime, which started the war at its 
own chosen moment, while none of the rest wanted it. Today, 
however, You are the guilty" means much more than war guilt. 
That poster has by now been almost forgotten. But what we learnt 
from it has remained: first, the reality of a world opinion which 
condemns us as a nation 
- 
and second, our own concern. "' 
After years of looking-away, of 'ignoring' what went on around them, the 
Germans were now abruptly forced to observe and to look 
- 
thus Germany's 
guilt and shame were presented to the entire world. With the posters the Allies 
aimed and hoped to implement a collective memory of guilt and remorse. If, 
however, they were intended for a speedy and complete transformation of 
(German) identity, Jaspers' account proves their intentionality wrong. The 
Germans did not see the crimes committed, the horrors of the Shoah, as part of 
their own life experience; instead they were understood and remembered 
351 Die Schuldfrage hat ihre Wucht bekommen durch die Anklage seitens der Sieger und der 
gesamten Welt gegen uns Deutsche. Als im Sommer 1945 die Plakate in den Städten und 
Dörfern hingen mit den Bildern und Berichten aus Belsen und dem entscheidenden Satz: Das ist 
eure Schuld!, da bemächtigte sich eine Unruhe der Gewissen, da erfasste ein Entsetzen viele, 
die das in der Tat nicht gewusst hatten, und da bäumte sich etwas auf: Wer klagt mich an? 
Keine Unterschrift, keine Behörde, das Plakat kam wie aus dem leeren Raum. 
... 
Die 
Kriegsschuldfrage ist diesmal klar. Der Krieg ist durch Hitlerdeutschland entfesselt worden. 
Deutschland hat die Kriegsschuld durch sein Regime, das in dem von ihm gewählten Augenblick 
den Krieg angefangen hat, während alle anderen nicht wollten. Das ist eure Schuld! " besagt 
aber heute viel mehr als Kriegsschuld. Jenes Plakat ist schon vergessen. Was dort von uns 
erfahren wurde, ist jedoch geblieben: erstens die Realität einer Weltmeinung, die uns als 
gesamtes Volk verurteilt 
- 
und zweitens die eigenen Betroffenheit. ' Jaspers, Karl, 1996. Die 
Schuldfrage: Von der politischen Haftung Deutschlands (München: Piper), p. 29130; Jaspers, 
Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 41/2 
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independently as 'artificial memories', as Aleida Assmann points out352. She then 
continues that 'in retrospect one agrees that the therapy had not led to a 
spontaneous healing'. 'Healing' is a difficult concept within the attempts of 
working-through and coming-to-terms in post-war Germany. Aleida Assmann 
explains that the 'shock-therapy' of confronting the Germans with their guilt did 
not have the expected and hoped-for effect of a guilty conscience, which might 
have led the Germans to a 'new' and thus 'better' German identity. She notes 
that the 'wounds' the Germans suffer from are not the wounds of a guilty 
conscience. These psychological wounds that would not heal to bring the 
longed-for transformation are the distress of a shameful conscience and they 
are still very much open, as we have seen in Martin Walser's reaction. It is 
precisely this momentum of shameful distress that blocks itself from a possible 
transformation, from a genuine working-through and coming-to-terms. It is this 
momentum that Aleida Assmann calls the German 'trauma 3354 
. 
The transition from the Nazi German to post-war German society seems 
to be explicable only as an 'abrupt shift: Goldhagen speaks of a guilty 
generation of Germans that suddenly is followed by an innocent generation. 
Jaspers and Mann describe a powerful, omnipotent Germany that at of a sudden 
is confronted its own powerlessness. Over 'the world opinion that accuses the 
entire nation' the nation bonds anew; not on the grounds of a positive self- 
attitude, however, but as a collective of perpetrators united in a communal guilt. 
For Thomas Mann the new German identity could only be based in a collective 
352 Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: 
Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 
GmbH), p. 126 
3 im Rückblick ist man sich heute einig, daß die Therapie nicht zu einer Spontanheilung 
geführt hat. ' ibid., p. 126 
354 ibid., p. 126. At this point, it is probably also worth noting that neither Margarete and 
Alexander Mitscherlich nor Martin Walser ever speak of 'trauma'. 
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feeling of shame. Jaspers on the other hand writes against a form of a collective 
identity based in the traumatic experience of shame. In his philosophical 
reasoning Jaspers argues for a highly differentiated concept of guilt. Guilt is 
there but it can not function as a unifying principle. Jaspers knew that the scene 
Mann is describing would lead to the collective experience of shame and 
humiliation which, in turn, would prevent any honest attempts of addressing the 
issues. Jaspers is adamant that 'to hold liable does not mean to hold morally 
guilty' but he insists that ` every German asks himself: how am I guilty? '. 
The reality of Walser's speech has proven Jaspers right: 'That poster has 
by now been almost forgotten. But what we learnt from it has remained. ' 
- 
and it 
remains to this day. What is at stake here, according to Assmann, is the problem 
of the paradox linking `forgetting' and 'remembering' that forms the experience of 
a trauma. 
My interpretation of the recent events is informed by the socio- 
philosophical writings of the last century. I cannot speak with the knowledge of a 
psychologist but I struggle to find a plausible answer to this paradox: the Allies 
made the Germans look at the crimes and horrors committed by them and in 
their nation's name. As Karl Jaspers warned in 1946 and Aleida Assmann points 
out, this 'therapy' was hardly successful because the Germans failed to make 
the connection between their own private biographical experiences and the 
pictures they were presented with. As a result, vehement repulsion put a stop to 
any attempts of working-through or even coming-to-terms with the ambivalence 
of self-experience and actual past events. 
355 Jaspers, Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 
55 + 57 
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4. Mourning and History 
- 
Memory and Melancholy: `The 
Inability to Mourn' 
In their book 'The Inability to Mourn', first published in 1967, two years 
after the Auschwitz Trial in Frankfurt (December 1963 to August 1965), 
Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich concern themselves with the 
phenomenon of suppression within the society of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Their socio-psychological research was targeted at a German 
collective psyche; their observations of a collective rejection of guilt were the 
starting-point for their contemplations of a 'working-through' the past. In their 
view there was a determined connection between the prevailing political and 
social immobility and provincialism on the one hand and the persistent repulsion 
and fending off of memory on the other, in particular the banning of an emotional 
participation in the very events of the past that were now denied. They 
diagnosed a collective neurosis, which derived from subconscious and 
suppressed wishes. They connected the inability to mourn to a not-worked- 
through libidinal attachment to Hitler, which, after the capitulation, had led to a 
psychological numbness. Consequently, the Mitscherlichs explained the inability 
to mourn the loss of the 'beloved' Führer Adolf Hitler as the morbid pathological 
state of melancholy: 
When mourning a lost object, we try to emulate also the ideals of 
the person that was taken from us. Only slowly, with the end of the 
process of grieving, are new powers for object occupation, new 
identifications, new attentions of love and interests released. It is 
different though for a mourning if the object was loved on a 
narcissistic basis. Their loss is always associated with a loss of 
self-esteem. The loss of the object causes a psychological loss of 
energy; it leads to a "grandiose impoverishment of the ego". Within 
this mourning of a lost object there is no pain, but rather grief over 
356 Mitscherlich, Alexander und Margarete, 1998. Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen 
kollektiven Verhaltens (München: Piper) 
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oneself and a distinctive ambivalence of feeling towards the self- 
hatred of melancholy. But the pain is always characterised as one 
that does not mean the end of a relationship, but one that concerns 
the partial loss of the self as if it was amputated. The lament of 
mourning over the lost object is opposed by a melancholic self- 
accusation. The self-tearing apart of melancholy is in its essence 
an accusation of the object which has afflicted such a loss on its 
own 317 
Through their writings and therapeutical attempts the Mitscherlichs hoped 
to make the necessity to mourn and to remember more accessible to a society 
that was marked to maintain its self-esteem through a communal psychological 
strain and effort. 
In his essay `Mourning and Melancholia', published in 1917, Sigmund 
Freud sets out to explain how mourning happens within the subject and how it 
tries to be different from melancholy. It is his explanation of structure and cause 
of melancholy that was of interest to the Mitscherlichs. Freud delivers a 
description of mourning in order to explain the normal behaviour, only to 
357 in der Trauer um ein verlorenes Objekt versuchen wir, auch den Idealen des Menschen, der 
uns genommen wurde, nachzueifern. Erst langsam, mit dem Ende der Trauerarbeit, werden 
Kräfte für neue Objektbesetzungen, neue Identifizierungen, neue Liebes- und 
Interessenszuwendungen frei. Anders in der Trauer, wenn das Objekt auf narzißtischer Basis 
geliebt wurde. Mit seinem Verlust ist stets ein Verlust an Selbstwert verbunden. Der 
Objektverlust bewirkt einen psychischen Energieverlust, führt zu einer 
großartigen Ich- 
Verarmung". Es kommt nicht zum Schmerz in der Trauer um das verlorene Objekt, sondern zur 
Trauer über einen selbst und in der Verbindung mit ausgeprägter Gefühlsambivalenz zum 
Selbsthaß der Melancholie. Immer aber ist der Schmerz dadurch charakterisiert, daß er nicht 
das Ende der Beziehung meint, sondern daß er einen Teilverlust des Selbst betrifft, als sei es 
amputiert worden. Der Trauerklage um das verlorene Objekt steht die melancholische 
Selbstanklage gegenüber. Die Selbstzerfleischung der Melancholie ist im Grunde eine Anklage 
gegen das Objekt, das dem eigenen Selbst einen solchen Verlust zugefügt hat. ' Mitscherlich, 
Alexander und Margarete, 1998. Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens 
(München: Piper), p. 7819 
358 Freud, Sigmund, 2001. On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on 
Metapsychology and Other Works. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, 
vol. XIV (London: Vintage) 
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differentiate it from the neurotic. Mourning, accordingly, is a feeling that is 
unavoidable and therefore necessary. We can be working with that feeling, we 
can work through it: 
Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or 
to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, 
such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on. 
He then continues to differentiate the normal, universal condition of mourning 
from that which he calls melancholy: 
In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead 
of mourning and we consequently suspect them of a pathological 
disposition. It is also well worth notice that, although mourning 
involves grave departures from the normal attitude to life, it never 
occurs to us to regard it as a pathological condition and to refer it 
to medical treatment. We rely on its being overcome after a certain 
lapse of time, and we look upon any interference with it as useless 
or even harmful. 0 
Not only is mourning the usual reaction to the death of the beloved 
person, more so it is the necessary reaction; the lack of mourning might thus be 
explained as the morbid state of melancholy: 
The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly 
painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of 
the capacity of love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the 
self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self- 
reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional 
expectation of punishment. ' 
359 Freud, Sigmund, 2001. 'Mourning and Melancholia'. The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works, vol. XIV (London: Vintage), p. 243 
0 Freud, Sigmund, 2001. 'Mourning and Melancholia'. The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works, vol. XIV (London: Vintage), p. 243/4 
361 ibid., p. 244 
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Freud continues to explain, that mourning has the same characteristics as 
melancholy, with the exception that `the disturbance of self-regard is absent in 
mourning"'. Mourning is caused by the loss of a beloved person or something 
that had taken his place; in a certain way, mourning thematises our relation to 
the lost object. The mournful self has to process and work through the loss; 
through such a relation to the loss the mournful self addresses and works 
through itself. Freud asserts that within the melancholic the "impoverishment of 
the ego" takes place: 
In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in 
melancholia it is the ego itself. 
Freud defines a concept of mourning in the cultural context wherefrom he 
then differentiate the concept of depression. Detlef Hoffmann claims that, for 
that reason, 'many cultures have provided rituals for the mournful which allow for 
seclusion yet prevent lapses into depression'. 
A process of mourning is necessary so that we can dissolve the energies 
of attachment, necessitate the withdrawal of the libido from the object and give 
time for self-rearrangement; all these are painful processes because losing 
somebody is painful. On the question of mourning within history, the concept of 
mourning in psychoanalysis serves as an important paradigm because Freud's 
concept of the 'process of mourning' has shaped later approaches and 
describes the active psychological effort of a successful process of mourning. 
His description of the process of mourning bears valuable insight for our 
analysis of the German mourning process: 
362 ibid., p. 244 
363 ibid., p. 246 
364 Hoffmann, Detlef, 2001. Bilder der Trauer 
- 
Bilder des Traumas. Liebsch, Burkhard & Rüsen, 
Jörn (eds. ), 2001. Trauer und Geschichte (Köln: Böhlau Verlag), 206 
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In what, now, does the work which mourning performs consist? I 
do not think there is anything far-fetched in presenting it in the 
following way. Reality-testing has shown that the loved object no 
longer exists, and it proceeds to demand that all libido shall be 
withdrawn from its attachment to that object. This demand arouses 
understandable opposition 
- 
it is a matter of general observation 
that people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, 
indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning them. This 
opposition can be so intense that a turning away from reality takes 
place and a clinging to the object through the medium of 
hallucinatory wishful psychosis. Normally, respect for reality gains 
the day. Nevertheless its orders cannot be obeyed at once. They 
are carried out bit by bit, at great expense of time and cathectic 
energy, and in the meantime the existence of the lost object is 
psychically prolonged. Each single one of the memories and 
expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought up 
and hypercathected, and detachment of the libido is accomplished 
in respect of it. Why this compromise by which the command of 
reality is carried out piecemeal should be so extraordinarily painful 
is not at all easy to explain in terms of economics. It is remarkable 
that this painful unpleasure is taken as a matter of course by us. 
The fact is, however, that when the work of mourning is completed 
the ego becomes free and uninhibited again. ' 
Freud refers to the principle of or respect for reality as the basis of every 
mourning. Not only does separation in its most extreme form of death need to be 
recognised, the mourner has to accept the loss despite the immense pain 
suffered. This process 'physically prolongs the existence of the lost object'. ' 
How do we then encounter the paradox of the German remembrance 
process? How can we reaffirm the past, yet at the same time relieve it of all 
powers? Mourning in psychoanalytical terms allows us to look at an important 
model for mourning within the conscience of history. Important here is the 
historio-philosophical notion that the process of mourning gives back to the past 
a future, e. g. it leads from a fixation onto the past into a future opening. Mournful 
remembrance of traumatic events could be understood as dealing with the pure 
365 ibid., p. 244/5 
366 ibid., p. 245 
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facts of the past. On the other hand, the remembering-mourning process could 
orientate itself towards the ambiguities of the past. The latter form produces a 
creative remembering process of mourning; in retrospect potential meanings of 
subliminal alternatives could be tracked down, which were present 
- 
if only 
latently 
- 
in the past. 
How do we relate the dead who have had no mourners for over fifty 
years? How do we approach the history of remembrance in Germany that, like 
historicism, took into account all and everybody but denied any form of 
interpretative concentration? The past event of the Shoah, the Third Reich, its 
ideology and politics, is still and always will be a 'black hole', there will always be 
'some things which have yet to be said'. ' Yet this 'black hole' is the reason for 
the continuous stream of on-lookers, for their attention and interpretation. It 
seems that incredible detail of what went on inside this 'black hole'. is recorded 
and 'known' today (from the historian's viewpoint). Nevertheless, it is with much 
difficulty that the great love of one's fatherland can be seen as compatible with 
the chaos of these recorded phenomena. Mourning seems to be rendered 
obsolete. The realistic view is no longer aimed at the dead but at the mourners. 
So that memory can be handed down, it not only needs to be 
communicable but it also needs to be stabilized. Stabilization can be achieved 
through storage of material facts but also through forms of practise. Rituals are 
such forms of practise that preserve memory through forms of communication. A 
culture without such rituals is unthinkable. Religious rites, for example, 
especially those regarding death and dying, are often older than written records, 
or the constant change of ways of greetings. All these rituals are pillars of 
support, models of structure which we cannot renounce, and which, however, 
always need to be filled anew with life. 
367 Steyn, Juliet, 1999. The Jew: Assumptions of Identity (London: Cassell), p. 185/6 
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With the risk of stating the obvious, I want to warn against an all too 
simplistic use of the conception of a victim. Victims and perpetrators are not the 
same. Aleida Assmann points out that this is immediately recognisable if one 
considers the counter concept: 'the opposite of a loser is a winner; the opposite 
of a victim is the perpetrator. Every category has got its own specific form of 
remembrance. While a loser participated in actions of war, for the victim there is 
no such premise based on the very principle of reciprocity'. 368 As the reading of 
Mann and Jaspers has made clear, for the Germans the traumatic experience of 
a victim-status created some kind of negative identity. The unwillingness and 
inability to address the past is reflected in the collective memory. The victim's 
memory has a lot in common with the loser's memory, Aleida Assmann writes. 
Karl Jaspers feared that the German attempt to address the issues at stake 
would be marked by resentment and hostility, that guilt and shame would be 
covered by silence. The remembering process is Germany is a long and 
complex one, never stable and continuous; it erupts at unforeseeable moments. 
For the perpetrators it is easier and more comfortable to fend-off and repulse 
any memory. The process of active suppression and wilful forgetting results in 
the phenomenon that we hardly have any perpetrator memory whereas there 
are numerous examples for remembrances of victims. It is difficult to remember 
one's own guilt but it is essential so `that the murderer might not be triumphant 
over the innocent victim'9. 
The longing to draw the bottom line, and the urge to forget, have been 
unfolded in detail by the Mitscherlichs. They drew our attention to the conflict 
between the victim's and the perpetrator's memory, and to the striking 
368 Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: 
Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 
GmbH), p. 44 
369 Horkheimer, Max, 1970. Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag), 
p. 62 
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discrepancy between the two. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich remind us 
that it is an illusion to believe that guilt can historically be eliminated through 
denial: 
The hope that the post-war period may be brought to an end, 
which has been expressed repeatedly by leading German 
politicians, must prove a fallacy, for the very reason that we alone 
do not decide when it is sufficient to draw conclusions from a past 
which has exterminated the lives and lucks of such a huge number 
of people. Supporters of the illness theory of a dictatorship are 
quickly ready with a parting from that which lies behind us. There 
exists, however, a world wide public that by no means has 
forgotten or is prepared to forget what happened during the Third 
Reich in Germany. We had the opportunity to see that it was only 
the pressure of opinion from outside Germany that forced us to 
conduct juridical proceedings against Nazi perpetrators, to extend 
the limitation period or to reconstruct the sequence of mass crimes. 
Because of this difference between our own limited ability to 
remember and the, by no means, paralysed [ability to remember] 
of our former enemies and victims are we forced to keep up our 
psychological defence position under continuous expenditure of 
energy. 3'o 
370 Die Hoffnung, die Nachkriegszeit sei abgeschlossen, was wiederholt von führenden 
deutschen Politikern geäußert wurde, muß sich deshalb als Irrtum erweisen, weil nicht wir alleine 
bestimmen, wann es genug ist, Folgerungen aus einer Vergangenheit zu ziehen, die Leben und 
Glück einer so großen Zahl von Menschen vernichtet hat. Die Anhänger der Krankheitstheorie 
der Diktatur sind da rasch mit einem Abschied von dem, was hinter uns liegt, bei der Hand. Es 
besteht jedoch eine Weltöffentlichkeit, die keineswegs das, was im Dritten Reich sich 
zugetragen hat, vergessen hat noch zu vergessen bereit ist. Wir hatten Gelegenheit zu 
beobachten, wie es nur der Druck der Meinung außerhalb Deutschlands war, der uns zwang, 
Rechtsverfahren gegen Nazitäter durchzuführen, die Verjährungsfrist zu verlängern oder den 
Hergang von Massenverbrechen zu rekonstruieren. Wegen dieser Differenz zwischen unserer 
eigenen eingeschränkten Erinnerungsfähigkeit und der keineswegs behinderten unserer 
ehemaligen Kriegsgegner und Opfer sind wir gezwungen, unsere psychischen Abwehrpositionen 
unter fortwährendem Energieaufwand aufrechtzuerhalten. ' Mitscherlich, Alexander und 
Margarete, 1998. Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens (München: 
Piper), p. 4112 
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Post-war German attempts to work trough and to come to terms were 
rendered impossible by a collective silence and suppression. The perpetrator's 
attempts at remembering can hardly fall back onto public rituals and symbols. 
Aleida Assmann points to the ambivalence of the German word 'Opfer which 
incorporates both concepts of 'sacrifice' and 'victim'. The own personal 
experiences of war and destruction could not be reconciled with the traumatic 
experiences and remembrances of the concentration camp victims. In his 
'Minima Moralia', Adorno writes, 'wrong life cannot be lived rightly'37. In my 
understanding, the still-prevailing problem of the German remembrance process 
is the inability to differentiate the honorary loser's memory from the traumatic 
memory of the perpetrators. 
Walter Benjamin has given us a picture of historical mourning in the form 
of an allegory; it is his Angel of History from the theses 'On the Concept of 
History'. The Angel flies against time, carried by the wish to heal history, to pace 
together the debris and to waken the dead. The Angel throws himself against 
the storm of progress and thus opens the continuum of history because, for him, 
the work of the past is not closed. 
37 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Minima Moralia (London: Verso) 
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5. Thematising more recent Problems of Coming-to-Terms: 
Martin Walser and the Quest for Identity and Normality 
Why do we assume that there is such a thing as identity, let alone 
national identity? Why do we take for granted that there is an identity that 
persists over time, that can be defined, that is independent of changes in 
attitude and appearances? The discussions around the German question of 
identity now are unique in so far as they involve a double history of coming-to- 
terms with the Nazi regime and 
- 
as a direct result of that 
-a coming-to-terms 
with a post-war division into two states and now the re-unification of the two 
states. How else could one explain the vehement debates on the 'German 
character and 'German identity' in post-war Germany? The debates have 
shown that, in view of the NS crimes, any notion of national German identity has 
proven and will prove to be problematic. In Thomas Mann's 'Doktor Faustus' the 
very attributes and qualities of 'Germanness', as manifested in the heroes' art, 
become a question of ontology. 
Each German state began to establish its own new identity; for both 
states it was politically important to clearly mark a new beginning by opposing 
the mutual past and by positioning the own political identity in strict opposition to 
the other state and thus political order. Because of its integration into the 
Eastern hemisphere the German Democratic Republic (East) defined its new 
nationalistic role in terms of a 'socialist state of workers and farmers'. Naturally, 
it considered itself the real 'anti-fascist state'. The Federal Republic of Germany 
(West) struggled to define its national identity in view of the past. In many ways, 
I suppose, the Federal Republic's political situation allowed for the possibility of 
addressing any notion of national identity. In the West the new constitution was 
highly regarded (Habermas); yet even after the opening of the 'Ostpolitik' and 
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formal recognition of the GDR, the Federal government continued to promote its 
vision of two states within one German nation. In her book 'German National 
Identity after the Holocaust' Mary Fuibrook claims that 'the Germans on both 
sides of the wall had a strong sense of who they were: who was included, who 
excluded', that it was a 'curious combination of perpetual penance and a sense 
of superiority 
- 
of constant self-consciousness in the eyes of each other and the 
world', that they wanted 'to carry the burden of the past alone'. 372 
From mid October 1998,10 years after the reunification, Germany's 
major newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations discussed the possibilities 
and impossibilities of public(ly imposed) memory at length. At the turn of the 
century/millenium, the Germany turned back to their past. The Walser-Bubis 
debate, provoked by Walser's speech for the 'Peace Prize of the German Book 
Trade', forms part of a German history of memory, which seems to be erupting 
with more or less regularity. In Western post-war attempts of working-through 
and coming-to-terms many memorials and other commemorative places 
(Gedenkstätten) and public institutions were established in order to promote and 
aid continuous historical research and the work of remembrance. With the event 
of Walser's speech on 11 October 1998 public excitement surrounding the 
history of memory and remembrance found a new. 
Martin Walser and Ignatz Bubis are both witness to the history and its 
memory that came to be discussed yet again. The enormous media coverage of 
their debate reached a wide German audience. Towards the end of the year 
1998, interest in the debate subsided. The Historian's Dispute of 1986 was a 
major scholarly debate whereas in 1998 two private individuals openly 
discussed the problematics of memory. Yet due to their individual biographical 
positions their memories were diametrically opposed. The author Martin Walser 
372 Fulbrook, Mary, 1999. German National Identity after the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity 
Press), p. 179 
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is a prominent representative of the German generation of perpetrators; Ignatz 
Bubis was a survivor of the Shoah in which he had lost the major part of his 
family. Both expressed their personal experiences and memories; even after 
more than fifty years and given their absolutely incompatible experiences, their 
dispute was fierce. Not for long can such voices be heard. Ignatz Bubis' death 
shortly afterwards made his voice fall silent thus, as Aleida Assmann asserts, 
lending 'the character of legacy to his intervention in the debate'373. To this 
generation also belonged the majority of those who intervened in the dispute 
and took part in the discussions, for example Klaus von Dohnanyi from a family 
of famous members of the resistance, and Walter Jens, professor of rhetoric at 
the University of Tubingen. 
The huge resonance and public interest in the debate further points to the 
fact that the two individuals were addressing and expressing issues that still 
need to be answered. My generation, and possibly the generation of my parents, 
no longer speak from the fund of personal experiences and memories, but rely 
on a fund of knowledge and ideas that have been communicated. The 
experiences and thus the positions of victims and non-victim of the National 
Socialist State in the memory debate are in stark contrast. 
The debate set into motion by Martin Walser's speech in October 1998 
was nothing less than a debate about the possibilities and impossibilities of 
public memory. Apparently, for Walser, it was not easy to interfere in questions 
of conscience and at the same time avoid the impression that one considered 
oneself better than those one was criticising. He simply 'cannot' believe those 
'pain-creating sentences' of the radical critics because they are meant to 'hurt', 
and the critics think it is what 'we' (the Germans, according to Walser) deserve. 
373 Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute, 1999. Geschichtsvergessenheit 
- 
Geschichtsversessenheit: 
Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 
GmbH), p. 23 
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All this also applies to the German memory of the Shoah, when Walser claims 
that 
no man who is to be taken seriously denies Auschwitz; no man 
with a sound mind quibbles about the horrifyingness of Auschwitz; 
when, however, I am confronted with this past in the media on a 
daily basis, I notice that within me something fights against this 
permanent presentation of our shame. Instead of being grateful for 
the constant presentation of our shame I begin to look away. I want 
to understand why the past is presented in this decade as never 
before. When I notice that something within me fights against this, I 
try to tap the reproach of our shame for a motive, and I am nearly 
glad when I believe that I have discovered that more frequently the 
motive no longer is remembrance, the not-permitting-to-forget, but 
the instrumentalisation of our shame to contemporary purposes. 374 
Walser claims to be happy when he believes he has discovered that the 
attempt to remember is no longer of predominant importance but that 'our 
shame' becomes instrumentalised for immediate purposes. In Walser's 
understanding, 'Auschwitz' is particularly ill-suited to play the role that it was 
given by those critics: 
Auschwitz is not suitable to become a threatening routine, to be 
used at any time as a medium of intimidation or a moral club or 
only as a ritual exercise. What comes into being through such 
ritualising has the quality of a 'lip prayer' (empty talk). But what is 
374 Kein ernstzunehmender Mensch leugnet Auschwitz; kein noch zurechnungsfähiger Mensch 
deutelt an der Grauenhaftigkeit von Auschwitz herum; wenn mir aber jeden Tag in den Medien 
diese Vergangenheit vorgehalten wird, merke ich, daß sich etwas gegen diese 
Dauerpräsentation unserer Schande wehrt. Anstatt dankbar zu sein für die unaufhörliche 
Präsentation unserer Schande, fange ich an wegzuschauen. Ich möchte verstehen, warum in 
diesem Jahrzehnt die Vergangenheit präsentiert wird wie noch nie zuvor. Wenn ich merke, daß 
sich bei mir etwas dagegen wehrt, versuche ich, die Vorhaltungen unserer Schande auf Motive 
hin abzuhören, und bin fast froh, wenn ich glaube, entdecken zu können, daß öfter nicht mehr 
das Gedenken, das Nichtvergessendürfen das Motiv ist, sondern die Instrumentalisierung 
unserer Schande zu gegenwärtigen Zwecken. ' Walser, Martin, 1998. Erfahrungen beim 
Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede. Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 October 1998 
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one suspected of, if one said the Germans now were a normal 
people, an ordinary society? 375 
Walser wants the old-new Berlin Republic to turn around to face the 
future. Relieved of the burden of such a horrific past, we can dispose of all 
attempts of working-through the still overwhelmingly powerful past. The place 
where all working-through should take place is, according to Walser, the 
individual conscience. Walser demands nothing less than the end of public 
working-through and coming-to-terms with the Shoah in Germany. What, 
however, is normal or normality to Walser in view of the German history? The 
concept of the 'normal' always entails a differentiation from the abnormal, the 
different, the Other. 
In 1979, Walser writes in 'On the Spiritual Situation of the Time': 
a purely worldly, a liberal society that flees the religious and 
generally everything that exceeds the ego, can only suppress 
Auschwitz. Where the ego becomes the predominant, guilt can 
only be suppressed. Absorbing, keeping and bearing one can only 
do together. 376 
The planned 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe' in the centre of 
the capital of the newly united Germany tries the perhaps impossible: by 
375 Auschwitz eignet sich nicht dafür, Drohroutine zu werden, jederzeit einsetzbares 
Einschüchterungsmittel oder Moralkeule oder auch nur Pflichtübung. Was durch solche 
Ritualisierung zustande kommt, ist von der Qualität Lippengebet. Aber in welchen Verdach gerät 
man, wenn man sagt, die Deutschen seien jetzt ein normales Volk, eine gewöhnliche 
Gesellschaft? ' Walser, Martin, 1998. Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede. 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 October 1998 
378 Eine rein weltliche, eine liberale, eine vom religiösen, eine überhaupt von allem Ich- 
Überschreitenden fliehende Gesellschaft kann Auschwitz nur verdrängen. Wo Ich das höchste 
ist, kann man Schuld nur verdrängen. Aufnehmen, behalten und tragen kann man nur 
miteinander. ' Martin Walser, 1979. Zur geistigen Situation der Zeit. Quoted after Brumlik, Micha, 
1999. Vom Alptraum des nationalen Glücks. in Schirrmacher, Frank (ed. ), 1999. Die Walse- 
Bubis-Debatte: Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), p. 49 
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addressing on a different level the possibilities of a (national) memory. Walser's 
determination to get over guilt and conscience far exceeds the individual sphere. 
As Jaspers' definition has made clear, guilt is a concept that works on four 
different levels. If guilt truly was unjustifiably personal and individual, Walser 
(and his generation) cannot be guilty of the crimes of National Socialism. 
However, guilt is not the issue for Walser, he concerns himself with the 'constant 
presentation of our shame'. Walser speaks of the planned memorial as 
the concreting of the centre of the capital with a football-pitch sized 
nightmare. The monumentalisation of shame. " 
In 1965, Walser published an essay on the Auschwitz Trials which he had 
attended to observe; he wrote about a suspicion that the conditions that made 
'Auschwitz' possible were not yet overcome and that humanity could 'hit upon 
the idea' again: 
But if people and state were at all meaningful concepts for the 
political, then everything that happens, is presupposed by this 
collective. Then no deed is any longer subjective. Then Auschwitz 
is a pan-German matter. Then everybody belongs to some part of 
the cause of Auschwitz. 378 
Frank Schirrmacher, who held the eulogy on Walser at the Peace Prize 
ceremony, claims that it is one of the easiest things of the 'talk about Germany' 
377 Die Betonierung des Zentrums der Hauptstadt mit einem fußballfeldgroßen Alptraum. Der 
Monumentalisierung der Schande. ' Walser, Martin, 1998. Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer 
Sonntagsrede. Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 October 1998 
378 Wenn aber Volk und Staat überhaupt noch sinnvolle Bezeichnungen sind für ein Politisches 
... 
dann ist alles, was geschieht, durch diese Kollektive bedingt 
... 
Dann ist keine Tat mehr bloß 
subjektiv. Dann ist Auschwitz eine großdeutsche Sache. Dann gehört jeder zu irgendeinem Teil 
zu der Ursache von Auschwitz. ' Quoted after Schirrmacher, Frank (ed. ), 1999. Die Walse-Bubis- 
Debatte: Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), p. 26 
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to condemn the crimes that the Nazi Regime committed. Germany is re-united, a 
prosperous and powerful nation; yet in its quest for the future it does not dare to 
face the past. Walser is representative of the generation which knows about the 
catastrophe of the Twentieth century century. Schirrmacher believes that only 
`stories can make us understand how misfortune and crime can grow around 
one without one noticing', 
how a landlord's son from Wasserburg could find his identity and 
his language in Hitler's Germany and not know anything of 
dictatorship and democracy, of the extent of the spreading crime, 
of the inexorable decline in ruins, of Federal Republic and GDR. 379 
Schirrmacher claims that to Walser his biographical experience seems 
indeed not compatible with representations of the German past. But that his life 
and biography are in one way or another in a timely connection with Auschwitz 
seems to have no implications for Walser. Walser's lamentation about the 
difficulties to be a German, a conscientious, mindful German of the generation of 
perpetrators can only mean to trivialise the committed crimes. 
The concepts of acknowledging and fending-off, of working-through and 
lack of engagement, of memory and forgetting are laid open in Walser's speech 
and he admitted to a personal impossibility of engaging with the continuous 
problem of the presence of Auschwitz. At his 'Peace Prize' speech Martin 
Walser refused to give a 'Sunday speech' in the form of a 'critical sermon', he 
had no intention of reading the Riot Act. The first 'emotion' he was overcome 
with, when contemplating the content of the speech, was that 
379 Wie ein Wasserburger Gastwirtssohn in Hitlers Deutschland zu seiner Identität und seiner 
Sprache finden konnte und nichts weiß von Diktatur und Demokratie, von dem Ausmaß des 
umgehenden Verbrechens, dem unaufhaltsamen Untergang in Ruinen, von Bundesrepublik und 
DDR 
... 
' Schirrmacher, Frank (ed. ), 1999. Die Waise-Bubis-Debatte: Eine Dokumentation 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), p. 29 
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he would say nice things for 20 or 30 minutes, agreeable things, 
invigorating things, things appropriate to a Peace Prize. For 
example, praising trees that he has become acquainted with over a 
long period of time by watching them unintentionally. To speak 
about trees is no longer a crime, because so many are diseased. 
He could also appear as an expert on sunsets and he could 
express how the sun, when it is setting over the sea, tends to 
appear exaggerated. 25 minutes of nice things 
- 
whether one 
managed to wrest this from or caress it out of language, 25 
minutes or even 30 minutes of nice things, then one would be worn 
out. A Sunday-speaker's desk, St. Paul's Church [in Frankfurt], the 
most public public, media presence, and then something nice! No, 
without any outside help it became clear to the one who was 
chosen for the prize, that that should not be. But when it was 
explicitly said to him that it was expected of him to hold a critical 
Sunday speech, his soul, thirsting for freedom, fought once again 
within him. Of the fact that I would have to defend my pot-pourri of 
nice things, I was aware. At best with confessions as: I close my 
mind to evil in whose remedying I cannot be involved; I had to 
learn to look away; I have several corners of refuge into which my 
view immediately flees when the screen presents the world to me 
as an unbearable one. I should think my reaction was relative. The 
unbearable I do not have to be able to bear. I am also trained in 
the art of thinking something away, of making something not to be 
there. I cannot participate in the disqualification of suppression. 
Freud advises us to substitute condemnation for suppression. But 
as far as I understand, his enlightening work is not directed at the 
behaviour of man as fellow man but at the one who has a shaken, 
compulsive desire (Triebschicksal). I would not make it through the 
day, least the night, without looking away and thinking away. I am 
also not of the opinion that everything has to be atoned for. In a 
world where everything had to be atoned for I could not Iive. 0 
380 Er wird fünfundzwanzig oder gar dreißig Minuten lang nur Schönes sagen, das heißt 
Wohltuendes, Belebendes, Friedenspreismäßiges. Zum Beispiel Bäume rühmen, die er durch 
absichtsloses Anschauen seit langem kennt. Und gleich der Rechtfertigungszwang: Über Bäume 
zu reden ist kein Verbrechen mehr, weil inzwischen so viele von ihnen krank sind. Er könnte 
auch als Sonnenuntergangsexperte auftreten und mitteilen, daß die Sonne, wenn sie am 
Wasser untergeht, zu Übertreibungen neigt. Fünfundzwanzig Minuten Schönes 
- 
selbst wenn du 
das der Sprache abtrotzen oder aus ihr herauszärteln könntest, fünfundzwanzig oder gar dreißig 
Minuten Schönes 
-, 
dann bist du erledigt. Ein Sonntagsrednerpult, Paulskirche, öffentlichste 
Öffentlichkeit, Medienpräsenz, und dann etwas Schönes! Nein, das war dem für den Preis 
Ausgesuchten schon ohne alle Hilfe von außen klargeworden, das durfte nicht sein. Aber als er 
dann so deutlich gesagt kriegte, daß von ihm erwartet werde, die kritische Sonntagsrede zu 
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Walser's speech has made it clear that Jaspers' quest for 'inner 
willingness to accept responsibility' for a political heritage has not, in more than 
fifty years, found its way into the nation's consciousness. Through his writings, 
Jasper hoped to transform an apolitical society into a political culture that is 
characterised by the free acceptance of the individual's responsibility for the 
collective. Walser wants his privacy of thought; he wants to remain alone with 
his conscience. The individual level on which Walser is prepared to confront and 
work through his memory would have, at the most, a partial resemblance to 
Jaspers' concept of moral guilt. It is Jaspers' demand to work through the guilt- 
ridden past on an individual level, and at the same time, to be more than aware 
of its collective implications - it is precisely the momentum of reaching beyond 
the individual that Walser underestimated when he addressed his audience. 
So where is Walser's conscience? Given Jaspers' definition it is not 
enough to postulate that 'no serious human being denies Auschwitz', or that 'no 
sound mind would quibble about the horrors of Auschwitz', or that no-one would 
wish to evade the problem of the continuing presence of Auschwitz by attacking 
those who aim at a 'continuous presentation of our shame'. A conscience that is 
halten, wehrte sich in ihm die freiheitsdurstige Seele noch einmal. Daß ich mein Potpourri des 
Schönen hätte rechtfertigen müssen, war mir schon klar. Am besten mit solchen Geständnissen: 
Ich verschließe mich Übeln, an deren Behebung ich nicht mitwirken kann. Ich habe lernen 
müssen wegzuschauen. Ich habe mehrere Zufluchtswinkel, in die sich mein Blick sofort flüchtet, 
wenn mir der Bildschirm die Welt als eine unerträgliche vorführt. Ich finde, meine Reaktion sei 
verhältnismäßig. Unerträgliches muß ich nicht ertragen können. Auch im Wegdenken bin ich 
geübt. An der Disqualifizierung des Verdrängens kann ich mich nicht beteiligen. Freud rät, 
Verdrängen durch Verurteilung zu ersetzen. Aber soweit ich sehe, gilt seine Aufklärungsarbeit 
nicht dem Verhalten des Menschen als Zeitgenossen, sondern dem vom eigenen Triebschicksal 
Geschüttelten. Ich käme ohne Wegschauen und Wegdenken nicht durch den Tag und schon gar 
nicht durch die Nacht. Ich bin auch nicht der Ansicht, daß alles gesühnt werden muß. In einer 
Weit, in der alles gesühnt werden müsste, könnte ich nicht leben. ' Walser, Martin, 1998. 
Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede. Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 October 1998 
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retreating into the private sphere does not have to meet the public. As we have 
seen above, such conscience addresses the question of guilt never on a 
'political' level. To Moshe Zuckermann it is deeply alarming because of its 
disposing and compensating functions, because it will not disturb the 'public 
peace'. Moshe Zuckermann points out that 
a conscience which troubles the individual personally for 
objectively committed crimes, but which does not objectify itself in 
so far as it makes the actual torment into a subject of a controversy 
reaching beyond the personal 
- 
thus by force public 
- 
such a 
conscience holds something ideological. 38' 
The National Socialist crimes, the murder of the European Jewry exceed 
the private sphere by far 
- 
most definitely the private conscience of a German 
who belongs to the generation of perpetrators. This is a crime against humanity 
committed in the collective name of Germany; on a political level, also Walser 
has to accept a co-responsibility which needs to be addressed in collective 
attempts of coming-to-terms and remembering. 
From mid-October 1998, Germany's major newspapers, magazines, radio 
and TV stations discussed at length the possibilities and impossibilities of 
public(ly imposed) memory. In that discussion the phrase of 'collective guilt' 
came to play, yet again, an important role. Although the principle seems so 
clear, more than half a century after the end of the war any allocation of 
responsibility and guilt were proven yet again to be all but simple. 
Jaspers demands that 'we must restore the readiness to think'382 and that 
'we talk aloud to each other'383. According to Jaspers, it is silence 'to which we 
381 Zuckermann, Moshe, 1999. Gedenken und Kulturindustrie (Berlin: Philo), p. 16 
382 Jaspers, Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 
6 
383 ibid., p. 7 
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incline and which constitute(s) our great danger' for 'it becomes self- 
deception". Walser emphasises the private, personal conscience: 
A good conscience is none. With one's conscience one is alone. 
Public acts of conscience for that reason are in danger of 
becoming symbolic. And nothing is more alien to the conscience 
than symbolism, how ever well meant. This "continuous retreat into 
oneself, cannot be re-presented. It has to remain "inner 
loneliness". 3115 
Walser stresses the importance of freedom for his inner conscience. A 
fine balance between personal and public acts of memory and addressing the 
issues at stake is needed so that the private, individual is not permitted to hide 
behind the judgement of its own safe conscience. Why does Walser so urgently 
insist that with the re-unification Germany had fulfilled its 'duty' of 
remembrance? 
Walser cannot believe the reports of a serious newspaper that sausage- 
stands are set up in front of burning hostels of asylum seekers; it is beyond his 
imagination that 'one can hear hostile things about foreigners at drinking and 
pub meetings'. In Walser we find the very phenomenon Jaspers feared and 
warned against: self-deception and evasion. Yet Walser claims to be addressing 
the 'politics of conscience of this epoch'. The imbalance of the re-unification 
384 ibid., p. 10/11 
385 Ein gutes Gewissen ist keins. Mit seinem Gewissen ist jeder allein. Öffentliche 
Gewissensakte sind deshalb in Gefahr symbolisch zu werden. Und nichts ist dem Gewissen 
fremder als Symbolik, wie gut sie auch gemeint sei. Diese durchgängige Zurückgezogenheit in 
sich selbst" ist nicht repräsentierbar. Sie muß 
innerliche Einsamkeit" bleiben. ' Walser, Martin, 
1998. Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede. Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 October 
1998 
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treaty seemed to stir Walser's conscience; he asks for the 'idealist Rupp"" to be 
pardoned. 
Everybody knows our historical burden, the eternal shame, there is 
not one day when we are not blamed for it. 
... 
My nothing-less-than 
trivial reaction to such pain-creating sentences: I hope that what is 
said so bluntly is not true. And to completely expose myself: quite 
simply I cannot believe these pain-creating sentences, which I can 
neither support nor deny. It goes, so to speak, beyond my moral- 
political fantasy to believe that what is being said is true. To me 
comes this un-provable premonition: those who come up with 
these sentences want to hurt us, because they think we deserve it. 
They probably want to hurt themselves as well. But also us. All. 
With one exception: all Germans. ' 
Why has the last decade 
- 
more than ever before 
- 
been so concerned 
with the re-presentations of the past? Walser wants to know what the motivation 
behind the constant reproaches with shame are. Private conscience is 
acceptable but the recognition of a co-responsibility for a committed crime is 
unbearable. Walser knows that the reported and televised atrocities and horrors 
are indeed true and real. But to speak of it is unbearable for him; Walser learnt 
`not to look'. Despite all assertion of a private conscience, Walser knows that 
386 Rainer Rupp was found guilty of espionage for the GDR after the re-unification and sent to 
prison for 12 years despite an agreement in the unification-treaty to exempt spies of both sides 
from persecution. But in 1992, a law was passed in parliament which declared the West spies 
exempt from punishment and rendered the Eastern spies free to criminal prosecution. 
387 
, 
Jeder kennt unsere geschichtliche Last, die unvergängliche Schande, kein Tag, an dem sie 
uns nicht vorgehalten wird. 
... 
Meine nichts als triviale Reaktion auf solche schmerzhaften Sätze: 
Hoffentlich stimmt's nicht, was uns da so kraß gesagt wird. Und um mich vollends zu entblößen: 
Ich kann diese Schmerz erzeugenden Sätze, die ich weder unterstützen noch bestreiten kann, 
einfach nicht glauben. Es geht sozusagen über meine moralisch-politische Phantasie hinaus, 
das, was da gesagt wird, für wahr zu halten. Bei mir stellt sich eine unbeweisbare Ahnung ein: 
Die, die mit solchen Sätzen auftreten, wollen uns weh tun, weil sie finden, wir haben das 
verdient. Wahrscheinlich wollen sie auch sich selber verletzen. Aber uns auch. Alle. Eine 
Einschränkung: alle Deutschen. ' Walser, Martin, 1998. Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer 
Sonntagsrede. Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 October 1998 
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there are different (moral) concepts and values at stake that far exceed the 
individual sphere: he wants to be allowed to look away. 
It is as if fifty years of history never took place. Yet, the repulsion and 
fending-off of all accusations of guilt seem to have undergone a transformation. 
When Walser claims to have learned 'to look away 
... 
when the screen presents 
the world 
... 
as an unbearable one', when he claims that the unbearable he did 
'not have to be able to bear', when he states that he could not 'participate in the 
disqualification of suppression', he falls back onto the very pattern that Jaspers 
had warned of: the repulsion of the guilt-accusation. The emphasis has shifted 
ever so slightly, however: prevailing now is the repulsion of the accusation of an 
incorrect and insubstantial memory process and working-through. 
The monstrous and horrific is unbearable but that cannot mean that one 
can pass over the unbearable with silence, that we no longer have to believe the 
'pain-creating' words. At stake here is no longer the ability to comprehend the 
incomprehensible, the unutterable; for Walser the possibility and the constant 
threat of a relapse into barbarism do not exist and they do not have to be 
overcome. Moshe Zuckermann leaves us to consider the following questions: 
'What were we to do if the unbearable became the real, and not just intellectual 
manipulation? What if the criticism manifested itself to be true anguish and not 
an attempt 'to hurt us'? What if we really deserved to be criticised because we 
'learnt' to 'look away'? What if looking-away has become the accepted 
ideology? '
Walser does not want to watch the horrors he is presented with. Only for 
a short time Jaspers allows for 'a proudly silent bearing' as 'a justified mask, to 
catch one's breath and clear one's head behind it"9 At some point, 
388 Zuckermann, Moshe, 1999. Gedenken und Kulturindustrie (Berlin: Philo), p. 14/15 
389 Jaspers, Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 
11 
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overwhelmed by the powerful images of war and terror, we have all looked 
away. But where would it leave us were we simply to follow Walser's 
presentiment, the suspicion 'that everything is much nicer as it is spoken about. 
Everything is more beautiful than one can say so far. 'm? 
More than thirty years before Walser, Adorno reflected on the dialectical 
status of culture after Auschwitz in his 'Negative Dialectics': 
Whoever pleads for the maintenance of this radically culpable and 
shabby culture becomes its accomplice, while the man who says 
no to culture is directly furthering the barbarism which our culture 
showed itself to be. Not even silence gets us out of the circle. In 
silence we simply use the state of objective truth to rationalise our 
subjective incapacity, once more degrading truth into a lie. ' 
We need to remember the victims 'in their status of being victims', Moshe 
Zuckermann demands. 392 By addressing and working-through the issues at 
stake, through constant reiteration of the questions, we work against the 
circumstances which create and allow for victims. This is what Adorno meant 
when he famously asked the question 'What does it mean: "coming-to-terms" 
with the past? ': 
A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon 
unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that 
Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will 
happen. " 
Adorno here presumes that the social conditions that made Auschwitz 
possible are by no means overcome and that a relapse into barbarism is 
390 ibid. 
391 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 367 
392 ibid., p. 14 
393 Adorno, Theodor W., 2000. Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge), p. 365 
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historically and socially not overcome. The continuous working-through of this 
constant threat becomes the categorical imperative because a tendency to 
relapse into barbarism has to be understood not as something utterly alien to 
humanity but as something utterly familiar and intimate 
- 
that can be nurtured 
under captivity and under certain historical and political conditions. To speak 
with Adomo's categorical imperative and against Walser's attempt to fend-off 
public memory processes, I believe, with Jaspers, that it is essential for us 
- 
being collectively liable 
- 
to remember. 
Walser's contribution to the ongoing debate will not help future 
generations to surmount the problem of remembering the deed and to mourn the 
dead. How are we going to approach the problematic paradox of forgetting and 
remembering now? How are we to remember if there is no 'true' memory left? 
What do we remember then? Will we encounter a massive de-politicisation of 
the event and its historical context, as some historians want us to believe? 394 IS 
something remembered that stands isolated and erratic as a horrific event in 
history? 3" 
Walser talks about the 'banality of good'; he invents an abundance of 
combat words and slogans from 'moral weapon', at 'moral gunpoint' to 'soldiers 
of opinion'. Walser's demand for 'normality' entails a notion of the conscience 
where subjective self-awareness becomes the criterion for truth: 
Within each of us a decision is made to participate in the memory 
of Auschwitz. The conscience is free, or it is none. '' 
394 Frei, Norbert & Steinbacher, Sybille (eds. ), 2001. Beschweigen und Bekennen: Die deutsche 
Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag) et. at. 
ass The Federal Government justified its intervention in the Kosovo with a referral to 'Auschwitz'. 
ass in jedem von uns entscheidet sich, wie er an der Erinnerung an Auschwitz teilnehmen kann. 
Das Gewissen ist frei, oder es ist keins. ' Walser, Martin, 1998. Erfahrungen beim Verfassen 
einer Sonntagsrede. Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 October 1998 
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Hannah Arendt reminds us that such a notion must be utterly inadequate 
if those who remember Auschwitz as perpetrators do not have a bad 
conscience. It is precisely then that the subjective, guilt-ridden conscience 
comes close to the Jaspers' criteria of self-deception and evasion. 
Walser's speech was met with general approval by his German audience. 
Ignatz Bubis accused him of 'spiritual arson' and of wanting to sanction the 
suppression intellectually'. In the public dispute that followed, Martin Walser 
claimed that he himself had long been working through and attempting to come 
to terms with the issues at stake before Bubis turned to them. Bubis replied that 
he 
could not have lived. I could not have gone on living had I engaged 
myself with it earlier. 
There can never be a symmetry between the suppressed memories of 
the generation of perpetrators and their attempts of coming-to-terms and the 
haunting memories of the survivors. What is at stake here is ultimately 
irreconcilable. Germany's national attempts of coming-to-terms need to address 
and admonish the deed; Walser had no right to question Bubis' attempts of 
remembering. Any attempts of thinking and working-through the questions of the 
Shoah cannot be easy. To address the role and the involvement of the 
perpetrators and the perpetrating nation will demand `full frankness and 
honesty', as Jaspers insists. ' The victims' memories are something intrinsically 
397 Geistige Brandstiftung: Bubis wendet sich gegen Walser. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 
November 1998 
398 Ich hätte nicht leben können. Ich hätte nicht weiterleben könne, wenn ich mich damit früher 
beschäftigt hätte. ' Walser, Martin & Bubis, Ignatz, 1998. Wir brauchen eine neue Sprache für die 
Erinnerung. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 290,14 December 1998 
399 Jaspers, Karl, 2001. The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press), p. 
10 
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different; the personal experience of terror, death and destruction needs to find 
its own very different way of coming-to-terms. Walser's and Bubis' debate, 
however, has clearly marked the problematics of a communication between the 
victims and the generation of perpetrators. As such Walser's and Bubis' dispute 
contributed to the debate on the (im)possibilities of public memory. 
Klaus von Dohnanyi, politician, essentially sanctioned Walser's speech by 
arguing that Bubis might have misunderstood Walser. Dohnanyi writes: 
Certainly the Jewish citizens in Germany would have to ask 
themselves whether they would have acted so much more 
courageously than most of the other Germans, if, after 1933, "only" 
the handicapped, the homosexuals or the gypsies were deported 
to the extermination camps. Everyone should attempt to answer 
this question honestly for oneself. 400 
How could Dohnanyi possibly ask the survivor to 'sympathise' with his 
perpetrator? Moshe Zuckermann demands to know what could possibly be 
achieved if the victim was to be transported into the status of the perpetrator? 401 
What would I have done? 
- 
Dohnanyi's question can quite simply not be 
answered. The Germans, the generation of perpetrators, Dohnanyi's claims, 'we 
are all vulnerable'402. Where are the Germans hurt and wounded? In their pride? 
To be addressing the question of guilt is painful; and it creates plenty of shame. 
400 Allerdings müßten sich natürlich auch die jüdischen Bürger in Deutschland fragen, ob sie 
sich so sehr viel tapferer als die meisten anderen Deutschen verhalten hätten, wenn nach 1933 
nur" 
die Behinderten, die Homosexuellen oder die Roma in die Vernichtungslager geschleppt 
worden wären. Ein jeder sollte versuchen, diese Frage für sich selbst ehrlich zu beantworten. '
Dohnanyi, Klaus, 1998. Eine Friedensrede: Martin Walsers notwendige Klage. Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 1998 
401 Zuckermann, Moshe, 1999. Gedenken und Kulturindustrie (Berlin: Philo), p. 26 
402 Dohnanyi, Klaus, 1998. Wir sind alle verletzbar. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 
November 1998 
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But to demand of the survivor to understand this 'vulnerabiliy' would trivialise the 
victim's experience and ask for the sheer impossible. 
Ultimately both Walser and Bubis have been expressing their personal 
reactions to the problematics of remembering. However, what makes their 
dispute important are the resonances and the public reactions with which their 
arguments were met. Their dispute achieved historical significance because it 
was held at a moment of radical change: the generation of victims and 
perpetrators was slowly beginning to disappear and both were prominent 
representatives of that generation; Berlin had just become the old and new 
capital of the re-united Germany; and, after more than 20 years, a new political 
discourse began to emerge with the new coalition government of SPD and 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. The new political constellations also indicated a re- 
formulation of the conventional discourse of 'coming-to-terms' with the past. 
What is intriguing is the fact that the first generation, who had initiated the fierce 
debates and confrontations in the late 1960s and in the beginnings of the 1970s 
and who had just found their way into the government, was 'conspicuously 
silent', as Moshe Zuckermann asserts403. The public debate, initiated by Walser 
and Bubis, was essentially a discourse between the generation of perpetrators 
(the grandparents) and the second generation (the grandchildren). The former 
rebellious generation was now in power and could have been largely 
responsible for the re-shaping of the new discourse and the re-thinking of the 
questions of the Shoah in Germany. The biological line is ultimately coming 
closer which might explain in parts the explosive nature and the vehement 
confrontation between the representatives of the Walser and Bubis generation. 
The first generation's attitude of restraint I can only explain as an attempt to 
establish a silence and 'to draw the bottom line' (Schlußstrich). 
403 Zuckermann, Moshe, 1999. Gedenken und Kulturindustrie (Berlin: Philo), p. 26 
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Epilogue 
In 'What does it mean: coming-to-terms with the past? ', Adorno concludes 
that the past can only be mastered when 'its causes in the present are 
overcome". Adorno always insisted that the categorical imperative of post- 
Auschwitz society is to prevent the recurrence of Auschwitz. By transforming the 
present, the past could be redeemed through a constant and symbolic 
displacement of the past into the present. Perhaps it is the paradigm of the 
uniqueness of the Shoah that guarantees its memory and that, thus, enables the 
memory of the historically true and concrete. It is precisely this absolute position 
that, at the same time, demands the institution of a continual, adequate thinking 
in order to prevent its possible recurrence. Absolutely indispensable is the 
thinking of the questions of the Shoah. However painful and shame-creating it 
might seem, to keep alive any feeling of 'eternal guilt', Walser ultimately asked 
for the work of remembrance to be stalled. 
The complex process of regaining a German identity has been inscribed 
in the post-Holocaust discourse in Germany. Walser demanded 'normality', he 
needed to say that the Germans are a normal society now. That Germany 'is 
someone' again is sufficiently manifested in its current political and economic 
powers and strength. Especially since the re-unification, Germans seem to 
stress *a positive feeling of a new-old nationalism. It is disconcerting to discover 
that a nation that committed such terrible crimes only such a short time ago, 
could quickly gain so much power, strength and international recognition. The 
recent debates have made clear that Germany's new political constellations 
seem to be incompatible with the continuous awareness of past guilt and 
404 Adorno, Theodor W., 1997. Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit? '. »Ob nach 
Auschwitz noch sich leben lasse«: Ein philosophisches Lesebuch (Leipzig: Suhrkamp) 
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shame. What does 'normal' mean? Moreover, what does 'normality' mean for a 
country that is responsible for the Shoah? What can one conclude from the fact 
that Germany discussed the object of the Holocaust Memorial for over a decade 
but moved to Berlin and into the 'Reichstag' without much hesitation? 405 
But as the most recent debates in Germany have proved, the more often 
the status of 'normality' is praised, the more apparent it becomes that something 
utterly insurmountable is prevailing. During the Historian's Dispute in 1986, the 
phrase of 'the past that did not want to pass' was coined. In the late 1990s, this 
was followed by a looking-away from the unpleasant representations of that very 
past. Moshe Zuckermann remins us that the state of the world is worrying, so 
vigilance is important and essential. 
Martin Walser claimed that he and the German people had 'suffered' 
enough; the Germans had atoned for their past and with the German re- 
unification the phase of atonement was now over. Walser describes the design 
for the Holocaust Memorial as 'the constant representation of our shame' or 'the 
concreting of the centre of the capital with a football-pitch sized nightmare' or 
'the monumentalisation of shame'. Subliminally, however, Walser recognises 
that there is something that needs to be remembered, that needs to be 
addressed and worked through. It is alarming that Walser (or anybody) can say 
these things publicly and that his arguments find such a strong resonance. For 
this reason the memorial needs to be built; it needs to admonish 
- 
the nation 
and humanity in general 
- 
permanently and to point to the fact the past can only 
be mastered when 'its causes in the present are overcome'406. 
Perhaps intrinsic to every memorial process is the suspicion of symbolic 
exoneration. During the lengthy discussions on the (im)possibilities of the 
405 Zuckermann, Moshe, 1999. Gedenken und Kulturindustrie (Berlin: Philo), p. 126 
406 Adorno, Theodor W., 1997. Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit? '. »Ob nach 
Auschwitz noch sich leben lasse«: Ein philosophisches Lesebuch (Leipzig: Suhrkamp) 
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planned Holocaust Memorial, the major concerns were named as follows: the 
Holocaust Memorial as such implied a demand for a conclusion to the workings- 
through and the attempts of coming-to-terms; it was explicitly claimed that the 
quest for an adequately aesthetic solution seemed pointless and therefore, that 
the actual erection of a monument seemed questionable. As the debate 
between Martin Walser and Ignatz Bubis has made clear, in the country of 
perpetrators where the 'inability to mourn' seems to have stalled on the process 
of memory as such, any kind of social consensus in relation to the horrors of the 
National Socialist regime and society's involvement in the guilt complex has to 
be questioned fundamentally. Any re-presentation of memory needs to keep the 
duality and complexity of such remembering process alive. The abyss between 
the memories of the respective perspectives of victim and perpetrator cannot be 
bridged. 
The erection of a national monument and public ceremonies could imply 
the instruction and institution of politically shaped memory. But as the last 
decade has proven, there is an increasing will and need to remember. Even 
after more than half a century, any notion of identity within the German nation is 
uniquely problematic. As I have argued, the re-united Germany has formed its 
basis of national self-esteem on an ambivalent pride in its present as the utter 
rejection of the past. The remembrance of its horrific past is hugely self-serving 
in so far as its desire to form a national identity is based on a strict opposition to 
its past. Out of this understanding grew the important decision for the erection of 
a national 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe'. Only within this frame of 
reference was the decision for the Eisenman design over the Weinmiller project 
possible. 
The erection of a (national) work of art is perhaps an important attempt to 
address some of the questions, and possibly to provide some answers. The 
decision for such a national memorial is an attempt to address the problematic 
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of coming-to-terms with the event of the Shoah and the nation's involvement as 
perpetrators. For that reason, memory beyond the biographical limits is essential 
in the country of the perpetrators. The Holocaust Memorial on its own cannot 
achieve memory; it is not a memory-forming entity. Only a concrete admonishing 
remembrance of the deeds can achieve a linking of memory with vigilance. No 
aesthetic form can fulfil the function of remembering independently of and be 
unaffected by the knowledge of that which is to be remembered. Knowledge, as 
it is manifested in libraries, archives and research institutes, remains a vital 
contributing factor to the remembrance process. However, it does not 
necessarily demand the combination of a memorial and a research centre. The 
growing 'Holocaust Industry'407, as, for example, in the form of the Holocaust 
Memorial Museum in Washington, seems to shift the emphasis onto the 
particular and the individual remembrance. Perhaps such forms of remembering 
that aim in general at the particular, will become the focus for future forms of 
remembering, when the generations of victims and perpetrators will no longer be 
there. As the discussion of the various designs for a 'Memorial to the murdered 
Jews of Europe' has shown, in principle there can be a re-presentation of that 
which is and needs to be remembered. The perspective can never be universal 
but a form of remembrance can be possible that leads beyond the particular. For 
that reason, I want to stress the importance of a central, national 'Memorial to 
the murdered Jews of Europe' in Germany because it provides the politically 
necessary space for a collective statement of memory that does not have to be 
static or ephemeral. 
To remember the Shoah in Germany also means to be able to form a 
solidarity with the historical victims for their own sakes, as Walter Benjamin 
reminds us in his second thesis 'On the Concept of History': 
ARV 
'"' see for example Surmann, Rolf (ed. ), 2001. Das Finkelstein-Alibi: »Holocaust-Industrie« und 
Tätergesellschaft (Köln: PapyRossa) 
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The past carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to 
redemption. There is a secret agreement between past 
generations and present ones. Our coming was expected on earth. 
Like every generation that precedes us, we have been endowed 
with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a 
claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply. 
Adorno's categorical imperative demands a memory of the victims in the 
country of perpetrators by forming a respectful link to the historical victim409. This 
respect is shown by the current German nation, a community that itself is not 
guilty but has a blood and/or political relation to the perpetrators. The 
acceptance of responsibility is based on the understanding of the moral-political 
context. 
Benjamin writes in his sixth thesis 'On the Concept of History': 
The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer, he comes as the 
subduer of Antichrist. Only that historian will have the gift of 
fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that 
even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this 
enemy has not ceased to be victorious. 410 
Benjamin's hope, I think, can ultimately only be explained and understood 
in theological terms: 'the past carries with it a temporal index by which it is 
referred to redemption. '41 Redemption does not figure in consequence, not in 
the final fulfilment and not as a result of worldly history, but as the abrupt break- 
off of the catastrophic world history. Benjamin's concept of 'Eingedenken', rather 
Illuminations, 1999, p. 24516 
409 There is one design in Berlin which overwhelmingly acknowledges the void left behind by the 
annihilation of the European Jews: Daniel Libeskind's annex to the Jewish museum. What is so 
phenomenal about this building is, that in its construction it convincingly and overpoweringly 
addresses the emptiness, the void left behind. 
410 Illuminations, 1999, p. 247 
411 Illuminations, 1999, p. 245 
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than 'Erkenntnis' (cognition/knowledge), provides the most necessary inner 
context of past, present and future, especially with regard to the problematic 
German memory process. The Benjaminian concept of 'Eingedenken' offers the 
German attempts at remembering the possibility of working-through and coming- 
to-terms with their role as perpetrators in history; then it becomes the concern of 
the present and remains an obligation for the future. Regarding the present 
political statement of a national 'Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe', it is 
its own past which Germany, the country of the perpetrators, needs to recognise 
when contemplating the future of a re-united state. 
The hope that we have to hold onto is the 'expression of a longing, a 
longing that the murderer might not be triumphant over the innocent victim'412. 
Germany's powers are fully restored; it is a strong, prosperous, re-united and 
internationally recognised country. How much more 'normality' could possibly be 
asked for in view of the crimes that were committed in its name just over half a 
century ago? 
However, it is in Gesine Weinmiller's design for the 'Memorial to the 
murdered Jews of Europe' that the notion of 'Eingedenken' in the Benjaminian 
understanding could find its re-presentation. Gesine Weinmiller's design alludes 
to the same perspective with which Benjamin's Angel of History looks upon 
history. The Angel of History flies against time, carried by the wish to heal 
history, to pace together the debris, to waken the dead. It is the Angel's 
aesthetic project to remove all debris from this world. To me, the Angel of 
History resembles Benjamin's mourning historiographer who opens up the 
'continuum of history' because 'the work of the past for him is not closed'413. The 
412 
, 
Ausdruck einer Sehnsucht, einer Sehnsucht danach, daß der Mörder nicht über das 
unschuldige Opfer triumphieren möge. ' Horkheimer, Max, 1970. Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz 
Anderen (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag), p. 62 
413 Das Werk der Vergangenheit ist ihm nicht abgeschlossen. ' GS II, 2, p. 477 
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Angel surmounts the 'inability to mourn' through a continuous effort of bearing 
witness; he recognises humanity's catastrophe and yet, the Angel allows for a 
past connection with a changed present and an open future. In the Angel's gaze 
lies the hope for redemption of the victims and as such it is a promise to the 
viewer. 
As a visitor to Gesine Weinmiller's memorial site, we are, like the Angel of 
History, overlooking a field of ruins. Like the Angel of History, we cannot mend, 
we cannot heal, we have to stare in shock and horror. Only from a certain 
viewpoint, from a definite angle, only in a certain constellation the field of 
destruction becomes, in a very abstract way, a unity (again). The contours are 
blurred and the outlines obscured. Yet in this illusive, brief terrifying moment in 
time one comes as close as humanly possible to understanding. Here is where 
the whole truth, the sheer horrifying truth of the elusive past, seems to be falling 
into place. Flash-like, it all falls together into the overall picture, as Walter 
Benjamin reminds us: 
The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the 
instant when it can be recognised and is never seen again. 
... 
To 
articulate the past historically 
... 
means to seize hold of a memory 
as it flashes up at a moment of danger. 414 
- 
and the flash of the past becomes a present concern. Juliet Steyn, 
interpreting the poem 'Speak, You Also' by Paul Celan, draws the conclusion 
that 
the poem offers no consolation, simply the recognition that there 
are some things which have yet to be said. 415 
414 Illuminations, p. 247 
415 Steyn, Juliet, 1999. The Jew: Assumptions of Identity (London: Cassell), p. 185/6 
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Gesine Weinmiller's Holocaust Memorial design does not know of 
consolation; it bears witness to the impossibility, yet necessity to bear witness; it 
does not provide answers but points out that 'there are some things which have 
yet to be said'. Her design re-presents and challenges the dialectic at work here 
between presence and absence, between remembrance and forgetting. It offers 
a deep insight into the human character by exposing its profound and despairing 
vulnerability. As such, it is a monument of and to the future. 
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Figure 2: Winning design of the first competition by Christine Jackob-Marks 
Image taken from HEIMROD, Ute, SCHLUSCHE, Günter & SEFRENS, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Das 
Denkmal? Der Denkmalstreit: Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas 
- Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo), p. 275 
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Chronology" 
30 January 1989 First proposal of the citizens' action group 'Perspektive 
Berlin', under the chairmanship of the publicist Lea Rosh, to 
erect a memorial for the murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin 
on the site of the former Gestapo headquarters Prinz- 
Albrecht-Palais. 
7 November 1989 Founding of the 'Patrons for the Erection of a Memorial for 
the murdered Jews of Europe', under the chairmanship of 
Lea Rosh and Edzard Reuter (Daimler-Benz AG), Eberhard 
Jäckel (historian), Siegfried Lenz (author), Kurt Masur 
(conductor) et al. as members of the board of trustees. 
10 Nov. 1989 The GDR opens the boarders to West Germany and Berlin. 
Jan. /Feb. 1990 Proposal of the Patrons to erect the memorial on the site of 
the former Reich's chancellor's office in the centre of Berlin, 
after the Prinz-Albrecht-site had been rejected as not 
suitable for a memorial. 
5 May 1990 The Foreign Ministers of both German states and the four 
victorious powers of World War II (U. S. A., Soviet Union, 
France and Great Britain) 
- 
the 'Two plus Four Talks' 
- 
meet 
for their fist conference to discuss the political implications of 
a German re-unification for other countries. 
18 May 1990 Theo Waigel, Minister of Finance for the FRG, and his East 
German colleague sign the Inter-State Treaty 
(Staatsvertrag) between the German Democratic Republic 
and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
1 July 1990 The currency, economic and social union between the FRG 
and the GDR comes into force. 
17 July 1990 The `Two plus Four Talks' of the foreign ministers in Paris 
guarantee the West boarder of Poland. 
416 See also Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas: Gesellschaftliche Diskussion und 
parlamentarisches Verfahren, 1999 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, Referat für 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit), pp. 21 ff. and Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Seferens, Horst (eds. ), 
1999. Der Denkmalstreit 
- 
das Denkmal? Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten 
Juden Europas': Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo Verlag), pp. 27 ff. 
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23 August 1990 
3 October 1990 
4 October 1990 
14 Nov. 1990 
2 December 1990 
25 February 1991 
20 June 1991 
5 September 1991 
October 1991 
January 1992 
20 January 1992 
24 April 1992 
The GDR Volkskammer (People's Chamber) decides to 
accede to the legislative of the FRG on 3 October. 
The GDR joins the FRG. The separation of both states 
comes to an end after 41 years. 
First joint sitting of the Bundestag (Parliament) with East and 
West German members of parliament. 
The German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and 
his Polish colleague sign a treaty that establishes the Oder- 
Neisse Line as the Polish West boarder. 
The CDU/CSUIFDP coalition wins the first general elections 
in the united Germany. 
The Warsaw Pact is dissolved. 
The German Parliament decides on Berlin as future seat of 
government. 
Berlin's mayor Walter Momper gives the central council of 
the German Sinti and Roma the assurance that when 
deciding on a monument to the victims of the Holocaust 
Jews, Sinti and Roma will equally be taken into account. In 
March the Council of Sinti and Roma had already made a 
petition at the Senate of Berlin for a memorial and a site of 
commemoration for the murdered Sinti and Roma. 
Opening of the memorial 'Station Grunewald' by Karol 
Broniatowsky (Berlin-Wilmersdorf). 
Founding of the foundation 'Topography of Terror' (Prinz- 
Albrecht-Site) to impart the 'historical experience of National 
Socialism to future generations""'. 
Inauguration of the commemoration and educational site 
'House of the Wannsee-Conference' (Berlin-Zehlendorf). 
Agreement between the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
the Senate's Administration for Cultural Matters and the 
Patrons on the erection of 'a monument for the murdered 
417 Heimrod, Ute, Schlusche, Günter & Seferens, Horst (eds. ), 1999. Der Denkmalstreit 
- 
das 
Denkmal? Die Debatte um das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas": Eine 
Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo Verlag), p. 29 
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Jews of Europe' and on its site of the former Reich's 
chancellery. 
May 1992 Escalation of the public dispute between the Central Council 
of German Sinti and Roma and the Central Council of Jews 
in Germany after the press had reported that the Federal 
Government, Berlin and the Patrons had agreed on an 
exclusive dedication of the monument to the Jewish victims 
of National Socialism. 
July 1992 The Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Senate's 
Administration for Cultural Matters agree to erect two 
separate monuments for the Jewish victims of National 
Socialism and for the victims of the Sinti and Roma. 
September 1992 Arson attack on one of the barracks of the former 
concentration camp Saschenhausen (Oranienburg). 
20 Sept. 1992 Ignatz Bubis is elected as chairman of the Central 
Committee of Jews in Germany. 
13 October 1992 The Berlin Senate decides on the erection of a memorial for 
the murdered Jews of Europe and on the erection of an 
independent memorial for the murdered Sinti and Roma on 
a different site. 
June 1993 Opening of the several-part monument 'Places of 
Remembrance in the Bavarian Quarters' by Renata Stih and 
Frieder Schnock (Berlin-Schöneberg) 
14 November 1993 Re-dedication of the 'Neue Wache' (New Guardhouse, 
Berlin centre) into the central site of commemoration of the 
Federal Republic of Germany for the victims of war and 
tyranny (enlarged replica of the sculpture 'Mother with dead 
Son' by Käthe Koliwitz). After public controversies a plaque 
is added to the dedication naming the various groups of 
victims who should be commemorated. 
22 March 1994 Steven Spielberg's film 'Schindler's List' is awarded 7 
Oscars and becomes the most successful film of the year. 
April 1994 The announcement of the first open artistic competition for 
the presentation of a memorial; the prize is to be offered by 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the city (Land) Berlin and 
the Patrons. 
May 1994 Opening of the memorial of the concentration camp Sonnenallee by Norbert Radermacher (Berlin-Neukölln) 
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8 September 1994 The Allies leave Berlin; the official presence of the three 
Western powers (U. S. A., France and Great Britain) since 
1945 comes to an end. 
16 October 1994 With the narrowest of victories at the general elections 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl secures yet another term in office. 
3 December 1994 Opening of the concentration camp Columbia-House by 
Georg Seibert (Berlin-Tempelhof). 
March 1995 Opening of the Exhibition War of Destruction: The Crimes 
of the Wehrmacht 1941-1944' 
15/16 March 1995 The competition produces two first prizes: Simon Ungers (KÖINNew York) and the design of Jackob-Marks/Rolfe (Berlin)- a tilted, sloping slab onto which the names of all 
known murdered Jews should be engraved - favoured by 
the federal state Berlin and the patrons. The Federal 
Government and the Chairman of the Central Council of the 
Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, express strong 
reservations. The panel's decision provokes strong public 
criticism. 
20 March 1995 Opening of the memorial for the commemoration of the book 
burning of 10 May 1933 by Micha Ullman on Bebeiplatz (Berlin, centre). 
8 June 1995 Ignatz Bubis, chairman of the Central Council of the Jews in 
Germany, favours the design of Simon Ungers and declares 
himself against the award-winning design of Jackob-Marks. 
25 June 1995 After a controversial public discussion the three clients vote 
for the realisation of the Jackob-Marks's design. 
26 June 1995 The 'Initiative Gay's Monument' presents the memorandum 
'To remember the homosexual victims of National 
Socialism'; they demand their own monument for the group 
of victims. 
30 June 1995 The Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl declares himself 
against the realisation of the Jackob-Marks's design. The 
Federal Government issues the following statement: 'The 
Federal Government supports the erection of a memorial to 
the murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin. The Federal 
Government is in favour of a location in Berlin and 
establishes a plot of land for a memorial. It makes the 
planned contribution to the costs. However, the Federal 
Government does not support the design of Ms Jackob- 
Marks which is intended in the discussions. It thinks it 
necessary to continue the discussion about the design of the 
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memorial with the claim of reaching a broad consensus of all 
involved'. 48 
18 October 1995 Unveiling of the sculpture Women's Protest in the 
Rosenstraße' by Ingeborg Hunzinger (Berlin, centre). 
22 October 1995 The elections to the chamber of deputies lead to the 
formation of a coalition between the CDU and the SPD for 
the setting up of the Berlin Senate (Mayor Eberhard 
Diepgen). 
14 January 1996 In a speech before the German Parliament Israel's 
President of State, Ezer Weizmann, remembers the 
extermination of the European Jews by the Nazi Regime. 
27 January 1996 Initiated by the President of State, Roman Herzog, on the 
occasion of the anniversary of the liberation of the 
concentration camp of Auschwitz, for the first time in 
Germany a 'Memorial Day for the Victims of National 
Socialism' is observed. 
9 May 1996 The plenary meeting of the Parliament for the first time 
addresses in its debates the issue of a 'memorial to the 
murdered Jews of Europe'. Parliamentary debate over a 
motion put forward by the Social Democrats and the Green 
Party as to whether the Parliament should be involved in the 
debates surrounding the memorial; motions are forwarded to 
the Ältestenrat (all-party parliamentary committee assisting 
the President of the Bundestag) which then forms an 
'informal committee'. 
November 1996 To consolidate the budget, the Berlin Senate decides to 
postpone the building of the exhibition and documentation 
centre of the foundation `Topography of Terror' until after 
2000. The decision is rescinded after massive protests. 
Jan. to April 1997 Colloquiums in Berlin with controversial debates on the 
design and location of the memorial: 
" 10 January: Why does Germany need the memorial? 
418 ; Die Bundesregierung ist für die Errichtung eines Denkmals in Berlin für die ermordeten 
Juden Europas. Die Bundesregierung ist für den Standort in Berlin und stellt dort ein Grundstück 
zur Verfügung. Sie leistet den vorgesehenen Kostenbeitrag. Die Bundesregierung unterstützt 
aber nicht das in der Diskussion vorgesehene Modell von Frau Jackob-Marks. Sie hält es für 
erforderlich, die Diskussion über die Gestaltung des Mahnmals fortzuführen mit dem Ziel, einen 
breiten Konsens aller Beteiligten zu erreichen. ' Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas: 
Gesellschaftliche Diskussion und parlamentarisches Verfahren, 1999, p. 21 
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" 14 February: The location - its historical and political 
context, its future integration into the area. 
" 11 April: Typology and Iconography of the monument. 
March 1997 Daniel J. Goldhagen is awarded the `Prize of Democracy'. 
18 April 1997 As a result of the colloquiums the following was decided: 
" 
The monument would be built; the digging of the first 
turf would be, at the latest, on 27 January 1999. 
" 
The building costs remain unchanged at 15m. 
German Mark. 
" 
The responsible administration would again inspect 
the three most favourite potential sites for their 
suitability ('Ministergärten'; ground between 
Reichstag and the 'House of the Cultures of the 
World'; area close to the Foundation 'Topography of 
Terror'). 
" 
The competition should be closed, the presented 
designs should not be built. The commission is to 
organise a second level of the competition. 
17 June 1997 The three clients agree to a so-called procedure of selection 
with a new competition and to the implementation of a so- 
called 'Findungskommission' (body of experts responsible 
for the finding of participants). On the recommendation of 
the commission, the nine best contestants of the first 
competition and 16 other domestic and foreign artists were 
invited to present new designs; 18 of the invited promise 
their participation. 
20 June 1997 Opening of the monument 'Arcades' at the site of the former 
synagogue in the LindenstraRe (Berlin-Kreuzberg) by Zvi 
Hecker, Micha Ullman and Eyal Weizman. 
31 October 1997 First meeting of the 'Beurteilungskommission' (assessment 
commission) in Berlin where the submitted designs were 
presented by the 'Findungskommission'; from the 19 
submitted designs, 8 were short-listed. The artists or 
architects were asked to present their designs to the 
assessment commission. 
14/15 Nov. 1997 Second meeting of the assessment commission, 4 designs 
are taken into the selection of designs that could be 
realised: 
" 
Peter Eisenman/Richard Serra 
- 
suggested by the 
'Findungskommission'. 
" 
Jochen Gerz 
- 
favoured by the Patrons. 
" 
Daniel Libeskind 
- 
favoured by the Federal 
Government and the County Berlin. 
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" 
Gesine Weinmiller 
- 
suggested by the 
'Findungskommission'. 
From Nov. 1997 
26 January 1998 
27 January 1998 
16 February 1998 
Spring 1998 
22 May 1998 
2 June 1998 
17 July 1998 
Vivid debates in the media about the designs and the 
meaning and point of the monument in general. 
The preparations and clearance of the land planned as the 
memorial site, reveal remains of an air-raid shelter which 
belonged to the former villa of Joseph Goebbels, the 
National Socialist minister for propaganda. 
Unveiling of the memorial 'Platform 17' by the architects 
Nicolaus Hirsch, Wolfgang Lorch and Andrea Wandel at the 
station Grunewald to commemorate the Jews of Berlin who 
were transported to the death camps by the German 
Reichsbahn from here. 
Berlin's Mayor, Eberhard Diepgen, argues for a 
postponement since the current designs were 'intellectually 
and emotionally not convincing'. '"" Diepgen declares himself 
against further memorials to other groups of victims; the 
centre of Berlin should not turn into a 'Mahnmeile' (a 
collection of memorials the public can stroll along). 
The Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Helmut Kohl, on the 
other hand argues for a speedy erection of a memorial and 
evidently favours the Eisenman! Serra design which is to be 
amended (became widely known as Eisenman II). 
Meeting between Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Richard Serra 
and Peter Eisenman about their design and the specificities 
of the amendments. 
The artist Richard Serra withdraws from the competition for 
'personal and professional reasons'. 420 
The United Nations decide on the foundation of an 
International Court of Justice that is supposed to prosecute 
genocide and crimes against humanity in the whole world. 
419 Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas: Gesellschaftliche Diskussion und 
parlamentarisches Verfahren, 1999 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, Referat für 
Offentlichkeitsarbeit), p. 23 
420 Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas: Gesellschaftliche Diskussion und 
parlamentarisches Verfahren, 1999 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, Referat für 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit), p. 23 
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21 July 1998 The designated representative in cultural matters of the 
SPD, Michael Naumann, declares to renounce the memorial 
all together. 
4 August 1998 The artist Jochen Gerz withdraws from further proceedings. 
24 August 1998 Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Berlin's Mayor, Diepgen, agree 
that before the General Election at 27 September 1998 no 
decision regarding the memorial should be made. 
27 Sept. 1998 
11 October 1998 
In the general election for the 14th German Parliament, the 
coalition of CDU and FDP, which had been in power for the 
last 16 years, is not re-elected. Winner is the SPD which 
under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder goes into coalition with 
the Bündnis 90/Die Grüne. 
At the award of the 'Peace Prize of the German Book Trade' 
the author Martin Walser expresses strong criticism against 
the planned memorial. His speech prompted a huge major 
public controversy over the nature of public memory of the 
National Socialist past and the crimes committed. Ignatz 
Bubis accuses Walser of 'spiritual arson'. 
22 October 1998 Coalition agreement between the Social Democratic Party 
and the Alliance 90/Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen): 
'The Federal Government will take part in the broad and 
open discussion within society about the monument to the 
murdered Jews of Europe. The monument at the intended 
location will be decided on by the parliament. '421 
10 Nov. 1998 In the government statement Chancellor Schröder says that 
the decision on the monument will not be an executive one 
but 
- 
with consideration to the broad public debate 
- 
will be 
decided by the Parliament. 
13 Nov. 1998 Constitution of the committee for culture and media of the 
parliament which takes on the overall control of issues 
around the monument. 
18 Nov. 1998 Second meeting of the parliamentary committee for culture 
and media: the government's representative for cultural and 
media matters, Dr Naumann, addresses the possibilities of 
enlarging the monument project with educative elements. 
421 Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas: Gesellschaftliche Diskussion und 
parlamentarisches Verfahren, 1999 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, Referat für 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit), p. 24 
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24 Nov. 1998 Berlin Mayor, Eberhard Diepgen, rejects the Eisenman 
design. 
14 Dec. 1998 
17/19 Jan. 1999 
20 January 1999 
21 January 1999 
24 January 1999 
27 January 1999 
8 February 1999 
16 March 1999 
20 April 1999 
In a press conference, the government's representative in 
cultural and media matters, Michael Naumann, announces 
that he plans a completely re-designed Holocaust memorial 
for Berlin which consists of a museum, a library and 
research centre. 
The concept developed together with the architect Peter 
Eisenman (now known as Eisenman III) is presented to the 
public. Cost of realisation is estimated at a minimum of 
150m German Mark. Start of an intensive public debate on 
alternative contextual concept and legal issues with regard 
to the second, still ongoing competition. 
First meeting between the President of the Parliament, the 
chairmen of the parties represented in parliament, the 
Minister of State in cultural and media matters, Dr 
Naumann, and the chairman of the committee for culture 
and media about further procedures. The President of the 
Parliament asks for the legal issues to be clarified by the 
end of February 1999. 
Presentation of the four designs of the second level of 
competition and the concept Eisenman Ill. 
Opening of the new building for the Jewish Museum in the 
Lindenstraße by Daniel Libeskind still without exhibits. 
At the ceremony for the Memorial Day for the victims of 
National Socialism in Parliament, the President of State, 
Roman Herzog, demands a speedy decision from the 
monument dispute. 
Representatives of commemorative sites in Berlin and 
Brandenburg criticise, unanimously, the Naumann's 
'combination model'. 
A vote in the Berlin Senate on the memorial decides with the 
majority of, the CDU that the current procedure of 
competition should be stopped for the moment. 
Public session of the committee for culture and media in 
Berlin in the form of talks with directors and representatives 
of places of remembrance on the integration of the 
monument into the landscape of places of remembrance. 
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May 1999 Six group motions are put forward to the Parliament; one 
resents the realisation of the monument, another wants the 
decision to be handed over to the government. 
2 June 1999 The committee for culture and media calls upon the Federal 
Government with the support of the Social Democrats, the 
Alliance 90/ The Greens and 'the PDS (Party of Democratic 
Socialism) to declare the competition procedure to be 
finished. The Minister of State, Dr Naumann, follows the 
recommendation by writing to the other parties involved and 
artists on 8 June 1999. 
25 June 1999 Parliamentary debate and vote on the memorial. 
30 Sept. 1999 The author Günter Grass is awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Literature. 
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